IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA CHARLOTTE DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,)
Plaintiff,) 3:06CR96-1) DECEMBER 14, 2009
vs	
WILLIAM ROOSEVELT CLOUD,)
Defendant.) /

TRANSCRIPT OF SENTENCING HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE FRANK D. WHITNEY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

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PROCEEDINGS

(Court called to order at 9:00 a.m.)

THE COURT: Good morning. We're here in the sentencing of United States v. William Roosevelt Cloud. The Court notes Mr. Cloud is not in the courtroom yet, but the Court is going to proceed on an issue that has not been ruled on by the Court. Mr. Cloud doesn't need to be present during this ruling.

The defense filed on 27 October 2008 a motion to vacate conviction, or Judgment of Acquittal, on the money laundering charge, money laundering convictions, I think it's Counts Twenty-Seven through Thirty-Three, arguing that the Supreme Court's decision in *United States v. Sanchez*, 128 Supreme Court 2020, 2008, required to prove that the promotional money laundering transaction in fact involves profits of a specified unlawful activity rather than proceeds of a specified unlawful activity.

A threshold issue in this motion is timeliness. Recognizing that motions for Judgment of Acquittal must generally be brought within seven days after a guilty verdict, the defendant argues that Rule 45(b)(1)(B) is excusable, should be applied here because the Supreme Court case arose seven months after the jury verdict.

A new rule of construction announced by the Supreme Court must be given full retroactive effect in all

cases not yet final, still open on direct appeal. Of course, because of that, Mr. Cloud's intentions would be reviewable at the appellate level, even if not first addressed by this court. Principles of judicial economy would seem to favor scrutiny of these issues by this court who presided over the trial prior to a cold record review at the appellate level. So under the circumstances, the Court deems it proper to entertain this motion.

(Defendant Cloud enters courtroom.)

The Court also notes that Mr. Cloud is now in the courtroom.

Turning now to the merits of the defendant's motion, and for purposes of the record that motion is Document 185, a nearly identical argument to that advanced by defendant Cloud was recently rejected by the Fourth Circuit nonpublished decision, *United States v. Howard*, No. 87 -- excuse me, No. 07-4146, 2009, West Law 205649, Fourth Circuit, January 29th, 2009.

In that case the Court recognized the binding

Fourth Circuit precedent established that "proceeds," in

quotes, as used in 18 U.S.C. Section 1966 generally means

receipts, and that court cited United States -- that court

cited United States v. Singh, United States v. Caplinger,

United States v. Stewart. These all Fourth Circuit

decisions, and I'm not going to read their cites out for the

record, but note them as part of this Court's reasoning.

Furthermore, the Court held that the Santos decision did not upset this settled construction except in cases where an illegal gambling offense forms a predicate specified unlawful activity for the money laundering charge.

And this is because *Santos* was a plurality opinion, and so, quote, "the holding of the court may be viewed as that position taken by those members who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds," close quote.

That quote is taken from *Marks v. United States*, 430 U. S. 188, pinpoint cite page 193, which is a 1977 Supreme Court decision.

So in Santos it was Justice Stevens who concurred on the narrowest grounds. His holding was quite limited.

Quote, "The revenue generated by a gambling business that is used to pay the essentially expenses of operating that business is not 'proceeds' within the meaning of the money laundering statute." Close the larger quote there. Justice Stevens concurrence is found at 128 Supreme Court 2033.

Justice Stevens further explained that his

"Conclusion rests on conviction that Congress could not have
intended the perverse result that the dissents's rule would
produce it [the receipts] definition of proceeds were
applied to the operation of unlicensed gambling operation.
In other applications of the statute not involving such a

perverse result I," meaning Justice Stevens, "would presume that legislative history summarized by Justice Alito, [proceeds means receipts] reflects the intent of the enactment of Congress." That quote is found at page 2034, note 7, of Justice Stevens' concurrence.

Thus, as the Fourth Circuit held in Howard, that's the unpublished decision I'm relying on, Justice Stevens, "carves out an exception for illegal gambling operations in which proceeds means profits although the rule [in other context] is that proceeds means receipts." That quote, from the Howard decision, found at 2009 West Law 205649, at specifically page 9.

Although Howard is a unpublished opinion, his reasoning is both persuasive and consistent with a number of other district courts have concluded that Santos does not apply outside the realm of illegal gambling operations. The Court cites Bull v. United States, which is a Central District of California decision, December 3, 2008. United States v. Prince, which is a Western District of Tennessee decision, November 7th, 2008. Very few courts have taken the contrary position. One of those courts is United States v. Hedlund, Northern District of California, September 9th, 2008.

However, according to *Santos* plurality, Justice Stevens' position that proceeds could be profits for some

predicate and SUA's and receipts for others, is not only original with him, but also potentially foreclosed by the Supreme Court's opinion in *Hart v. Martinez*.

However, this Court, this judge, personally believes this argument is unavailable to Defendant Cloud for a number of reasons, given that Justice Stevens explicitly rejected that argument. He rejected it at page 203497. And under the Marks Supreme Court decision; under the Marks rule it is his understanding that controls.

Furthermore, it appears to this Court that the Santos plurality was wrong in thinking that Justice Stevens' view was so far out of the main.

Santos was far from the first court to identify and to redress the so-called "Merger" problem. In a treatise published nearly a decade earlier by the other side and his co-author, Frederick Williams, the undersigned and Mr. Williams explained some courts have attempted to distinguish between true money laundering cases and those which should be treated only a violations of the predicate SUA offense. Some suggest to be a true money laundering case, the transaction must, in some sense, be distinct logically -- distinct logically and temporarily from the specified unlawful activities.

That cite is taken from the Treatise Federal Money
Crimes and Forfeitures, Section 9.2, which is published by

Lexus Law Publishing, 1999 edition.

Furthermore, the office of that treatise expressed their opinion in the legal pitfalls of Justice Stevens' approach to the Merger problem. This Court, being one of those authors, nonetheless recognizes that a number of Courts of Appeal, including this circuit, have rendered a decision much in the spirit of Justice Stevens' concurrence.

For example, in *United States v Heaps*, 39 F.3d 479, the Fourth Circuit 1994, seemed to express an opinion that the one-time payment of an essential expense of a inchoate crime, in that case payment for drugs that had been sold on consignment, would merge with the SUA drug distribution and could not be separately punished as money laundering.

Thus, Justice Stevens' concurrence understood as a narrow exception necessary to redress the Merger problem, does little to change the state of the law as existed prior to Sanchez. Thus, the Howard opinion, the unpublished Fourth Circuit opinion on which this Court is relying, appears to reach of the correct result by concluding that profits -- that the profits definition for proceeds does not categorically apply to all money laundering crimes, and then defaulting to entrench precedent holding that "proceeds" means "receipts" in context other than those where a separately punishable conviction for money laundering would

present a Merger issue and produce a manifestly unjust result.

The Court notes that this alleged state of interpretation issue has also been legislatively resolved by Congress. This past fall Congress, by statute, wrote that proceeds means proceeds and not profits.

So the issue on which the Court is ruling today is -- will have little long-term precedent, because Congress has explained to us what Congress meant with the word "proceeds." However, it does have impact, of course, on Mr. Cloud's sentencing today because he's, under the Sentencing Guidelines, he received a two-point enhancement for money laundering conviction.

So in conclusion, the Court holds that the holding of *United States v. Santos* is limited to the reasoning found in Justice Stevens' concurrence. That consistent with that holding, as well as preexisting Fourth Circuit precedent, the term "proceeds" as used in 18 U.S.C., Section 1956(a)(1) should be construed to mean gross receipts except in circumstances not pertaining to this case.

Accordingly, the Court relies upon the reasons previously stated in its original determination of Defendant Cloud's Rule 29 motions, and has renewed Motion to Vacate Conviction and for Judgment of Acquittal, Document 185 is herby denied.

1 All right. Any questions on that holding? MR. MEYERS: No, Your Honor. 2 MR. TATE: No, Your Honor. 3 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 4 We can now proceed with the defendant's 5 6 sentencing. 7 Mr. Cloud was found guilty of all but one count of the Second Superseding Bill of Indictment on October 22nd 8 9 2008. Right? 10 MR. MEYERS: 2007. THE COURT: It's been over two years since the 11 conviction? 12 MR. MEYERS: Yes, sir. 13 14 THE COURT: Mr. Cloud, as I told you on the day of 15 your conviction, your case was referred to the United States Probation Department for a Presentence Investigation Report. 16 17 The Court has received that report; your counsel has. Both sides have extensively briefed that report, as 18 19 well as sentencing memos. I want to ask you: Have you 20 received this presentence report? 21 DEFENDANT CLOUD: Have I received the sentencing 22 report? 23 THE COURT: Yes, sir. The one prepared by the 24 Probation Office, have you received a copy of it? 25 DEFENDANT CLOUD: Yes, sir, I have.

1 | THE COURT: And have you read it?

DEFENDANT CLOUD: Yes, I have.

THE COURT: Have you had an opportunity to go over the report with Mr. Tate?

DEFENDANT CLOUD: Yes, sir, we did.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

All right. Now there are numerous objections to the report on both sides. The government has filed an objection with regard to which Sentencing Guidelines should apply, arguing that the current Sentencing Guidelines should apply rather than the ones in effect at the time of the conspiracy.

The government claims that since the Sentencing Guidelines have become advisory, that the ex post facto clause of the Constitution of the Bill of Rights does not apply. That's a legal issue.

The Court has extensively researched this issue.

The Court understands that several circuits have addressed the issue but the Fourth Circuit has not addressed the issue.

From the Court's research, the Court found the decision by the Honorable Henry Hudson, who is a distinguished jurist from the Eastern District of Virginia, former United States Attorney in the Eastern District of Virginia, as well as the former Director of the United

States Marshal Service.

Clause does apply to advisory Guidelines. He relies on the Supreme Court, Miller v. Florida, 482 U. S. 423, 1987, that holds that basically anything that makes more onerous the punishment for crimes committed before its enactment, violates the ex post facto clause. And based on the Miller decision, he says the Fourth Circuit has defined an ex post facto law as one that "changes the legal consequences of acts completed before its effective dated." Close quote. Citing United States v. Heater. Heater cite is at 63 F.3d 311, pinpoint cite page 332, Fourth Circuit 1995. I should add Judge Hudson is at 603 F.Supp. 2d 874, and that citation to Heater is found at pages 876 to 877.

The rationale that -- rather I should say based on that understanding of the meaning of ex post facto, Judge Hudson concluded that although the Guidelines are advisory, it is mandatory under Booker, Gall, and Kimbrough, or under I should say the Booker progeny of cases, that the Guidelines be consulted and be used as the starting point for the analysis of a defendant's sentencing.

And because it is the starting point for the analysis, it means the sentencing range that's determined after the Guidelines application will probably have some impact on the defendant's sentence, because a court will

have to explain in more detail a variance upward or a variance downward. It would have to be more detailed in explaining a downward variance, Judge Hudson concludes. It does impact the legal consequences of acts completed before the effective date of the more recent Guidelines.

2.

So the Court denies the government's objection based on the reasoning of Judge Hudson. In the case -- I never said the name of the case: *United States v. Lewis*, 603 F.Supp. Second, 874. I know you want to disagree with me.

MR. MEYERS: No, Your Honor. I want to ask the Court, I don't know if the Court has gotten to this part yet, to address the government's argument in the alternative as to the base offense level, and that's contained at page 30 --

THE COURT: Yeah, the continued conspiracy, and then it runs over.

MR. MEYERS: Yes, sir. United States v. Bennett, which is a Fourth Circuit case from 1993, the question is: Was there evidence that the conspiracy continued after the effective date of the Guidelines? Which for the purposes of here would be November 1st, 2003.

I point the Court to Exhibits 125B-8, 125B-9 -- again, this is addressed at page 30 of the Government's Sentencing Memo. Those are checks from Leon Orr to the

defendant. Those were introduced in furtherance of the conspiracy.

The Court also then, Exhibits 125E-1 through 125E-15, checks dated from March 2004, well after November 1st, 2003, to September 2005.

In addition, I will pull up as one example

Government's Exhibit 83C, which is the loan application for
a straw buyer, Gabriel Brown. And if the Court looks -this is a 2005 transaction, the Court looks at page 3 of
this, it says a HUD involving Defendant Cloud and his
co-conspirators, Defendant Daniel Greene.

If the Court looks at the HUDs for this transaction, 83A -- 83A to 83B, the documents on their face show same-day flip by the Defendant Cloud involving defendant, Daniel Greene, on April 7th, 2005, in which the Defendant Cloud as Prestigious Home bought the house for 84,000 -- perhaps that's 94 -- excuse me, and resold it to Ms. Brown the same day for \$164,000.

So the Court has -- and the Court additionally has the same documents for another purchase by Ms. Brown, both of which were primary residence purchases. To show the Court that I can show --

THE COURT: Let me ask you when -- all right, the 2002 Guidelines are the ones used in the report.

MR. MEYERS: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: What year Guidelines do you want to 1 2 use, 2005? When did the change go --MR. MEYERS: November 1st, 2003, Your Honor. 3 4 THE COURT: Let me ask, before I go to Mr. Tate, let me ask Ms. Easley. Ms. Easley didn't address this issue 5 because she thought the ex post facto clause would control. 6 What is the Probation Office's position on this issue? 7 PROBATION OFFICER: The only issue that I would 8 9 have with the under 1B1.11 commentary of the current Guidelines, which I will believe were amended in the 2002 10 Guidelines as well, which refers to the last date of the 11 12 offense of conviction is the controlling date, and in the 13 indictment is says through -- in or about 2002, that's why I 14 used 2002 Guidelines. The commentary goes on to say you can 15 use relevant conduct under 1B1.3 that occurs after that date. But that the controlling -- for the use of the 16 17 Guidelines then is what's charged in the indictment. That's commentary -- which commentary? 18 THE COURT: 19 PROBATION OFFICER: Commentary Application No. 2. 20 THE COURT: 2 to 1B1.11. 21 PROBATION OFFICER: Yes, sir. I've just looked. 22 It's the same in the 2002 Manual. However, I was just going 23 to say the technical wording in the indictment says from as early as 1999 through at least on or about 2002. 24 25 MR. MEYERS: Judge, I would point out that what

the Fourth Circuit says in *United States v. Bennett* is that it's not the allegations in the indictment, it's the count of conviction in the indictment. The count of conviction here being Count One, a conspiracy count, the government clearly introduced evidence going through 2005 at trial, conspiracy itself lasted through 2005.

There's additional evidence in the PSR, I don't think the Court should consider that. Like, for example, the Memorandum of Interview of Ms. Brown who said, "That the way it happened with me is exactly the way it happened with the other buyers."

The Court should not consider that, but the Court can look at the documents, which on their face, show two same-day flips to Ms. Brown in 2005, which have the same elements of the conspiracy; and one of which was done by co-conspirator Daniel Greene. I believe that that evidence introduced at trial meets the standard of *United States v. Bennett*.

I've also cited -- I believe that's the only case

I have in the Sentencing Memorandum on that issue.

But I think the courts are fairly consistent on that. The question was there evidence at trial showing that the conspiracy, or if that's the allegation, extended past the effective changeover for the Sentencing Guidelines.

I just want to ask the Court to consider that

argument, although I understand the Court's position with regard to argument.

THE COURT: Mr. Tate, what's your position? I'm sure you're opposed to that.

MR. TATE: Thank you, Your Honor.

We concur with Probation. We believe the commentaries in the Guidelines support a proposition that you go with the Guidelines. And I think looking at the indictment, the plain language of the indictment says "on or about 2002," it doesn't mean "on or about 2005."

As the Court recalls, we objected to the evidence, Gabriel Brown evidence, introduced at trial for that very specific reason: That it was not evidence.

What the Court has just looked at is the closing statement. The fact that there was a flip, same-day transaction, is not an issue of a crime at all. There's nothing illegal about that. People buy homes and sell them at a profit every single day. In other words, that would make every one of those transactions illegal.

There's no evidence at all introduced at trial that those transactions involving Gabriel Brown in 2005 were in any way fraudulent or illegal. The government certainly could put on evidence and chose not to. I think that speaks volumes to perhaps the proof on that issue.

For those we believe that the 2000, earlier

version of the 2002 Guidelines should be used.

MR. MEYERS: This will the last time I stand up, Your Honor.

If I may turn on the Court's screen now, because I think Mr. Tate made a fair point. I just do want to show the Court the kickback check which are contained in Government's Exhibit 117A, which was introduced at trial, along with Government's Exhibit 82B, I believe, which also was introduced at trial, clearly shows checks from Defendant Cloud, controls Prestigious Homes, to Gabriel Brown.

The Court can see the date is the same day as the settlement transaction. This is as kickback. If the Court looks, I'll scroll down under HUD, for the transaction 2317 Jordi Way, knowing that 2317 Jordi Way is also listed in the memo line of the check, the HUD shows only money coming from the borrower. It does not show money going to the borrower.

The check the defendant filed the same day to Ms. Brown with 2317 Jordi Way in the memo line shows money going to the borrower, Gabriel Brown, from the seller, when HUD shows only money going to the seller, in line 603, clearly says "to the seller" and it shows money coming from the borrower, Ms. Brown. Signed by the Defendant Cloud, signed by the borrower, and that kickback check of \$18,000 clearly shows fraud in 2005 related to this.

MR. TATE: Just briefly, Your Honor, on that issue

again, it doesn't show fraud other than the government saying the fact that this check is written is not evidence of anything. If it occurred after the closing, it couldn't possibly be the Settlement Statement.

And there are circumstances where sellers of homes pay closing costs and things like that; what's on the Settlement Statement is what's on the table at the time he closed.

Ms. Brown is not here to be questioned about that, and I just don't believe other than calling it kickback, which is labeling, that there's -- that that in any way shows there's any type of fraud at all. The transaction could have been perfectly legal and the same could have occurred. That in and of itself doesn't make it illegal.

THE COURT: Scroll back up to the top of the HUD.

MR. MEYERS: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: You used the term "kickback." Is this supposed to be covering the down payment of 12,000, or whatever the borrower was to bring, plus money that

Ms. Brown as the "investor" would have received, a payment.

MR. MEYERS: To be -- I think to be consistent with the case law, Your Honor, that evidence was not produced at trial why the money was paid. What the Court did see is two weeks of evidence about the pattern or conduct --

1 THE COURT: No, I understand that. I understand 2 that. The government's reasoning is what 3 MR. MEYERS: 4 these documents show on their face is the same pattern that all the straw buyers testified to. 5 Right. But I'm saying, your argument, 6 THE COURT: 7 though, is the 18,000 is both the down payment coming from the defendant to Ms. Brown, right, but Ms. Brown is supposed 8 9 to -- as the borrower is supposed to come up with the down 10 payment and she never did. 11 I think what the Presentence Report MR. MEYERS: 12 shows, because the Presentence Report contains the Memorandum of Interview from Ms. Brown, is that, in fact, 13 14 this was the kickback which was higher than what some of the 15 other folks were getting. THE COURT: It was exclusively kickback. 16 17 That's right. And that someone else, MR. MEYERS: Defendant Cloud paid the down payment besides this. 18 19 THE COURT: In addition to this. 20 MR. MEYERS: That's right. 21 And just to be clear, what the government's 22 argument is, it's the fraud that we have, a Settlement 23 Statement, just like we had at the trial, of April 20th, 24 2005, and we have a check from the seller on April 20th, 2005, to the buyer. As the Court heard over two weeks of 25

evidence, if there's going to be a check, let's be clear, this is for the very same property as the HUD-1 Settlement Statement and noted by the Defendant Cloud's own handwriting on this check.

You heard at the trial in order for the HUD to be truthful and not fraudulent, it needs to disclose any money going to the buyer. The Court can see, looking at lines 200, there's no monies going to the buyer other than the loan amount.

And in terms of the cash to the borrower, which is what this check obviously is, it's cash to the borrower from the seller, that needs to be disclosed on line 303 of the HUD-1 Settlement. There was a lot of testimony about that at the trial as the Court recalls.

Line 303 shows only cash from the borrower in the amount of \$12,000. It is not disclosed that the borrower will receive from the seller cash in the amount of \$18,000 for this transaction.

THE COURT: No, I understand all of that.

So this was -- Ms. Brown was an investor, using the term "investor" as used throughout the trial, that got paid a lot more money than the normal investor. Right? The normal investor received just a few thousand dollars.

MR. MEYERS: That's correct, Your Honor. This is a conspiracy evolved, I think the evidence shows, through

2005, and Defendant Cloud, not only did he have to go to

Georgia because people were complaining they had to pay more

money.

THE COURT: All right. Go ahead, Mr. Tate.

MR. TATE: I think that's exactly the conclusion.

THE COURT: It's argument. It's argument.

MR. TATE: But I think equally, every witness that testified about these Settlement Statements -- remember the charge is bank fraud, so it's the material omission that basically --

THE COURT: I think the charge is also conspiracy to commit mail fraud, wasn't it?

MR. TATE: Mail fraud and wire fraud. But there's no evidence whether it was mailed, whether it was in furtherance of the conspiracy, what the buyer -- we don't know who the lender is here.

THE COURT: We do actually know, don't we, up on top of the $\ensuremath{\text{HUD}}\xspace.$

MR. TATE: What I'm saying is what is consistent is what has to be to the Settlement Statement is what has occurred thus far. This statement in any way doesn't say what's going to happen tomorrow, what's going to happen later today or next year. And I think the people who discussed the Settlement Statement were very clear about that.

This concerns the transaction for the property.

This has nothing to do with the somebody is going to do for the buyer after the fact. And that's why it doesn't have to be on there. The only thing that's on there is what's happened. What is happening. Whose bringing what. The yield spreads are not on here either, I'll just point that out. The yield spreads are not on the Settlement Statement to the --

THE COURT: But that's all part of the fraud, right? The spread was never disclosed between the first transaction and the second transaction.

MR. TATE: The yield spread is paid from the lender to the broker. It has nothing to do with Mr. Cloud. It's paid from the lender to the broker. And that consistently wasn't on the Settlement Statements either. And they said, "Well --"

THE COURT: Wait. Wait. From the lender to the broker, the yield spread -- are you talking about -- what are you talking about? Are you talking about a float to the interest rate between the original contract?

I don't understand when you say "yield spreads."

When the term "spread" was used during the trial -- because

I went back and read a lot of the transcript this past

weekend of the trial -- "spread" referred to the difference

between the first purchase transaction where there was

legitimate seller selling it to -- usually to Mr. Cloud, and then Mr. Cloud selling it to the investor in the second transaction, and the spread was the difference, really, between those two transactions. What do you mean by "yield spread"?

MR. TATE: Yield spread is a premium paid to the lender to a broker, like Dan Greene, for charging a super high interest rate. See, that's supposed to be disclosed on that too.

THE COURT: Where do you know there's a yield spread on here?

MR. TATE: Well, because Daniel Greene talked about yield spreads. I mean the same reason we don't know what the yield spread is is the same reason we don't know what the \$18,000 is to Gabriel Brown. You would have to reach a conclusion that it was supposed to be on the Settlement Statement and it wasn't.

THE COURT: But why is that unreasonable to conclude based on all the evidence of all the transactions that were fraudulent.

MR. TATE: Because it just wasn't proven. It could -- very well be a legitimate transaction.

THE COURT: It could be. You're right.

So your point, though, is you're both arguing these different positions. That's what it is. You're not

saying there's insufficient evidence here; you're just arguing that the evidence is not by a preponderance.

MR. TATE: There's no evidence that -- number one, there's no evidence that the Jordi Way home was in any way fraudulent at all. That there's no evidence that --

THE COURT: Except there were 20-some-odd -- I forgot how many number of actual transactions presented to the jury, and the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that all those transactions were fraudulent. That -- you don't -- you're not -- are you taking the position the Court can't consider all the other evidence, the two weeks of trial?

MR. TATE: I'm not saying that. If this was part of the evidence, then, yes. But it wasn't. They introduced, over objection, a copy of the Settlement Statement. I said, "Nobody is here that was part of this transaction to talk about it, what happened. Was there fraud in this case? Was there a material lie or omission on the loan application to the bank? Was there a fraudulent asset statement? Any of that kind of stuff.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. TATE: The fact he wrote a check to Gabriel Brown the second day doesn't mean that there was a fraud, and doesn't mean it had to be on the Settlement Statement.

THE COURT: No, I understand. I agree. You're

making an argument that doesn't -- standing alone, this check for \$18,000 might not have to be on the HUD statement because it didn't relate to the closing.

But the Court is of the view that it can consider all the evidence in this case, including all the trial evidence, in reaching it's conclusion on this one transaction, whether this transaction was fraudulent or not.

Anything else, Mr. Meyers?

2.

MR. MEYERS: Just very quickly to correct the record, I believe defense counsel misrepresents the testimony; not intentionally, but I think he has got it wrong.

Argument was continually advanced during the trial that checks don't have -- checks from Cloud to the straw buyer don't have to be on the HUD because they came out, they were in the parking lot, whatever, all the evidence consistently established that if it relates to the transaction before, during, after, it's got to be on the HUD.

THE COURT: Right. I think that's not only a factual issue that was presented to the jury, it's also a legal issue.

The Court is aware that a HUD-1 is supposed to reflect all the money that passes between the parties with regard to the closing. And if it doesn't reflect it, then

one or more parties knows that something is not being reflected on the HUD-1 is involved in fraudulent conduct.

And sometimes I think the evidence shows it can be reflected without dollar amount so long as it's on the HUD-1 with some reference to paid outside of closing or something, but everything has to be reflected to the HUD-1 so someone could pick up the HUD-1 and understand the complete nature of the closing, because it's the one document that brings everything together.

2.

The Court does find by a preponderance of the evidence, based on the all the trial record in this case and extensive amount of fraudulent transactions, that this check from Prestigious Homes, which is, of course, the corporation under which the defendant operated for many of his illegal, fraudulent transactions, was a form of -- some form of illegal payment to Ms. Brown for this 2317 Jordi Way property.

It is -- it was part of fraud because it was not reflected to the HUD-1 statement, therefore making the HUD-1 statement fraudulent. There's just ample evidence HUD-1 statements are put into the mail or put into the wires.

There could not be a closing without a HUD-1 being sent from the closing attorney to a financial institution, to any real estate agent or mortgage broker.

So clearly this was a continuing act of a

conspiracy, as well as it could stand alone as a separate mail/wire fraud count or bank fraud count because a financial institution was involved.

So there is evidence that the conspiracy continued well into 2005, and that the defendant was the actual person committing these further overt acts of the conspiracy.

Now, with that finding of fact, I go back to the Probation Office and ask the Probation Office what is the legal effect of that finding of fact?

PROBATION OFFICER: Your Honor, then, I believe we would be using, in effect, today's Guideline Manual, because it would be the same one used in 2005. So it would increase the base offense level from 6 to a 7, and that will have a one-level impact on the total.

THE COURT: So that's Probation Office's interpretation. I'll let the defendant argue -- I presume the defense opposes that, and that I'll let you make argument.

MR. TATE: We would ask that this exhibit, the Settlement Statement, be marked and made part of the sentencing record introduced in evidence.

I'd just note for the record that the lender appears to be First Consolidated Mortgage Company, not a bank that would not qualify, would not be able to -- they would not able to charge the 13 with corporate bank fraud

because they don't meet the definition of a bank.

THE COURT: I concur with you on that. I'm not sure that First Consolidated Mortgage Company does meet the definition of a financial institution. So the Court will say it's still part of the continuing conspiracy without a doubt, and it's overwhelming circumstantial evidence throughout the whole trial that HUD-1's are wired and mailed. But as to bank fraud, the Court doesn't know specifically if First Consolidated Mortgage does meet the specific definition of a financial institution. So the Court concurs with that analysis by the defendant.

MR. TATE: Was it 117A?

MR. MEYERS: What the screen in front of the court is showing is Government Exhibit 82B on the top, and Government's Exhibit 117A at the bottom. Both of those were exhibits that were introduced and admitted at trial.

MR. TATE: For purposes of sentencing, retain the exhibit. I'll move for admission.

THE COURT: But they are admitted. They are in the record. We don't have to reintroduce things that are already in the trial record.

All right. Let me get my legal notepad. Can you give me, Ms. Easley, of those changes again to the offense level.

PROBATION OFFICER: At this point, on paragraph 24

the base offense level, according to 2B1.1(a) would be 1 2. increased to 7. It would make the total paragraph 24 increase to a 35, and the total offense of level paragraph 3 32 increase to a 43. 4 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Tate, I know you 5 disagree with the legal conclusion of the Probation Office 6 7 and the Court's finding of facts, but do you agree based on those two, the legal ruling of Probation and this Court's 8 9 finding of fact, that that's is the correct change on this 10 one narrow issue? 11 MR. TATE: Yes. Withstanding our objection, yes. 12 THE COURT: Okay. That covers the government's objections, or is there another? 13 14 MR. MEYERS: Yes, Your Honor. We objected to the 15 failure to include an increase of two levels for abuse of 16 trust. 17 THE COURT: Oh, okay. Your contention in your sentencing memo is it's a private trust, right? 18 19 MR. MEYERS: That's correct, Your Honor. 20 virtue of the defendant's relationship with the straw 21 buyers, the government used -- addressed this --22 THE COURT: Church membership. Saying to some of 23 them he was a real estate agent, things like that.

argument is contained as page 36 of the government's

That's right. The government's

MR. MEIER:

24

25

Sentencing Memorandum. And the government pointed to straw buyer Robert Moore as a good sample, and quoted some of his testimony.

That testimony is contained at page 5 of the Government's Sentencing Memorandum. So if the Court looks as page 5 of the Government's Sentencing Memorandum and cites page 1395 of the trial transcript, Mr. Moore was asked whether Cloud prepared his 1999 tax turn. Mr. Moore said, "Yes, he did."

The government asked, "How did that work?"

Mr. Moore responded, "Well, Defendant Cloud was also a tax preparer. He was a financial advisor."

Joseph Goines described the pitch Cloud instructed him to give as to buyers who were going to invest in real estate, so he set himself up as an investment advisor. Told folks he was looking for investors.

The co-defendant Lee testified that Cloud telling him he was in the business of investing in properties. And perhaps as importantly, there was substantial trial testimony, referenced on page 6 of the Government's Sentencing Memorandum, that these straw buyers provided the defendant with their Social Security numbers, their bank account numbers, their tax returns, information about their income and assets, the most personal information that you could give anyone.

And what the Fourth Circuit has said in United States v. Godwin -- or Goodwin, and that is cited a page 36 of the Government's Sentencing Memorandum, quote, "It is well settled that whether the defendant held a position of trust must be examined from the perspective of the victim." The defendant certainly held that position of trust when he told them he was a tax return preparer, he was an investment advisor. He told them he was a real estate agent.

THE COURT: Let me ask you, though, all of those are fraudulent statements. If you used the term "real estate agent" in the context of an agent that's a fraudulent statement.

Other than the power of attorney, was there anything where there was an actual, kind of fiduciary relationship, a truly legal one? Foundation of fraud?

MR. MEYERS: I don't think in terms of Defendant Cloud. He didn't have a licensure for it or anything like that.

THE COURT: He did receive from several of the investors powers of attorney. Correct? Or not? Page 37, 38 -- oh, I'm sorry. Cross-examination is that some of the straw buyers received a power of attorney.

MR. MEYERS: That's right. I'm not aware of any evidence that he exercised a power attorney for a straw buyer that was introduced at trial or in the Presentence

Report. He made that contention during the trial. It may be, and it probably is, there are transactions out there we still don't know about in which he did that. He did exercise power of attorney for his wife. I wouldn't call her a victim.

THE COURT: So other then that -- and that's cross-examination, which is not supported by any documentation, that doesn't mean it doesn't exist -- there's no abuse -- there's no trust position that legally arose.

Right? I mean, it was all a fraudulent positioning to assert that he had a special trust.

MR. MEYERS: I think that's right, Your Honor.

Instead of "legal" I would use the word "formal". There was no formal position of trust that he held. The only exception might be the 1999 tax return for Robert Moore.

Mr. Moore testified he have gave the information, that Defendant Cloud prepared his tax return, and he thought that Defendant Cloud did it. In reality what the tax return shows is that it was Tamika Monroe, Mr. Cloud's niece, who prepared that tax return.

The Court will recall there was also testimony that we showed that legitimate return for Mr. Moore, then we showed the fraudulent tax return of the defendant --

THE COURT: Still, that's not a formal relationship because you can prepare someone's return

without being an approved tax return preparer for the IRS.

MR. MEYERS: Agreed, Your Honor.

So to be clear, the government's argument is that the recent trust does not result from any formal relationship that he had. Rather it results purely from the perspective of these straw buyers who were victims in that sense.

THE COURT: Let me ask Ms. Easley why you weren't convinced that there was an abuse of position of trust?

PROBATION OFFICER: Your Honor, when I read the Sentencing Memorandum, I did not realize that was a formal objection to the Presentence Report.

THE COURT: It kind -- it wasn't in the original objections, right? Because your original objection was a letter to Probation Office describing ex post facto in referencing the continuing conspiracy, but it wasn't in that original letter, right? It was only in your memorandum.

MR. MEYERS: It was late, Your Honor, but it preceded the memorandum. And so in fairness to the Probation Office, there are hundreds of documents in this case --

THE COURT: This is the most briefed sentencing this Court's ever handled.

MR. MEYERS: My initial reaction was to apologize, Your Honor. I think it's appropriate --

THE COURT: 79-page memo. The Court read it all; read everything Mr. Tate prepared, too. It was extensively well prepared and briefed by both parties.

MR. MEYERS: Thank you, Your Honor. We believe ever word was necessary for the sentencing hearing.

I would refer the court to Document 189 which was filed on December 9, 2008. That is a letter to the Probation Office setting forth this objection for abuse of trust.

I never did formally go to the probation officer and ask that this be included because it was late. I did not file it within the required time period after the draft Presentence Report was put in, and so I guess I had assumed the probation officer did not consider it, as is their right, because it was not filed on time.

THE COURT: All right. And based on your honesty in admitting that, then the Court's going to deny it, and you can reraise it had if you think it's appropriate in the context of a variance. But for purposes of a Sentencing Guidelines, I think it's more appropriate to stick to our requirements that objections be timely made with the Probation Office so Probation has an opportunity to respond to it.

MR. MEYERS: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. That is the government's

objections. Correct?

MR. MEYERS: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Tate, you have several objections. Is there a particular order you would like to go through these objections?

MR. TATE: Well, no, Your Honor.

Obviously, our position, too, is that for most of our objections we set out that it's the government's burden of prove, so we have lodged our objections. We do intend to put on some evidence, but we would like the government to meet their burden first. Once the PSR is challenged, which it has been, the burden is on the government to sustain their position on here.

And, of course, our first objection is to the loss amount. And we also objected to the enhancement of the supervised release, organizer. We objected to obstruction of justice enhancement. I think I can speak to the obstruction enhancement.

THE COURT: I read, of course, your argument that it was a tactical decision made by you. Of course, I read the Government's Sentencing Memorandum, which summarize the sidebar where you said that you were told by your client that the zoning permit had been filed and had been denied. Why is that not enough? You were misled by your client.

MR. TATE: I don't know that I was misled by my

client for one. I believe the sidebar was what was the basis for the question. I said my client gave me -- and my client told me this, and he wasn't clear what he told me. I know he had some documents on his own.

2.

There was some discussion about whether or not he -- or whether or not his house was supposed to be permitted for a group home. He handed me a document I had not looked at before. Witness is on the stand; asked her had she ever seen the document. She said no. That was the end of it. I didn't say, "Isn't it the document you filed," or anything like that. I asked her to identify the document and then was going to based on whether she could identify it, was going to question her about any discussion she had with Mr. Cloud about getting the place zoned for a group home.

Once she could not identify the document, it was of no use to me, and I returned it to Mr. Cloud. The government then asked for it later and then pointed out it still had the carbon in it, but I don't recall any discussion it had been filed, or that she filed it.

Basically I asked her a foundational question. She could not identify the exhibit and that was the end of it. It was never marked. It was never admitted into evidence, and as far as I can recall, there was no further question other than by the government.

THE COURT: I didn't mean to immediately go into that one first, but --

MR. TATE: Well, it seems like one of the easier ones to discuss. I don't know what evidence could be put on it, so that's why --

THE COURT: Other than the sidebar transcript.

Mr. Tate -- excuse me. Mr. Meyers.

MR. MEYERS: Just to be clear, Your Honor. It was marked. It was marked as Defendant's Exhibit 7.

The Guideline in the Application Note 4 was two examples of obstructive conduct. First one, C, is attempting to produce a false or counterfeit document during a judicial proceeding.

If the Court will recall, during the cross-examination of Veronica Williams, and during the testimony regarding her, part of the fraud was the defendant promised to put her into a group home; promised he would file a zoning application. She testified to the jury that was one of the things he lied to me about.

Defendant Cloud avers that testimony, gives to his lawyer a counterfeit document, a zoning petition for 2800 Georgia Avenue. That was a false, counterfeit document. He gave it to his lawyer clearly with the intent that his lawyer show it to the witness in order to make the jury think that he had actually filed that zoning petition. He

hadn't. No zoning petition was ever filed. That's a false and counterfeit document. Defendant Cloud clearly attempted to produce a false and counterfeit document during a judicial proceeding.

2.

If the Court looks at page 40 regarding the Sentencing Memorandum, I lay out the testimony to address this materiality question. The Court was the one who is sua sponte asked for the sidebar. The Court was deeply concerned about the suggestion through his lawyer that this zoning petition was actually filed or not. The Court said, "Can we have a sidebar?"

"Question: What's your good faith basis that there was a zoning petition actually filed and that a zoning change was actually denied?"

"Answer: My client has told me that."

The clear import, whether or not his client specified said it or implied it to his lawyer is that a zoning petition was actually filed and actually denied. He gave his lawyer a counterfeit document to use --

THE COURT: I want to get something straight,
though. It wasn't a counterfeit document, it was just not a
processed document, right? It was an unfiled zoning
petition, wasn't it?

MR. TATE: Yes. I mean, that's the problem, is the use of the label "counterfeit."

THE COURT: The document itself wasn't counterfeit, it just --

MR. TATE: If it was counterfeit if it had a stamp on it indicating it had been filed. I hadn't looked at it. It was an application. You know, I believe what it was, I think there was questioning about whether or not that was one of the goals, and she said it was. And I asked her: "Had you ever seen this application?" And she said no. And I said okay. And that's the end of it. It was a proper avenue of cross-examination.

And the other issue that I think the Court -THE COURT: I don't think there's anything wrong
with your cross-examination or anything, I don't think
there's anything wrong with the witness's answer. What I'm
trying to do is clarify the document per se was not
counterfeit, it was what happened to that document that
was -- was a purported fraud on the Court. Because the -the Court was very concerned to make sure that that actual
zoning petition had been filed, because all that was
available was an unfiled copy. And that -- the Court didn't
want there to be any misunderstanding with the jury that
something had occurred that had not occurred, right, that
had been filed and the local zoning authority had denied it.

MR. MEYERS: I think that's not exactly correct, Your Honor.

1 THE COURT: Correct me.

MR. MEYERS: Two things. First I want to get the order of the testimony clear.

The Court asked for that sidebar prior to the government establishing that it was a false document, because the carbon copies were attached. So the Court asked for that sidebar before the government had established those carbon copies were there. So the clear import of the questioning was that the zoning petition had been actually filed.

And second, I want to address whether or not it's a false or counterfeit document.

THE COURT: Yeah, explain that.

MR. MEYERS: I think that it is, and this is the reason. The application was for 2800 Georgia Avenue and was for a straw buyer, Veronica Williams, for the time period in which this house had been done, which would have been 2002.

They're producing a document in 2007 which purports to be for 2002. And I'll show the Court by Government's Exhibit S-95, which is an affidavit from the zoning office in Mecklenburg County what the zoning office says in that affidavit, if I may present it to the Court.

THE COURT: Please.

MR. MEYERS: What the zoning office says is there's no --

THE COURT: The Court wants to note for the record that Mr. Meyers handed it to Mr. Tate and he glanced at it.

All right. Thank you.

MR. MEYERS: One, the zoning officer says is, in essence, there is no such thing as a -- there should never be in existence a denied zoning permit or application. Their practice and procedure there at the zoning office is to rip them up if they are denied.

That makes a purported zoning application for a 2002 house with Veronica Williams, for 2800 Georgia Avenue, a false and counterfeit document. There never was any zoning petition ever made. That document suggested that there was.

THE COURT: I guess I'm caught up with the phrase "counterfeit," because I think of "counterfeit" as being where there's legitimate currency; there's improperly counterfeited currency where someone is making an artificial copy of something that is not what it purports to be.

In this case, really you're saying this is a fraud document. It shouldn't exist. If it really had been denied, the document shouldn't itself exist because it should be torn up.

MR. MEYERS: Yes, sir. And in fact, I think "counterfeit" is purporting to be something it's not.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. MEYERS: And this document purported to be a 1 2 zoning application that had been filed and denied. That's exactly what's false. We never 3 MR. TATE: 4 even got to that step. There was never any evidence that he filed a zoning permit. The question to her was: 5 have you ever seen this?" That could have been did you 6 7 participant, did you go down yourself and pick up this 8 application? Was there even a intent to have a group home? 9 And I think that's what we're getting at. Not that it had been submitted and denied. That's the factual leap. 10 11 THE COURT: No, I don't think the government's 12 argument is that there was a fraud on the jury. 13 government's argument is there was a fraud on me, the judge, 14 at the sidebar. MR. TATE: Well, the Court rightfully asked what 15 16 is the good-faith question for that, and I told him. 17 client could very well -- the intent was -- well, he could say, "Well, listen, we intended to file it. Here's the 18 19 application." 20 THE COURT: But that's the point. That's not the 21 answer -- the Court asked the question. The Court asked the 22 question has -- has this been filed and has it been denied? 23 MR. TATE: The Court asked me had it been filed. THE COURT: It's in the transcript. 24

MR. TATE:

The Court called me to a sidebar, which

was to ask about -- I really shouldn't have been getting 1 into what my client told me at all. I shouldn't have really 2. been -- but -- but the --3 4 THE COURT: When you have a good-faith basis for a question, you have to say my client or someone else told me 5 this, and then you were protected. You were protected. 6 can then say I have a good faith basis for the question. 7 You're protected because you said, "My client has said it 8 9 was filed and it was denied." MR. MEYERS: Judge, I can help. I have the 10 11 transcript up on the screen. 12 THE COURT: The whole transcript. Yeah, I know in your summary you only have portions of it, but let's go 13 14 through the whole sidebar. MR. MEYERS: Well, this is before the sidebar, 15 Your Honor, this is page 1598 of the trial transcript. 16 It's 17 cross-examination of witness Veronica Williams: "Answer: Yes, I was calling Cloud and I was not 18 19 getting a response. 20 "Question: That's after he was denied zoning for 21 group home? 22 This is the whole -- do you agree that "Answer: 23 there would be no reason to steer you to someone to train you if the location can't be zoned for that. Correct?" 24

"Calls for speculation.

"The Court: Can we have a sidebar?" 1 2 So it was clearly right after a question, "that's after he was denied zoning for group home." There was no 3 ambiguity about that. 4 MR. TATE: It doesn't say anything about him --5 the location can't be zoned. That means you can't have a --6 a person could learn that without even filing a permit. 7 can't possibly have a group home in this area at all. 8 9 would be no reason to file. You could have talked about it but then it's not a reality. I think there's nothing -- you 10 would have to make a factual jump to say --11 12 THE COURT: Well, no, the issue was whether I was deceived, and I was deceived, quite honestly. If you scroll 13 14 a little further, I specifically asked, "Was this filed and 15 was it applied for?" 16 "Yes. "And who told you?" Go on. 17 And you say, "My client has told me that." 18 19 And I said, "Your client told you that. You don't 20 have anything other than that?" The "what" I think is 21 supposed to be "that." 22 I'm asking the witness, and she says that there's 23 a zoning -- that's not what she said. She said Mr. Cloud 24 told her it had been denied.

"So that's what I'm curious about.

I don't

want the jury to think the process was denied when, in fact, it might not never have occurred. You can ask those questions. That's my concern."

That was the whole essence of it. I don't want the jury to believe it had been denied when it might never have occurred. And you told me that your client told you that it had been denied.

MR. TATE: Right. Well, my client didn't tell me that specifically, but he did tell me that he could not get it zoned and that's what I knew. And I asked her did she know anything about the application process, whether he told her that he could not get it zoned because they won't allow it in that area, that's where I was going, and I was cut off with it. But once she said, "I can't recognize the document," that was the end of it. But there was never any indications, for instance --

THE COURT: I mean, this is very important, I don't want to put you on the spot, but you would swear that all your client told you was, "I could not get it zoned."

He didn't say, "It was denied."

MR. TATE: That's exactly what he told me. He told me that during the testimony. Then he was ruffling through his own files to hand me this application. I looked at it in the middle of cross and stood up and started asking her questions.

THE COURT: I'm not going to make you swear

because I don't want to require that, but a proffer from you

is, "All my client told me was I couldn't get it." Not

specifically that "I filed the petition and it was denied."

But rather, "I could not get the zoning for group home."

MR. TATE: That's what I recall him telling me at

the table.

THE COURT: That's it. It's only you and he are the witnesses to this.

MR. TATE: He told me, he said, "I couldn't get it zoned." The next thing is he handed me this. I looked at it and I asked her had she ever seen it. Those are foundational questions. Now, did you have discussions -- because their argument was that this was a complete fraud. That these people were duped. That there was no intentions --

THE COURT: Okay. This is a very sensitive issue because it does get into communication between an attorney and his client. But I accept Mr. Tate's assertion that all his client told him was that he couldn't get it zoned and that Mr. Tate then presumed that to mean he had applied and it was denied -- and it was denied. And I'm -- I think that's the proper holding of this case.

MR. MEYERS: And I think that may be, Your Honor, for the statement to the court at sidebar "my client told me

that." It was a false statement. Mr. Tate didn't know that.

The question for the Court now, I believe, is did Mr. Cloud attempt to produce a false or fraudulent document in a judicial proceeding? Did the Defendant Cloud attempt to produce a false or fraudulent document in a judicial proceeding by handing his lawyer that document?

THE COURT: Mr. Tate just said he was the one thumbing through the document.

MR. MEYERS: He said his client gave it to him, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yeah. But of course his client gave him everything.

MR. MEYERS: Yes.

MR. TATE: Mr. Cloud, for instance, he could hand me a document to look at, and because I stand up and do something with it, he doesn't know what I'm trying --

THE COURT: Sit down, Mr. Tate. You've won this one.

The Court is going to find as a matter of fact, that there was a miscommunication, misunderstanding between attorney and client, and that there's insufficient evidence to support obstruction of justice enhancement and that's based on Mr. Tate's proffer. All right. So those two points will be removed. That's paragraph 28.

PROBATION OFFICER: 28.

THE COURT: All right. Now let's start with the one that's going to take the longest amount of time of the objections that remain, that's the loss amount.

So it is the government's burden of proof. I know the government takes the position that it can, if it wants, rest on the Presentence Report, but I presume that's not what the government intends to do.

MR. MEYERS: Well, to be clear, Your Honor, the Presentence Report and the trial testimony establishes, I think, by a preponderance of the evidence the loss amount with regard to the actual properties here for the conspiracy, \$10 million.

THE COURT: Okay. But let me get into specifics there.

The defense's argument is you can't count

Mr. Strong, Mr. Phillips, and a few others because they were
separate conspiracies.

MR. MEYERS: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: All right. I've re-read a lot -- like I said, I went through the whole transcript. I didn't read it word for word, the whole transcript, this weekend, but I went through the whole transcript, and I did review the testimony of all the alleged co-conspirators. And I note that those co-conspirators are named as co-conspirators in

the indictment, either as fellow charged co-conspirators or named in other paragraphs as co-conspirators where they have been -- where they have pled guilty or have been charged in other indictments.

But let's get to the 10 million specifically through looking at each of the other co-conspirators, and making it perfectly clear how they are directly related to Mr. Cloud and how Mr. Cloud reasonably foresaw all the losses generated by those co-conspirators.

MR. MEYERS: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And don't spend a lot of time.

MR. MEYERS: I'm make it quite clear.

What I will submit to the Court, provide a copy to defense counsel as Government's Exhibit S100 and S100-A.

S100-A is a spreadsheet I provided to Mr. Tate last week. I presented this to the Court.

The Presentence Report is quite specific and establishes with plaintiff's specificity the properties that Defendant Cloud himself was personally involved with.

In terms of holding the Defendant Cloud for the for the other properties, S100 and S100-A put into the record for the Court, which I think is already a matter of public record for this court since this Court conducted the sentencing hearings.

THE COURT: Right.

1 MR. MEYERS: Is the stipulated loss amounts.

THE COURT: And I should note for the record the Court is considering all the other defendants it has sentenced, both for purposes of those defendants being similarly situated or not being similarly situated when I get the sentencing factors, and also for purposes of understanding the full scope of the conspiracy. I just want that on the record.

MR. MEYERS: To make clear for the Court, the argument for the government about what the evidence showed during the trial that the way this conspiracy worked is it had several cells or units, if the Court will, each unit being headed by a particular promotor. The promotor shared the lawyers, the underwriters, the mortgage brokers, the recruiters in some cases. And each promotor was the responsible for their own unit of operations knowing what the other promotors were doing, and using the same modus operandi et cetera, as laid out in more detail in the Government's Sentencing Memorandum.

What -- S100 is an affidavit of Special Agent Michael McNeely. He was the F.B.I. agent who was responsible for all the other promotors.

It just puts into this sentencing record what the stipulated loss amounts were by the defendant, Michael Brian, the defendant Henderson, the defendants Kenneth

Strong and William Phillips who operated together sort of as co-promotors.

I know the Court already has all this information because the Court handled the sentencings for all these individuals. The Court saw those individuals in open court stand up and stipulate to these loss amounts. And that affidavit also establishes why it was that those defendants were not asked -- we did not ask the Court to hold them responsible for their foreseeable losses from their co-promotors in the conspiracy. That's only because they pled guilty so early we didn't have a full understanding of the conspiracy at that point. As the government notes in it's Sentencing Memorandum, for example, Kenneth Strong, one of the fellows that pled guilty in 2003, years before the Defendant Cloud went to trial.

What the affidavit and what the spreadsheet establishes is that all of the loss amounts for those promotors were within the time period of conspiracy that the defendant was in the conspiracy, namely that the earliest transaction was August 4, 1999, by Michael Bryant, and the latest transaction was later then that in 2003. I believe there is a typo, I should say, in the affidavit.

We put this together yesterday. I want to make clear for the Court that it appears because of cutting and pasting that A through C all have the same second sentence,

which is incorrect. So I'd ask the Court instead to look at the spreadsheet, which is S100-A for those time periods.

S100-A indicates on it's face what the dates were and indicates, I believe, all those dates were within the scope of the conspiracy.

That's set forth more particularly in the Government's Sentencing Memorandum. I can find that if the Court doesn't have that information immediately available. We were working on this yesterday after receiving the spreadsheet.

THE COURT: We all were working on Sunday in this case.

All right. According to Ms. Easley's calculations -- well, I guess the government's calculations when you add in Mr. Cloud, Mr. Strong, Mr. Bryant, and Mr. Henderson, that the total intended loss was \$10,052,875. Is that correct?

MR. MEYERS: Yes, sir. And we ask the Court to hold that that was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant, Cloud, because of the trial testimony which established that all the factors of a common scheme or plan, according to 1B1.3, are established here.

THE COURT: Let me clarify: In the PSR of

June 29th, 2009, the number 9,161,509. Right? Then the

government said that was an addition error and the proper

amount is 10,052,875? 1 MR. MEYERS: That's correct, Your Honor. 2 3 THE COURT: I just want to make sure: Mr. Tate, were you aware of that alleged addition error? 4 5 MR. TATE: Yes, sir. MR. MEYERS: And just to be clear for the record, 6 7 if the Court looks at paragraph 12 of the Presentence Report, the four numbers that are there, 3.3 million, 8 9 2.9 million, 2.6 million, 1.1 million all do add up to that 10 \$10 million. It's -- all those numbers are correct, it's just the arithmetic is --11 12 THE COURT: I just wanted that explained on the record. 13 14 All right. This Exhibit S100-A is the 10 million 15 loss -- supports the \$10 million loss amount? 16 MR. MEYERS: Yes, sir. 17 To be clear, that identifies the properties that were involved for the co-conspirators, defendants --18 19 THE COURT: Right. 20 MR. MEYERS: -- Strong, and the loss amounts stem 21 from those. What that especially also does is it 22 establishes those losses were incurred during the time 23 period that the defendant was involved in the conspiracy. That's one of the factors the Court would need to find. 24 25 THE COURT: Which was '99 to 2005.

1 MR. MEYERS: Correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: According to paragraph 12. This is the 94 fraudulent loans that Ms. Easley refers to. S100-A.

MR. MEYERS: It does include those 94 fraudulent loans which are the ones Defendant Cloud himself personally had a hand in.

THE COURT: So how many total on this then? I'm sorry. 230. I see now.

MR. MEYERS: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: All right. Very briefly for the record, explain to me how -- I know all these -- most of them of these co-conspirators testified, but go through Mr. Strong, Mr. Bryant, Mr. Henderson and explain how they -- how Mr. Cloud reasonably foresaw their loss amount.

MR. MEYERS: Thank you, Your Honor.

I think there's two questions defense would challenge: One was whether they were involved in the conspiracy with Mr. Cloud; and the second one being whether their losses were reasonably foreseeable, so I'm going to address each in turn.

First, with regard to Michael Bryant, the facts supporting that -- at least some of the facts supporting that are set forth in the Government's Sentencing Memorandum starting at page 12, in which the defendant, Lee, testified quite extensively that he prepared transactions for both

Michael Bryant and for the defendant, William Cloud.

2.

The Court will recall there was testimony, the fact that they shared the same spot in Mr. Lee's trust account, each borrowing the other's money, coming into Cloud's together.

The evidence also established that Cloud and Bryant together were co-promotors on a number of transactions which are listed there, namely Steve Mirman transaction. The defendant, Lee, testified there was no difference between the way Mr. Cloud and Mr. Bryant operated in the conspiracy.

Straw buyer Robert Moore testified that Cloud had told him that Bryant was the man helping Cloud by houses at 1302 of the transcript.

This was testimony from Kim Dauria that they worked with Cloud and Brian together. In other words, there was a great deal of testimony about how those two worked together.

With regard to Defendant Strong, the facts tying them together from the trial begin at page 15 of the government's Sentencing Memorandum.

Mr. Strong testified they were in business together. He testified they had the same role. He testified their direct interaction was limited to Strong owing Cloud money for his closings, but he testified they

were in the same business of the transcript. He testified he worked with the same mortgage brokers, they worked with the same lawyers, they worked with the same underwriters. They used the same verification of deposits with Amy Phillips. They talked explicitly about loaning each other -- about Strong loaning money for his closing; they knew what the other one was doing in the conspiracy. They did it in the same geography, meaning Mecklenburg County. And Cloud, in fact, solicited them to go out to Atlanta in response to their getting heat from irate buyers.

Henderson said that his connection, that his link in the conspiracy to the Defendant Cloud was primarily through Dan Greene. He testified he had a standing agreement with Dan Greene that anyone who wanted to get one of his houses could. Cloud did that for the Kenneth Wanke transaction.

The defendant, Henderson, also testified that he had the same modus operandi as Defendant Cloud, namely the false lease agreements, the fake cashier's checks, the verifications of deposit from Amy Phillips. Together they used same conspirators: Leon Orr, Amy Phillips, Juderita Russell, Dan Greene. And the government's argument with regard to those is set forth in the Sentencing Memorandum in quite some detail. It starts --

THE COURT: You don't have to restate that part of

the Sentencing Memorandum.

MR. MEYERS: Thank you, Your Honor.

I just point out there's really two ways that the Court ought to do it. I think the two work together in the if Fourth Circuit.

First there's 1B1.3 which says if you're trying to figure out whether it's a common scheme or plan, if there's common victims; there are here in this case as set forth in the memorandum. Whether there's common accomplices. There are numerous. They used the same professionals, in the some cases the same straw buyers. Whether there was a common purpose. There was here: Defrauding mortgage lenders in the same way. Whether there was a similar modus operandi; there was here.

The Guidelines say there needs to be at least one of those factors. Here all four of those factors are met.

In addition, the Fourth Circuit adopts Pinkerton for purposes of sentencing liability. That's discussed in a number of Fourth Circuit cases, United States v. Newsome, United States v. McHan, which is another Fourth Circuit case; United States v. Moore, also at 56, 57 in the Government's Sentencing Memorandum.

And the question was was it reasonably foreseeable. I think the trial testimony established that it was. What Defendant Cloud, and what Defendant Strong,

Phillips, Henderson, and Bryant all knew is that they each were heading their own operation. Each had their role, which was to go find the straw buyers, organize the transactions, make the transactions work.

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Sometimes they worked together; more often, they worked on their own, in their own little units, in their own little cells. Each knew what the other one was doing. That's why they went to each other. They knew they were in the same business, as their testimony showed, and their transactions happened with the same people, in the way same way, under same location, under the same type --

THE COURT: When you say "same people," you're talking about the same accomplices, right? The real estate appraisers.

But the common victims, though, I have a little concern with because Mr. Cloud, I thought, targeted the Filipino American community. And did the other co-conspirators target that specific group of investors?

MR. MEYERS: I think that would be a difference.

I think that that's something Mr. Cloud brought uniquely to the table in his role. But in terms of the same bank victims, yes. They all worked through Juderita Russell.

Therefore Chase Manhattan was hit a number of times. Mr. Cloud and Mr. Bryant in particular went after Countrywide through Kim Dauria.

THE COURT: So it depends on which victim you're talking about.

MR. MEYERS: That's right.

THE COURT: All right. I did not understand that aspect of your common scheme or plan.

MR. MEYERS: And so for this reason, this is very much like, as I pointed out, the case of the *United States*v. Osborne, which is at the Government's Sentencing

Memorandum, page 59. That's a Tenth Circuit case from 2003.

In that case what the Tenth Circuit found was that the folks operated independent cells, and although the aggravate losses of the entire scheme there, the \$125,000, were foreseeable, because he knew the other members of the scheme with his roles, he knew the general outlines of what was done, and he knew it was done by all the cells.

Because of that, the Tenth Circuit found that the losses from all other folks in those independent cells were foreseeable. Fourth Circuit, reached the came conclusion in United States v. Codarcea, page 60 of the Government's Sentencing Memorandum, there it said he was responsible, even though he was only entitled to one part of the bank fraud scheme, because all the losses occurred during the same time period, in the same area, in the same manner.

He was involved in the conspiracy at the beginning and at the end, with no indication he withdraw, and he was

linked to the other individuals who were engaged in identical fraudulent transaction.

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It's also like the Fourth Circuit case of United States v. Newsome. That was the tree stealing conspiracy. The defendant was only involved, as the jury found, with a He was responsible for losses of \$1,000. couple trees. he was responsible for all the losses in the entire conspiracy of about \$32,000 during the time period that he The Fourth Circuit did not hold him for losses was in it. for the time period he was not in the conspiracy, only when he was in it, even though he was only involved with a couple trees, he was responsible for all the losses. reasons were it be reasonably foreseeable to him. other folks were doing the same thing he was doing. same co-conspirators. They were doing the same victims, whether it was the trees or the folks who owned the trees, I suspect in that case, and he did it in the exactly the same way; there was similar modis operandi.

Following the strictures set forth in 1B1.3, following *Pinkerton*, following these cases, we believe the Court should hold the defendant, Cloud, responsible for the losses incurred by the other promotors in this conspiracy.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Mr. Tate, I'll let you respond to that issue, the direct actual or intended loss. And I think you take the

legal position that actual loss is the only correct loss.

MR. TATE: Yes, Your Honor.

And our position is really that there was no intended loss in this case. Intended loss is what the defendants intended. I think every witness in here testified they intended to make money. Nobody intended for the lenders to lose money. Nobody intended for the straw buyers to lose money. Everything was about making money. Indeed, they made a lot of it, all of them, and there was no intended loss.

The reason they want to shift to intended loss is because they understand the problem with the actual loss. So they want to get into this murky world of reasonably foreseeable where you can't really go to that unless there's some intention of intended loss.

Let me start off by saying first of all, the first procedural error would be crediting any stipulations by co-defendants; that they have stipulated to loss amounts and said those are specific and apply to loss amounts.

I believe the testimony would be they never really undertook the analysis on loss that we've done, and just like the Court would instruct a jury, the fact that a co-defendant has pled guilty is no way evidence against Mr. Cloud. Mr. Cloud was not a party to that stipulation. He didn't know what it was. I suspect those defendants

really didn't care because they knew at the end of the day that their sentence was based on the 5K, so they weren't mitigating loss as we are here.

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THE COURT: Well, I have agree to the extent that they are concerned about a 5K, but are you saying they lied? They just didn't know.

THE COURT: They lied when they said this is the loss amount which I was responsible for.

MR. TATE: No.

MR. TATE: I can't say whether they lied or not, I haven't spoken to them. I can't get into their heads. what I do know from my practice and experience is that they didn't litigate loss. They stipulated to a loss amount. One reason Mr. Cloud didn't plea is that they offered the same deal for Mr. Cloud, the loss amount. We said let's see. And they didn't produce it, and Mr. Cloud wouldn't agree to the loss amount.

THE COURT: But now, though, in this case, the government has a record of interviews of all those co-conspirators, and the FBI has put together a database based on those debriefings and has come up with this number of probation officers who have reviewed the number.

> That's not true. MR. TATE:

THE COURT: It's not true?

MR. TATE: I've looked at all the 302s. I haven't seen anything talking about loss. Just looking at this

chart he just turned in this morning, it's 230 pages, it 1 2 probably doesn't even list a loss amount on there at all. This chart to is identify 3 THE COURT: No, no. properties, it's not to identify loss amount. 4 They haven't established a loss 5 MR. TATE: No. There still isn't any evidence before the Court --6 7 all of them people were just saying it, but you can say anything --8 9 THE COURT: Wait, wait. That's evidence. It's evidence. 10 11 I can come in here and say there's MR. TATE: No. 12 zero loss. Is that evidence? No. But if a co-conspirator says to 13 THE COURT: 14 FBI agent these are the properties that I was involved in 15 and this is the spread, these are the two different transactions, the first and the second, that's evidence. 16 17 That's exactly what's not before the MR. TATE: Court, though. I haven't seen that at all. Let me go 18 19 through where I think we are. 20 THE COURT: If you didn't -- I mean that was --21 that's in the Presentence Report. 22 MR. TATE: Presentence Report is not evidence. 23 It's just conclusions. It's not evidence. 24 They have -- a Presentence Report, Probation did 25 not interview a single one of those people. And I haven't

seen a 302 where Don Strong, Bryant, Mr. Henderson or anybody else said, "Here's the loss amount."

THE COURT: Let me ask Ms. Easley where she got her specific numbers then. So -- because I have seen some charts. I saw them last week. And I want Ms. Easley to explain those charts. She was showing them to me.

PROBATION OFFICER: One of the charts that determine Mr. Cloud's actual loss was part of the attachment to the objections and to the Presentence Report.

And what we did in all of these cases is we went and worked with the FBI agents, went through the file, took the difference between an original amount of the loan and then the foreclosure price, the actual loss. If we could not come up with actual loss because foreclosure procedures had not been processed, and we could not obtain those files because the banks were out of business or whatever, we took an average of what the ones we could determine was, getting rid of the high and the low, came up with a average, and multiplied that to get intended loss for the other loans that we could not come up with. We did that in the Strong case. Henderson. We followed that procedure in all the cases.

THE COURT: Mr. Tate, you're saying you didn't ask
Ms. Easley --

MR. TATE: What the Court had just suggested had

happened. What she just admitted is that they did it in 1 Cloud, Strong, Henderson, so it's not their statements. 2 It's not co-conspirator statements --3 4 THE COURT: But this is sentencing. The Probation Office never, to the best of my knowledge in preparing a 5 Presentence Report, in no case ever actually goes and tracks 6 7 down a co-conspirator, but it works through the agents and the counsel on both sides on coming -- on putting this 8 9 together. MR. TATE: Correct, Your Honor. And I understand, 10 except they didn't work with me in this case. 11 THE COURT: But you met -- didn't you meet with 12 Ms. Easley some time --13 14 MR. TATE: No. No. 15 THE COURT: But you certainly had the opportunity 16 to. 17 MR. TATE: Well, we exchanged documents. disagreed. 18 19 We're saying their procedure of determining loss, 20 which she's just said is that herself and FBI agent determined the loss amount, and then they used estimates for 21 22 houses they couldn't find records of. 23 They didn't go and talk to the lender see what the actual loss amount was. That's all speculative. 24 It has to 25 be specific and reliable. You just can't come up with a

number to fit where you want it to be, and that's what we're saying has happened here.

THE COURT: Well, and that's the nature of the intended loss, is you estimate -- because it's intended, you estimate what the loss was supposed to be, even if there was no loss. If the actual loss was zero -- my understanding of the law is that the actual loss is zero, but there was an intended loss, you still go with the intended loss.

And, of course, intended loss is not going to be supported by addition and subtraction of different transactions, because the actual loss between two transactions -- well, between the second closing and the foreclosure, the actual loss might be zero, but it's still intended loss that counts.

MR. TATE: But whose intent is it?

THE COURT: To defendant's and the co-conspirators.

MR. TATE: So how does an FBI agent or Probation determine what Mr. Cloud's intent was based on something that somebody else did that they didn't talk to?

THE COURT: Well, the jury found he intended to commit this fraud beyond a reasonable doubt, so the FBI doesn't have to go back and rethink the jury verdict. They just have to present the evidence showing the loss amount supporting the jurors verdict that the defendant intended to

defraud. They have already made that finding beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to defraud. That's not for me to relook at.

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MR. TATE: Intending defraud and intending a loss for the lender is two different things. The jury did not entertain that question.

We're not here questioning whether Mr. Cloud was guilty. The jury spoke. The issue is: Do you use actual loss or intended loss? If it's intended loss, it's Mr. Cloud's intent, not Mr. Bryant's, not Mr. Henderson's.

THE COURT: No, in that case, it's -- it's
Mr. Cloud's reasonably foreseen view of the other
co-conspirator's intent.

MR. TATE: But the testimony of the people that testified, both Mr. Henderson and Mr. Strong, is very clear: They had very limited dealings with Mr. Cloud. They did one house apiece with them. They brought in over 100 houses that these folks did that had absolutely nothing to do with Bill Cloud.

THE COURT: Well, that's a factual issue.

MR. TATE: But that's exactly what Probation just admitted they did.

THE COURT: Right. I know. That's a factual issue. That goes back to Mr. Meyers' argument of common scheme or plan.

Let me just get back to -- your position is there's never ever an intended loss of your client ever.

MR. TATE: That's not my position at all, in all due respect.

THE COURT: I thought you said that there was no intended loss.

MR. TATE: As I understand the concept of intended loss, I said it's not present here. The intent -- the intended loss, you have to intend for the lender to take a loss, or whoever the victim was in the case, which the government has charged there are lenders --

THE COURT: Or investors.

MR. TATE: The investors can't be victims because the government identified them as co-conspirators at trial when they put them on the stand and had them introduce 801(d)(2)(e) statements.

THE COURT: No. See, that's where I disagree with you as a matter of law.

A co-conspirator can also be a victim. When they are lulled into something and they commit fraud, and then they find out their commission of fraud leads to them being -- losing their own home from the fact they are having to cover a default or deficiency in a foreclosure, they lose their own home. They lose their credit worthiness. They were victims. They are co-conspirators and they're victims.

MR. TATE: I would respect the Court's ruling if that's the ruling --

THE COURT: I'm saying legally a victim can be a co-conspirator.

MR. TATE: Well, the Guidelines say they can't.

They said if they are a culpable participant, they can't be considered a victim.

And when they put them in on the stand they said they -- because at that time I asked them -- I said the judge is going to -- it's going to -- the Court is going to have to consider it foundationally for evidentiary rules like 801(d)(2)(e) statements. The government said they were unindicted co-conspirators.

THE COURT: Okay. And I went too far adrift on that. We need to -- I think I've got your argument: That Mr. Cloud personally never intended for anyone to lose any money. He intended for everyone to be whole. That's your --

MR. TATE: To make more than whole. That everyone would make money in this thing.

And what we're saying is we relying on Fourth Circuit decision in *United States v. Bolden*. And in *Bolden* they said the fact that the defendant is aware the scope of overall operations having been held accountable for activities the whole operation -- determine the role the

defendant agreed to play.

And the role the defendant agreed to play here with Mr. Henderson was his invitation -- it was a standing invitation. I asked him at the trial, "Sir, if I would have brought you a buyer, would you have given me 50 percent?"

He said, "Yes."

This was not a part of any criminal conspiracy.

He's basically a booster. If he brings somebody in, there's a reward. His agreement was with Dan Greene.

THE COURT: He's a recruiter.

MR. TATE: Mr. Cloud knew somebody, took him to Mr. Henderson and he got at commission out of it. That was the end of their dealings, the only dealings he ever had. It wasn't a part of any other aspect of Mr. Henderson.

Mr. Strong, he had a limited role, was that Mr. Strong borrowed him some money after Daniel Greene referred Strong for a loan. He said that was the extent of our dealings. I didn't know why he was loaning the money. He paid me back with interest, and I was happy to get it back.

Mr. Bryant, we never heard from Mr. Bryant. We know that Mr. Bryant had some dealings with Mr. Mirman. The did two deals, Mr. Cloud's name was not on those transactions. Just because Mr. Cloud knew Mr. Mirman and Mr. Bryant, and that Mr. Cloud sold houses to Mr. Mirman at some other time doesn't make him vicariously liable for any

and everything Michael Bryant did.

Now, common scheme and plan.

All the literature on these cases, they are like blueprints, and they say at all times -- this is how they operate: If that were the case, Mr. Cloud would be liable not just for losses of any and every mortgage fraud here, but anywhere in the United States, because they all have a common scheme and plan. They all use straw buyers. They did not even use the same people.

If you look at the lenders here, most of the loans done by Mr. Bryant, done by Mr. Henderson, a lot of them were subprime loans.

Mr. Cloud, when he dealt with Mr. Greene, those were performing or confirming loans that went through Fannie Mae, that means they were not subprime. People had to use certain underwriting standards by Freddie Mac. There was evidence of that.

When you get into some of these subprime loans, they were outside the time frame of the indictment Mr. Cloud was charged. There's no evidence he was ever involved or knew anything about it.

They were subprime. And during that time, Your Honor, you heard evidence it didn't -- in many instances it didn't require them to state it, they just came in and said what their income was, and it was encouraged by the lenders.

The other distinction is both Ken Bill and Mr.

Henderson are not similarly situated with Mr. Cloud. They
were builders. They had licensed people that had a license.

Real estate people connected to them. Mr. Cloud was not
even in their class of people. They were builders.

Mr. Henderson builder. Just like Beazer Homes, he was
building properties. He had special privileges with the
banks and underwriters that Mr. Cloud knew nothing about.

And so he's not even similarity situated to these people.

And trying to tax him with hundreds of loans that they did outside of the scope of this time frame, when they did one limited transaction with him, we think would be error.

Additionally, they haven't even proven that even if those transactions involving other people were fraudulent they were losses. There's no evidence there are any losses in connection with those other properties or those other defendants who were charged in different indictments to even come up with a ten million. It's just a number that seemingly is picked out of the sky; that we've seen nothing that would support that there were any losses in connection with those properties.

THE COURT: But you had the opportunity to see all of these records that Ms. Easley prepared.

MR. TATE: No. Her records are --

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THE COURT: Did you call?

MR. TATE: Your Honor, we've looked at those. We're saying they are not evidence. We haven't seen anything from the lenders in these other 230 cases that suggest there were any losses. We went out and got the records ourselves for the 94 that were identified.

THE COURT: See, now, yes, I know what you pulled. You pulled some very narrow actual losses. And you also said when there was no losses, there was no loss whatsoever. And yet that's not the law. The law is the higher of actual or intended loss.

MR. TATE: Right. Of course, our position is there was no intended loss.

THE COURT: I understand your position that there is know intended loss, but that -- the Court has to legally and factually reject that, and I want to explain why.

Under your theory, there was no intended loss.

Bernie Madoff would not be in prison right now. You're

basically arguing that if you're running any form of fraud

scheme, you're always hoping to catch up. That's the goal.

You're claim here was hoping to catch up, meaning hopefully

the properties would be resold quickly -- or not going into

foreclosure, and -- or some tenant would get in there and

actually be a good, honest tenant that would stay there and

pay, but -- and hopefully that would cover the debt

servicing.

The bottom line, the loans were made based on fraud, extensive amounts of fraud. And hoping that the fraud would never be detected, because you could stay ahead of the cash flow by either having the property eventually sold again, or having a good tenant in there that would cover the cash flow, is kind of a fanciful view of no intended loss.

Bernie Madoff, and all Ponzi operators hope they are going to be able to cover everybody, but eventually the house of the cards collapses. And so that argument of intended loss, that "I never really intended anyone to be victimized but I got in over my head and I got ahead of myself," is just really a fanciful view of intended loss because it would mean it would never be intended loss ever.

MR. TATE: The way -- even the cases the government cited where it was only two courts that I saw filed intended loss in this kind of a case, they found because there's inflated appraisals. The people -- they duped people. The said come and buy this house --

THE COURT: But we haven't inflated appraisals on this, but we have also outright lies on loan applications, we have lies with the underwriter. We have bribes paid to the underwriter. We have real estate closing attorneys, who have fiduciary duty, who are watching money being churned

through their accounts that wrong people were bringing in down payments. There's just a vast multitude of fraud in each of these transactions.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ TATE: No -- no -- no qualms with that at all. We agree.

THE COURT: I appreciate with you agreeing with me there.

Now, so there's -- the intended loss comes from the fact that when you create the fraud and you get money you're not supposed to get from an lender, that hoping that that lender will get paid back in whole down the line is not a defense to intended loss.

Intended loss, as you know, I've got a flip that's occurring on the same day, or within a couple days, and I have -- you know, it's 100,000 purchase for the first day, first transaction; it's flipped to \$130,000 the same day or the next day, there's no way your property appreciates 30 percent in this one day.

MR. TATE: What the evidence was in this case, and if the Court would listen to me mechanically how this works.

There's no dispute: Mr. Cloud owned these properties. And the evidence was even Brian (ph) said they were in foreclosure. When the house is already in foreclosure, it's already in a reduced rate because the lender -- we're going to put on evidence of this effect --

the lender is only interested in recouping what's 1 2 outstanding on the house. THE COURT: No, that's the first lender. 3 4 They are not trying to get full market MR. TATE: value. 5 THE COURT: Are you saying that -- you're saying 6 7 purchasing a property out of foreclosure before he was flipping it. That's what you're saying. 8 9 MR. TATE: Right. He had rights to the house.

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What the government would have to show you that you intended to defraud the lender because they issued a

loan on a house that wasn't worth what they put into it.

THE COURT: Well, then why -- why did he have to

bring down payments or bring in investors?

MR. TATE: Because he was selling them the house.

THE COURT: No, he wasn't selling them the house. The investor thought we were buying the house, but knew that -- well, excuse me. The banks knew the investors were buying the house for a residence, when the investors never intended to do that. And they were just really nominee owners of the property. He was kind of de facto owner of the property in the sense that he was responsible for putting a tenant and doing other things to keep it from going into foreclosure.

MR. TATE: This deal was all about him getting a

house at a lower price and selling it at a higher.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. TATE: The issue price he sold it to a party, was it inflated? Was it the fair market value of the house? We're saying it was, despite the lies about -- of what was needed to qualify the straw buyers, there was no intent that the lenders loosing any money; there was no intent that the straw buyers loose any money. The idea was that the house would keep appreciating and they would sell it and make money.

But it was a business. Once you try to put renters in there, you try to get it Section VIII qualified -- if you have well intentions, if you don't know how to do that, it doesn't happen. Now you're over your head.

There was ample evidence that Mr. Cloud had keys to properties. He was going down and trying to do evictions. And most of these mortgages did not go into foreclosure right away. It was several years don't the line. People had paid money. Mortgage payments had been paid on these houses. There was no intent to defraud the lender.

He was a bad businessman, is what happened. You get tenants in there. They don't pay the rent. Now it's going to cost money to get them evicted. Who's going to pay

for that? See, people don't think through all of that.

THE COURT: But you're right, people don't think

through all of it. But the thing is, is that they know what

they are -- they are intending to do something that is not

5 | legally and factually possible.

MR. TATE: That's right.

THE COURT: And, therefore, that is what ends up being the intended loss. All -- they don't know the exact dollar amount of the intended loss per se, but what they are hoping -- they are hoping to benefit in a spread, for example, and they are hoping that they will catch up in a few months or years by keeping the cash flow positive on the property.

MR. TATE: Well, see, what are they trying to catch up?

THE COURT: They trying to catch up on the fact that there's the quick flip, and the flip is under fraudulent pretenses.

MR. TATE: No. That's not the evidence in this case.

THE COURT: Oh, yes, it is. Every single flip was under fraudulent pretenses.

MR. TATE: The flip itself was legal. What was under fraudulent pretenses was the loan application.

THE COURT: Right. I agree. I agree. They

couldn't have gotten -- Mr. Cloud couldn't have gotten this money. Two things couldn't have happened: Mr. Cloud wouldn't have gotten the spread and Mr. Cloud could have never gotten the loan in the first place because he wouldn't qualify for those loans if he was buying --

MR. TATE: Mr. Cloud didn't get a single loan. It was the straw buyers that got the loans.

THE COURT: But that's the point, isn't it?

MR. TATE: Yes. But the issue is outside of the fraudulent loan application, just because you intend -- a person could intend to do a fraudulent loan application to live in their own primary residence. Their own house. We just want a house. They pay the house off or sell it and go somewhere, they didn't intend for the lender to lose any money. I mean people go buy houses everyday. If that's the case, anybody who buys a house or loses their job and goes into foreclosure, they should have foresaw they might lose their job.

THE COURT: If they lied on the loan application, yes, that's --

MR. TATE: They committed the crime which is bank fraud or whatever it is. That's the crime. But the issue of loss is separate and a different analysis than underlying offense. That's what I'm saying. In order to get into the intended lose, it's Mr. Cloud's intent, not what Probation

thinks it is, not what the FBI thinks it is.

THE COURT: But I'm saying you're view of intended loss is the same as Bernie Madoff's theory, or any Ponzi, is that we will stay ahead of the cash flow issue, and hopefully -- you know, in Bernie Madoff case or any Ponzi scheme case you hope the equities market just skyrockets, and because it skyrockets, you can catch up.

Eikewise, your client's hoping that the real estate values of property will skyrocket, and that property can be sold down the line at such an appreciation that it covers his -- the flip that he was involved in, and that the property is rented in the interim that keeps the property from the going into foreclosure.

MR. TATE: With all due respect, Your Honor, I disagree. First of all, he didn't need to cover the flip because the amount that the house was sold at was the fair market value.

THE COURT: Well, see that -- except for where you had fraudulent appraisals.

MR. TATE: There wasn't no fraudulent appraisals.

THE COURT: See, that's a factual issue. So you are arguing that every single one of his sales was at fair market value.

MR. TATE: Yes, the evidence --

THE COURT: No, that's not the evidence. What's

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your evidence to show that every single one of these properties was sold as fair market value?

MR. TATE: The fact that Fannie Mae bought them and didn't send them back to the lender when they have provisions to do that if there was responsible appraisal. The fact that not a single fraudulent appraisal was not introduced into evidence into this case. The fact there wasn't single testimony about any fraudulent appraisal that would have suggested the house --

THE COURT: In this case there weren't a lot of fraudulent appraisals, but there are fraudulent appraisals -- but there were fraudulent appraisals in this grand scheme.

MR. MEYERS: Your Honor, there are so many factual misrepresentations presented that I'd like to correct the record.

First of all, we did not put on an appraiser to testify that they were fraudulent. However, we introduced numerous fraudulent appraisals. And the way they were fraudulent is -- and it's alleged in the indictment and the jury found it, the appraisals are in evidence --

THE COURT: Right. And it says in the indictment there were fraudulent appraisals.

MR. MEYERS: Absolutely. Mr. Cloud would be falsely represented on the appraisals as the owner of the

property before he owned the property. Those appraisals were false. I want to show the Court an example.

MR. TATE: Let me say, that that has nothing to do

with inflating the market value.

MR. MEYERS: Mr. Tate, I let you talk for a long time. I'd like to correct a few of the misrepresentations you've made.

One of the things Mr. Tate said was that there was no fraudulent appraisals because they were all bought out of foreclosure.

THE COURT: That's not true, though. There was a couple bought out of foreclosure. I don't know how many specifically, by my review of the evidence is not many were bought out of foreclosure.

MR. MEYERS: It's not true and it's not relevant.

If the Court looks at, for example, at

Government's 57A and 57E which were introduced in evidence.

This is a property Eda -- Edna Griffin Fish and her husband,

Robert Fish. That's not a foreclosure company.

Mr. Cloud bought it on November 28th, 2000. It's closed at John Lee's office, and he sold it same day, November 28th, 2000, for 120 percent increase.

The way he did that, as the evidence established, was by paying the straw buyers to sign the documents without reading them.

I wanted to correct the statement that there was no fraud outside the loan applications. It's simply not true.

There was fraud on the HUD-1 Settlement Statements as well. There was fraud on the appraisals. Those appraisals are in evidence.

It's true that it wasn't a focus of the government's case because there was so much other fraud in the case we didn't focus on the appraisals, but there was evidence false appraisals. And one thing, the increase in price, we had experts testifying about it.

The suggestion that Mr. Cloud had nothing to do with the appraisals is also false. We have numerous documents in which Mr. Cloud is ordering the appraisals that are in evidence, in the Presentence Report.

The suggestion that all of this talk about Mr. Cloud's intent, there's no evidence of Mr. Cloud's intent in this case. Mr. Cloud didn't testify. That's his right. Mr. Tate's saying he hoped for it to work. That's not evidence.

THE COURT: It goes back to what I'm saying, in every tiered fraud scheme, the goal of the perpetrator of the fraud is hopefully to catch up.

MR. MEYERS: Agreed, Your Honor.

THE COURT: In every one; whether it's mortgage

fraud or Ponzi or whatever .

MR. MEYERS: And I'm sure, you know, that in some part of his brain that rationalized his conduct, if there was such a part, he hoped these properties would have appreciate in value, despite in the increasing them one day by 120 percent, as in this case. There's no way he would have legitimately thought that.

The First Circuit addresses this claim in this case in *United States v. Innarelli*, which is cited in the Government's Sentencing Memorandum on page 46.

There the Court of Appeals rejected the defendant's argument and, quote, "never intended the buyers to default." The court said, "We focus our loss inquiry on the objective reasonable expectation of a person in his position at the time he perpetrated the fraud, not on his subjective intentions or hopes."

The only way this objective intent came into Mr. Cloud's sentencing memorandum was by false citations. The cited to the Fourth Circuit case.

THE COURT: Well, the Court knows it's an objectively reasonable standard, not a subjective standard with regard to loss. Because otherwise, it would be a meaningless standard because no defendant would ever have the intent to have a loss.

MR. MEYERS: Intent of loss in the Presentence

Report has been repeatedly approved by the Court of Appeals, by the First Circuit, *Innarelli*, on page 46; on the Seventh Circuit in *Bryson*; by the Eleventh Circuit in *Greene*, and it fits the intent of the co-conspirators. They talked about getting the spread. They talked about the spread. The spread is the difference between the loan amount and what they had to pay for the property.

And to be precise here, the intended lose is the entire loan amount. That's the intended money that they intended to get out of it. It's fair to subtract from that a proxy for the value of the house. Because Mr. Cloud knew once there was a foreclosure on the loan, the lender could get the house back.

So I think it's fair, although the intent of loss amount is the entire loan money that was gotten by fraud, that's what they did. They get loan money by fraud. It's fair to substract, even in intended loss calculations, I think, a proxy for the value of the house.

THE COURT: But that's what the Probation Office did.

 ${\tt MR.\ MEYERS:}$ That's what the Probation Office did.

THE COURT: In every one of these calculations.

MR. MEYERS: And the Courts of Appeals have repeatedly approved that methodology.

Take the loan amount, which is the money they got

by lying. Subtract from that a reasonable proxy for the value of the house. A reasonable proxy is what Cloud paid for it because that's the only free market transaction that existed in this case, what Mr. Cloud went out and bought it for. Not all of our -- well, if even they are, it's not like he was the only one there. Lots of people bid on these houses. That is a reasonable approximate fair market.

2.

I want to address the question of what this Court has to do to include the losses from the other co-conspirators.

THE COURT: The Court has to make findings of fact whether these individuals are co-conspirators or they ran separate conspiracies, or were not part of the same common scheme or plan. The Court does understand that's something it has to do.

MR. MEYERS: Yes. The Court has to find what a reasonable approximation of the loss from those co-conspirators if it's attributable to this defendant.

This Court does not have to do that on a house-by-house basis. It simply doesn't have to do that. The courts are the quite clear. The Guidelines say that the Court needs to make reasonable approximation of the loss. Fraud cases are complicated, this Courts of Appeal have repeated held. This Court needs to make a reasonable approximation of this loss.

This Court could do that by taking, as set forth in Comment (3)(c) of Section 2B1.1 of the Guidelines, by simply taking the approximate number of victims, multiple by the average lost to each victim. This Court could do that here if it wanted to. It could simply say this was the approximate loss, and multiplying that by the number of houses. The Court could do that if it wanted to.

What the Presentence Report suggests instead -- in fact, it enures to the defendant's benefit -- I think the Court could reasonably say what we're talking about was what was reasonably foreseeable to this defendant. He knew they was doing the same thing, in the same area as him, with the same co-conspirators. I say the reasonably -- an approximate estimation of the loss attributable to him is the same as him. He knew that he caused around \$3 million in loss. He could have reasonably assumed that his promotors would have caused \$3 million of loss. So for the intent of loss, that would be a reasonable process for this Court to do, and that would be much worse for the Defendant Cloud.

THE COURT: Much closer to 12 million.

MR. MEYERS: Yes, sir.

Instead, what the Presentence Report says it's used as the reasonable approximation, a stipulated loss.

It's backed up by all the documents in the government's open

file, that this defendant has access to more than three years. Now, so the Court is well within its rights to do that.

I want to correct a couple other things. Ken Bill was not a builder. That was part of the problem. They had a company, just like Prestigious Homes. Cloud wasn't a builder. He had a company that sounded like a builder, Prestigious Homes, but he didn't build any houses. Don Henderson did build houses at one point, but not any of the fraud houses. The fraud houses, he acted just like Cloud did; just like Ken Bill did. Michael Bryant wasn't a builder. It's just not true.

There's no evidence that these were subprime loans or stated income loans or NINA loans. There's no evidence of that. All the evidence is to the contrary.

So all of the attachments to the defendant's

Sentencing Memorandum about Countrywide, state income loans
and NINA loans, it's just a red herring. There's no
evidence of that being the case in these cases.

I also want to address -- I don't know if the court will address it -- we've looked, even though it came in Sunday morning, yesterday morning, at Mr. Tate's actual loss calculation. It is riddled with errors.

He repeatedly picks the wrong deed to determine the foreclosure sale amount. He picks the trustee deed,

which is the deed filed by the bank, which is the tax value in most cases, or reasonably close proximity to the tax value. The deed that matters is the warrant deed, the resale from the foreclosure company to the new buyer. And that one, way lower. So the actual loss calculations by Mr. Tate are just wrong.

actual -- substitute trustee or the trustee, but you normally say substitute trustee -- that is bidding the bank's actual loan principal plus cost. That's normally what -- the foreclosure bid in the financial institution is not -- as I said, they are bidding their remaining principle and cost. They are not actually bidding fair market value.

MR. MEYERS: I'd be happy to show the court a few examples of that, just so the Court understands. Again, we don't think the Court needs to get into actual loss.

Just so the Court understand, I'm putting on the document cam a modified version of Mr. Tate's spreadsheet. Again, we got this yesterday morning, which was a Sunday. We did do our best to work on that.

We have a few examples here that show the error that was made by the defendant, Cloud.

For example, No. 12, on this spreadsheet is 2301 Sanders Avenue in Charlotte, North Carolina. This document claims that the loan amount was 135,000, and by and large

once we check, the loans amounts seemed to be correct. He claims there's no loss. Zero loss for this property. This is an example of different kind of error.

In fact, the actual resale amount is \$88,000, and I can show the Court that by showing the government -- by showing the Court Government's Exhibit 101A.

This is a real estate lookup for this. In fact, when a loan is sold, resold, to a true buyer, Mr. Morris, the price is \$88,000. You can see the trustee deed which is loan 135, much higher in this example. So the true resale price is 188,000, which makes for an actual loss of \$47,000.

The Court will note that for 2301 Sanders, which is this property, the PSR loss is less, \$36,000. So this is one example in which Mr. Tate's spreadsheet says that there was zero loss; in reality there was an actual loss of \$47,000, and it is more than the presentence loss.

I'll take the Court to the next example.

THE COURT: The presence loss, column X, is taken from the Cloud properties chart, Cloud only, which is incorporated as part of paragraph 12 to the Presentence Report.

MR. MEYERS: That's correct.

THE COURT: That's where column X is coming from, from paragraph 12 and the chart attached to that.

MR. MEYERS: That is correct, Your Honor. And

that's the loss from -- I will mark the document I'm using as Government's Exhibit 101.

So in this case the actual loss actually exceeds the intended loss.

The next example is 9255 Hutchinson Lane. It's a Rodney Thompson transaction.

The Court heard Mr. Thompson testify at the trial. The claim said the loan amount was 199. There was a foreclosure amount of \$135,000. That column K comes from the defendant's spreadsheet. In reality, as the Court can see looking at 101B, that \$135,000 number is the trustee deed. In reality it resold for less than that, \$128,000.

I can show the Court the trustee deed came from the defendant, and it clearly says "trustee deed," and it shows it's Chase Manhattan mortgage, \$135,000. That's the trustee deed.

And this, by the way, illustrates a number of factual inaccuracies proffered to the Court earlier, which is that Fannie Mae never forced the banks to buy them back.

Just to the contrary. The standing agreement that Chase and just about ever other lender had with Fannie Mae was that if there's fraud, you have to buy the loan back.

And this is an example, obviously, in which Chase did.

MR. TATE: Excuse me. I'm sorry. It is not.

Chase was a servicer, so their name goes on the trustee. The

loan was sold to the bank and we have the records from that.

MR. MEYERS: Okay. We're going to see some of those records pertaining to Fannie Mae actually which show the true actual loss.

Let's get to the point here. The point here is that the numbers are wrong from what the defendant submitted. They said 128; the actual loss is the loan amount, which is 199 minus 128; which is, in fact, 71-five. The PSR loss is a little bit higher than that, the intended loss, \$75,500.

Look at the next example, which is 1609 Forest Street. Douglas Edwards. Mr. Tate's spreadsheet says if the loan amount is 111. We believe that to be correct based on our limited research we were able to do yesterday, in reality -- and he says their foreclosure amount was \$90,000, and, therefore, there would be a loss of zero. Well, that on its face is just poor arithmetic. Now, again, that's just a typo, I see.

MR. TATE: No. We said there was an intervening sale. That being somebody else got the property and sold it. I mean, theoretically if that were the case --

THE COURT: How did you have an intervening sale, because on a Deed of Trust you have a due-on-sale clause. So the property should have still been in the name of the original party that acquired it under the mortgage, unless

it's an assumable mortgage, but there haven't been many assumable mortgages for a decade.

MR. TATE: We have an intervening sale. My understanding is that whoever --

THE COURT: But that's fraudulent, though. If there's a due-on-sale clause and there was an intervening sale, then that was a fraudulent sale.

MR. MEYERS: I have the documents right here. I'd be happy to illustrate for the court.

THE COURT: Maybe I should -- so I'm not misleading anyone, the Court has a pretty substantial background in real estate closings and real estate finance. The Court was a real estate paralegal. I did 400 title investigations for purposes of closings before I went to law school. When I was in law school, I was also a joint MBA, and I concentrated in real estate finance and took a substantial amount of secondary mortgage market courses, real estate finance courses, tax and financial accounting. I have probably about 40 to 50 hours of intermediate and advanced accounting.

So I just wanted everyone to know that I do understand this terminology. And so if I respond quickly like say there's a due-on-sale clause, it's because I have a background in real estate finance and real estate closing.

MR. MEYERS: Thank you, Your Honor.

I want to show the Court 101C, which is the real estate look-up for Forest Stream Court in Charlotte, and there they have the trustee deed being 91,000, and the actually resale -- actually 93,000 to Zito Latino (ph).

Again, it shows the error in them picking the wrong deed. Here's the substitute trustee's deed, which is the next page of this exhibit, and it shows it's the Deutsche Bank National Trust Company. So again the are looking at the wrong deed when they're trying to do the resale. In this case it's actually to the defendant, Cloud's, benefit because it actually resold for a higher amount.

But, again, just to show the Court for reliability of what they have submitted is not reliable. Here, in fact, are the stamps. The way the Court can find the sales prices is divide the stamp by two, and times them by a thousand. I'm not so brave as to do that on the spot.

Here, what we've got, though, then is a actual loss of this one, of \$18,000; the PSR intended loss is \$16,000. This shows again an actual loss that's higher.

Look at the next one, which is 4203 Brian Furr Drive, no 52 on Mr. Tate's spreadsheet. What's listed here is a loan amount of \$87,300. There's no foreclosure amount listed on the spread sheet and therefore it didn't go into losses. In fact, the resale amount, after foreclosure, was

\$60,000.

MR. TATE: Again, so we're clear, that's why I want the government to put on their evidence instead of going back to Furr. Furr Lane is the property from Alice Ben (ph), and we could not find any evidence of a foreclosure.

a presentation on the actual intended loss that was related to all the co-conspirators. And after we had, the Court had ruled on that, then deal with the issue of the unintended victims, such as the communities and neighborhoods. Because I think, one, it is dependent on the other, and I think it would have allowed the parties to better argued the unintended victims after we made a determination of the actual intended lose, the direct victims.

MR. MEYERS: To be clear, Your Honor, the government supports and suggests that the Court adopt the intended loss calculation of the Presentence Report which has been affirmed over and over by courts of appeals.

THE COURT: And that's basically the Cloud properties, Cloud-only chart, that is incorporated by reference in paragraph 12. Obviously, Mr. Tate, you have reviewed that whole chart because you referenced it in your column X on your chart. You had that chart, right?

MR. TATE: Yes, we do have it.

MR. MEYERS: Just to be clear, Your Honor, column 1 2 R through F on this chart were added by the government in order to show the error --3 THE COURT: Oh, I see. 4 MR. MEYERS: -- Mr. Tate's reasonableness. 5 6 THE COURT: This is your variation of Mr. Tate's 7 chart . I'll put a yellow line down here. 8 MR. MEYERS: 9 couldn't adjust it to put columns in the middle. columns L from the left are from Mr. Tate's chart, and 10 columns R through Y are the government's, and this is 11 12 intended to show the Court the errors. THE COURT: No, I understand. You've clarified 13 14 for the Court, but Mr. Tate, you've always had access and 15 reviewed that Cloud properties, Cloud-only chart? 16 MR. TATE: Yes, we've had a copy of the chart, and 17 that's what we use to prepare our chart. 18 And just so it's clear, that's why I wanted the 19 government to go forward and deal with it in that way is 20 that on this chart there are a number of properties that say "no data," and just picked a price of \$32,000. 21 22 THE COURT: Well, but Ms. Easley explained that 23 that's an averaging process that the Probation Office used 24 that's based on, as Mr. Meyers said, case law and the 25 Sentencing Guidelines. It's a reasonable calculation when

you don't have complete data.

MR. TATE: Yeah. I think for some of those homes we did find data that suggest no loss at all. And then I think it was Ms. Easley that said the 32,000 was based on some figure divided by the number of defendants that came from precisely what we're objecting to, Henderson, Strong, and those folks.

THE COURT: Right. Right, I understand that, but that was the same process that was used -- no, actually you used the stipulated amount.

PROBATION OFFICER: Right. Other ones I used that and that was based on the same amount. 32,000 number came up just from the Cloud -- and in fact, it should be higher than that now because when I did it, I based it on the first number that we had, which was most mostly intended loss, which was \$2 million. Now with the actual loss in some of those properties, it was increased to 3 million, which would increase our average so we should have used the new data.

MR. MEYERS: What I'm doing for the Court right now is I don't want the Court to be under the misapprehension that there was no actual loss.

THE COURT: Oh, no, no, no. The Court knows in many properties, or to define an actual loss in many properties, or the intended loss, the Sentencing Guidelines -- the Court's understanding of the Sentencing

Guidelines is you can use the higher of those two.

MR. MEYERS: Absolutely. And so the Court doesn't need to address this, but I do think it's relevant for the record that the charts submitted by the defense in this case arises at its conclusions by simply looking at in the most cases the wrong deed or just getting the numbers wrong. We were able to put together about ten samples. I can run through them pretty quickly here.

THE COURT: No. No, my -- you can just introduce your variation of Mr. Tate's chart. What I want to do is proceed.

Like I said earlier, I wanted to do this in two phases: The actual intended loss directly from this conspiracy, and then the unintended loss from the neighborhoods.

And Mr. Tate is taking the position there's no intended loss of his client, and, therefore, should only rely on actual loss in the handful of cases there are. And I think Mr. Tate, you aren't presenting any additional evidence other than what you've handed up to the Court in relying on the Presentence Report which has these already prepared charts in it?

MR. MEYERS: And two weeks of trial testimony.

THE COURT: And two weeks -- and all the trial testimony. All the records there. You're not putting

Special Agent McNeely back up to add to the record. 1 2 MR. MEYERS: Oh, there's nothing -- I think that's right, Your Honor. The evidence of his intent was the way 3 he acted and what he told the --4 THE COURT: Right. So what we need to be doing 5 right now is allowing Mr. Tate to present his factual case 6 7 against the actual and intended loss, and then get to the unintended victims in the second phase after the Court's 8 9 made a ruling on that. Thank you, Your Honor. 10 MR. MEYERS: I would introduce at this point Government's 11 12 Exhibit 101. Again, it shows again in nearly every case the 13

Again, it shows again in nearly every case the actual loss, when you look at the correct deed, exceeds the intended loss that is in the Presentence Report.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

All right, Mr. Tate.

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MR. TATE: Your Honor, at this time we haven't had it marked. We will have marked as Defendant's Exhibit 1 our chart, and ask it be moved into evidence.

We stand on our chart and the figures therein. I think the record is just as reliable, more reliable than those produced by the government.

In addition, we reassert our objection to many of those properties as not being relevant conduct and not being

tied to Cloud.

We do intend to during -- put on a witness during the collateral damages stage that will address some of the lending practices, a review of the statements, and where these houses were purchased. And our position is to -- in order to determine -- when you look at a loss, the Guidelines are specific. It has to be a victim, and they define a victim as a person -- or a person, including the corporation, has suffered actual pecuniary harm. That's the leap they -- that any lender that lent a loan here was a victim for the purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines and also, they sustained a loss.

Even when there's a foreclosure doesn't mean there was a loss, even if the loss was less than the loan amount, because as our witness will testify the originator of these loans services the loan. That's where they make their money. They don't make their money transacting with Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, they're going to get money to servicing the loan, and that's where the huge profits come in as well.

We believe that we can demonstrate that a number of these loans are actually sold.

Now, just so the Court is clear, we don't believe that we necessarily have a burden of proof at all, but we endeavored to go out and as best we could to assign these deeds. It was a daunting task to come up with the loss

amounts to the extent we could.

A number of these, in the 94 properties -- I don't know the exact number -- but a number of them are classified as attempts. That means there was never any loan issued at all, and then they have been assigned a loss value 32,000 apiece, and that's what we specifically object to.

One, that it's not an attempt to do anything illegal. Two, that it had anything to do with Cloud; and three, that that's suggested as an intended loss.

I did ample research, too, and we did look at the case where the government cited where the Court's found -- and I would say that most of the authorities say that you use actual loss in this case. That dealt with bank-fraud type cases.

Now, when I look at the cases that went to specific -- they talked about intended loss, it always talked about the intended defendant. And where they found intended loss in most cases was the defendant's scheme was to sell the house at an inflated appraisal. And there was evidence introduced that there was an inflated appraisal that showed the value of house being higher than what they were selling it for. And then the purchaser of the home was still --

THE COURT: I understand all your argument. But what evidence do you have to present -- not argument -- what

evidence do you have at this time.

MR. TATE: Other than our chart of intended loss, we would present our chart that shows there was no intended loss, and the lack of evidence that there was an intended loss on Mr. Cloud's part.

We would suggest that the record as a whole suggests that the intent of all the parties involved, including anyone that testified in his trial, Mr. Greene, Ms. Dauria, the straw buyers, the intent was that they make money, not that they intended to defraud the lender and get more money for a house that really wasn't worth that.

This was a real estate investment. It was a real estate investment scheme, is what it was, and the proposition was that, you know, I can find a house that's in a depressed condition, thereby that -- the prices, he can buy the house that's artificially low because the lender -- and the Court said he was involved in real estate -- the lender is only interested --

THE COURT: I was -- I want to make clear I never practiced real estate law but I was a real estate paralegal, and -- but I do have, on the accounting and finance side, I do have an extensive background in real state finance.

MR. TATE: We intend to get this on with our witness. I just wanted to put it on a good amount ahead of time.

What we're basically saying is that Mr. Cloud bought these homes, oftentimes -- not always -- they're in foreclosure. Whoever is the lender is only interested in getting back that's owed on the home. So what's what they sell it for. The house may as well be worth more than that because, as the Court may know, if the lender takes in more than that, more than what the house is worth, then they have to give the residual --

THE COURT: Back to the person who signed the promissory note.

MR. TATE: So, Mr. Cloud, I think the evidence was, would go in and put down \$200 on it and said, "I want the right to buy the house." He didn't own it yet.

Mr. Greene who is the mortgage broker, lenders will not allow Mr. Cloud to do an appraisal --

THE COURT: You still have to outbid the financial institution, so \$200, plus whatever the financial institution is bidding.

MR. TATE: Well, the financial institution may not be linked. If he goes directly to the person that's holding the foreclosure and say, "I'm going to find a buyer. I want to rights to by this house," and the banks allow it and authorize simultaneous closings and then find somebody else; sells it to the --

THE COURT: Okay. Show me the evidence of that.

1 MR. TATE: The evidence of what?

THE COURT: Of a simultaneous closing, where he had an authorization from an financial institution to do that.

MR. TATE: No. The evidence was at the trial was that they were simultaneous closings.

THE COURT: No. No. No. What he just said was that a financial institution was going to go and put property in foreclosure, and he went to the financial institution and got permission to do this simultaneous transaction where he would buy it and flip it.

I don't recall any evidence of that at trial. So if you have evidence of that, present it.

MR. TATE: Let me take a look.

THE COURT: I do not recall any of that. I would have definitely remembered -- if he had a written authorization from an financial institution to do that, I would have remembered that. I reviewed the transcript yesterday, and I don't remember any testimony to that. If that's true, let's hear it. Let's hear the evidence. If you have don't have evidence, then I have to deal with the way the evidence is.

MR. TATE: Let's for the sake of argument here, what I'm saying the value of the house that Mr. Cloud sold it at versus what the buyer of that is not a fair -- is not

a loss -- it's not an intended loss. It's an attempt to make a profit. But it hasn't been established that it's fraudulent. Because if the house was not worth what it was appraised for, the lender would reject it. And I think the Court can take judicial notice of that. They would reject it.

of fraudulent real estate appraisals, and the government didn't have to get into it in this particularly case because the focus for the jury, in front of the jury -- they're focus before the jury was the transaction itself was just fraudulent because it was purported to be a residential purchaser when they were an investment purchaser. But they were fraudulent real estate appraisals in this case --

MR. TATE: Fraudulent in what context? How were they fraudulent?

THE COURT: They were inflated. The real estate appraiser would have known of the flip and would have known that the property sold at one value in the morning and one value in the afternoon, and in preparing its flip, would have known the actual nature of the double transaction.

MR. TATE: Okay. But I'm not aware of any appraisal that was faulty, other than the government's position it was fraudulent merely because Bill Cloud was listed as the owner.

I haven't seen any evidence or any testimony that a particular property appraisal or a property in this case was appraised as a value higher than what it actually was worth. And that's what I'm talking about. And in the cases is I've looked at that about talked about intended loss.

THE COURT: But then why would the property have had a hard time selling in a foreclosure, when down the line, when there's no rent to cover the debt servicing, then why couldn't the property have sold close to what the investor had acquired it for?

MR. TATE: Well, they did; and oftentimes they sold it for more. They showed an example of ten, but if there's 94 houses that we got --

THE COURT: So we're back to intended loss, not actual loss.

MR. TATE: Right. And our position is that they have to show something that he intended a loss and the burden doesn't shift to us to prove he didn't.

THE COURT: No, no, no. Now, but you made a factual assertion a moment ago of something that there's nothing in the record; that he had authorization from financial institutions to pull a property out of foreclosure, so to end the foreclosure start -- it was in a foreclosure start. He went to a financial institution and got authorization to do a direct purchase from the person

selling it, and the financial institution would stop the foreclosure and then he could resell it.

You're right. That would be a probably pretty honest transaction so long as the resale was to a true residential purchaser, not an investor. But where is the evidence of that?

MR. TATE: I'm saying we're relying on the lack of evidence.

THE COURT: No. No. No. You just asserted a legitimate transaction all the way through, and I'm trying to find the evidence of that in the record.

MR. TATE: What I'm saying, Your Honor, just so it's clear, is that there is no evidence of a fraudulent appraisal.

THE COURT: Okay. I agree in this -- that not every one of these properties had a fraudulent appraisal on it. The government didn't present fraudulent appraisals to the jury in this case because that wasn't important for meeting the elements of conspiracy in the fraud charges.

But there were -- there is in the record, as Mr. Meyers said in the open file, there are fraudulent appraisals. But that still begs the question of the fact there was an intended loss versus as actual loss.

MR. TATE: Our position is this: One, that the open file is not evidence. Because it's an open file it's

not evidence.

THE COURT: I agree. Open file is not evidence.

But they presented a methodology that was used by the

Probation Office for the intended loss calculation. Your

response is: There was never an intended loss. And there's

no evidence to show there was never an intended loss.

MR. TATE: There is no evidence of an intended loss.

THE COURT: No. No. No. I said the other thing. I said there's no evidence -- when you started your whole argument at the very beginning, and Mr. Meyers pointed this out, there's no evidence that there's no intended loss other than your assertion.

MR. TATE: Right.

THE COURT: And there's no evidence of these legitimate transactions where you had authorization from a property that was supposedly going into foreclosure and Mr. Cloud bought it so there -- and so there was a foreclosure start, but it never completed, and then he bought it and then flipped it. There's no evidence of any of this in the record.

MR. TATE: Okay. Let me say what there is evidence of. There's evidence Mr. Cloud flipped it.

THE COURT: Evidence Mr. Cloud flipped it. Absolutely.

MR. TATE: We rely on that. And rely on the fact that the loans went through and were not rejected. That the appraisals were legitimate as well.

THE COURT: And I think a large portion of these appraisals the appraiser were legitimate and a large portion they were illegitimate. The bottom line is: All the loans are fraudulent.

MR. TATE: Not all of them. We would concede 18 of them produced were fraudulent. The other 76 or 66 -- 76 we don't know anything about.

THE COURT: So are you saying that the Court has to have the government make in this hearing today, where hearsay evidence is permissible, the Court is required to have the government present every one of those closings?

MR. TATE: No. The Court can do whatever it feels necessary to make its findings, but the Court has to make those findings and it has to be on specific and reliable evidence. We'll deal with the Court's findings. Well accept the Court's findings.

But our position is that as the matter currently stands, they have not substantiated anything outside what they prove is actually fraud. Two, they haven't proved there was a loss associated with it. Three, they haven't demonstrated that Mr. Cloud intended any loss because the evidence is to the contrary; the evidence at trial was that

this was a profit-making scheme for everybody down the line.

THE COURT: It was a profit-making scheme for everyone but the financial institutions.

MR. TATE: Financial institutions, too. That's why they were --

THE COURT: Well, why was the financial institution lied to? I mean, comes down to: Why lie to a financial institution?

MR. TATE: Because people -- you're asking -- if you ask me my opinion of it, I think at the trial the evidence was because many of these people already owned a home. And the reason they took the straw buyers is because they had strong credit source. And because they already owned a home it's going to be a red flag. They say, well, you're buying another house, how are you going to pay for both of them? So then they come up with fraudulent lease agreement and say it's actually rented, and because you can get a better interest rate --

THE COURT: Most of these -- there were a few where they had fraudulent rental agreements, but most of these, the investor was purported to be the residential purchaser. There were some where there were fraudulent leases created also, so you could have the appearance it would be a positive cash flow, at least a wash between rent coming in and debt service going out.

MR. TATE: And I think Mr. Green's testimony was that if the house is designated or underwritten as primary residence, it gets a more attractive interest rate.

THE COURT: That's very true, yes.

MR. TATE: That wasn't the fraud. But that -that is an intent to get a loan fraudulent. It's not an
intent that the lender suffer a loss because it wasn't.

THE COURT: Well, that's an actual loss there just in the differential between the proper loan rate and the higher loan rate. I mean, if a investor is acquiring the higher, they pay a higher interest rate. So that's a loss based on fraud there.

MR. TATE: Except for the fact that we know that Mr. Greene testified about it, that the fact that at Chase, that's why we're using Fannie Mae's underwriting desktop system was because if it was approved in through their underwriting system, Fannie Mae would purchase the loan; Chase would service it, making money but it would never be at risk on the loan. If it defaulted, then it's Fannie Mae. That's going to go into the other part of our presentation: What happens when Fannie Mae if there was fraud and what happens to the loans even when they go into to foreclosure.

THE COURT: What happens is the taxpayers' pays for it. So when Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac or Ginnie Mae end up having to cover it all, there's still ultimate

victimization, it's just the taxpayer becomes the victim.

MR. MEYERS: Your Honor, just a few things I want to make clear. First --

THE COURT: Let me finish up with Mr. Tate.

Are you presenting any evidence today about your client's lack of intent to have a loss amount?

MR. TATE: No. We're relying on our position there has been no sufficient evidence that he intended a loss. That's our position.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. MEYERS: Thank you, Your Honor.

I just want to make clear that there's a suggestion that belies here about primary residence.

To be clear, for the record, they lied about nearly everything. They lied about income. They lied -- presented fake tax returns, there was fake verifications of deposits. They presented cashier's checks to receive other sources of down payments. So that wasn't an important part of the lie but it was everything.

Second, I heard the Court say when it was -- the conversation with Mr. Tate that it would take it that some appraisals were not false. I'm assume the Court was just saying that for purposes of argument, saying assuming arguendo some appraisals were not false.

THE COURT: And you didn't present to the jury any

appraisals in this case. You introduced them, but they were 1 2 never shown to them. Right? I think we did. We certainly did 3 MR. MEYERS: introduce for the appraisals. They were there for the jury 4 to inspect during its deliberations. 5 THE COURT: You never referred to them in 6 7 argument, I don't recall. 8 MR. MEYERS: It certainly wasn't a focus of our 9 I'm not saying that -- that, you know, that was an 10 important part of our case. I just wanted the record to be clear that the Court wasn't making a factual finding --11 12 THE COURT: No. The Court is not making a factual finding, but there were -- there were a handful, I don't 13 14 know the number, but there were transactions where it wasn't 15 necessarily a fraudulent real estate appraisal. 16 MR. MEYERS: I wouldn't agree with that, Your 17 Honor, but it certainly wasn't the focus of our case. 18 long as the Court is clear that that was for purposes of 19 argument, I just wanted to make the record clear on that. 20 THE COURT: Are -- you're saying in every single 21 one of these closings there had to be a fraudulent real 22 estate appraisal? 23 MR. MEYERS: I'm just saying that that's an issue 24 we really didn't get into.

Right.

THE COURT:

MR. MEYERS: When you increase the price of a house by 30, 40 percent in one day, and the way to do it is by eliminating all the market factors; by paying the borrower, by lying about their income and by lying about everything else, I think that is evidence of a false appraisal.

THE COURT: Oh. You're creating a false fair market value.

MR. MEYERS: Absolutely.

THE COURT: That's different than a licensed real estate appraiser actually preparing a fraudulent document knowing that his or her document is going to be relied on by a financial instruction.

MR. MEYERS: Fair enough.

And we did have one appraiser plead guilty in this case, Buddy Nabs (ph) that was only one transaction, but listen, if a appraiser needs for the appraisal to be wholly and completely accurate, he need to list whether there's a kickback. Because that effects whether or not this is a free market transaction.

There are kickback in ever single instance in this case. So I think that is evidence that in fact every one of the appraisals if false.

Again, I don't mean to take the Court on this tangent, but to the extent the Court did travel down that

road a little bit, I want to make the record clear on that.

That the Court is simply not finding --

THE COURT: The Court's is not addressing the real estate appraisal issue because it is -- it's not necessary, in the Court's opinion, based on the methodology used by the Probation Office to show an intended loss.

MR. MEYERS: Yes, Your Honor. I just wanted to make the record clear with that respect.

With respect to whether or not there is evidence of intended loss, I think the Court has already addressed that issue, I just would like to reference the Court to page 21 of the government's Sentencing Memorandum.

This addresses that there are intended losses, not just because they lied like crazy to get these loans, but also because the defendant knew that these loans were going into foreclosure and continued on with this scheme. The defendant --

THE COURT: You're talking about the fact that he would start getting phone calls -- and this was clearly presented to the jury -- he start getting phone calls from investors who said they are receiving foreclosure notices, and they thought that he was covering the debt service.

MR. MEYERS: Absolutely. He told -- he told the straw buyers that he'd put renters on the properties.

Testimony from the staw buyers was he lied, never put a

renter in there at all. In some cases when there was a renter in there, he wouldn't follow through on it. The testimony was the Defendant Cloud promised that if anything went wrong, that he would make the mortgage payments. The evidence was that he did not make the mortgage payments.

THE COURT: That was consistent from the every investor that has testified. No investor has ever contemplated that they were going to have to cover the shortfall from debt servicing.

MR. MEYERS: And if the Court -- page 23 of the Government's Sentencing Memorandum references page 1403 of the transcript where straw buyer Moore said consistently the rent wouldn't pay the mortgage. And the reason for that is because the price of these houses was increased in some cases by 120 percent in one day. Of course, the rent won't cover the mortgage, wouldn't cover the mortgage in that case.

Some of the straw buyers said they flatly told the defendant that the properties were in foreclosure and they were getting foreclosure notice, and Cloud simply ignored them.

Cloud paid them. Cloud arranged for them to buy multiple houses with enormous loan amounts in a short period of time. He knew what their income was because he plugged in their true financial information that misrepresented that

financial information to the banks.

That on it's own, again, when he knows he's going to walk away from these, he knows these properties are going into foreclosure and no one is going to be around to make the mortgage payments. He told the straw buyers they wouldn't have to make the mortgage payments, and he lied to them over and over again.

So there is plenty of evidence of intended loss, even besides him creating multiple lies on multiple fronts simply in order to get the loan amounts.

Again, to be clear, the intended loss is the money that was received because of the lies, subtracted by a fair proxy for the value of the house.

THE COURT: All right. On the first issue of the actual intended loss, before we consider the unintended victims and collateral damage, the Court makes the following findings of fact by preponderance of the evidence:

The defendant did become a member of a broad-based conspiracy to defraud home lenders and others sometime in 1999. He continued well into 2005. The Court's already found that earlier today.

The conspiracy involved multiple aspects of fraud in mortgage applications and mortgage transactions. It was pervasive fraud from virtually ever area of the closing.

Real estate attorneys were brought in; real estate

appraisers in many cases were brought in and aware of the fraudulent nature of the flip. Real estate mortgage brokers were brought in in virtually all the cases. In some cases, real estate agents and real estate brokers were brought in.

In every case, an investor was brought in who never intended to occupy the property and was brought in because they had a credit worthiness that allowed them to apply for a mortgage.

These were very sophisticated transactions, which I'll be getting into later in more detail, because so many people with fiduciary duties were brought in by the promotor and the defendant, Mr. Cloud -- in this case promotor.

"Promotor" is not a legal term per se, such as real estate appraiser. A promotor is just a term that's been adopted by this Court and other courts in referring to the person who puts all these pieces of this fraudulent transaction together. But the promotor is the key figure in ever transaction, but they usually receive the largest amount of illegal profits, illegal gain. And they are facilitating the whole transaction, getting all the parties together, and finding the property.

And the geographic scope of this conspiracy was throughout Mecklenburg County surrounding counties, and even reached down to Atlanta, Georgia, where the defendant was intending to go into the business of mortgage fraud because

he believed the spread would be greater in Atlanta, Georgia.

And the "spread" refers to the additional amount of money

that he received between the two transactions, the flip.

And the spread came primarily from the loan proceeds.

Now, this was a broad conspiracy, and included other promotors than just Mr. Cloud. It included Michael Bryant, Don Henderson, Kenneth Strong and William Phillips. It included attorneys such as John Lee and Leon Orr. It included mortgage brokers, such as Kim Dauria and Daniel Greene. It included recruiters, such as Mr. Goines and Ms. Wright. It included underwriters -- and I want to add back that an underwriter has an fiduciary duty, such as Ms. Russell, who was also convicted at trial with this defendant, Mr. Cloud. It included bank officials like false account verifier, Amy Phillips, who falsified account records, I believe, from Bank of America. That's correct. It was Bank of America, right?

MR. MEYERS: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: The nature of this scheme was common. It was a common plan, although each of the individual promotors did not necessarily consult with each other when they were doing a real estate flip. Although, they did talk to each other about how to do the flips, in fact it was the intent of Mr. Strong to get training from Mr. Cloud. But that never actually came to fruition because Mr. Strong

figured it out and started going into the flips. But he did talk to Mr. Cloud about it. He talked to Mr. Cloud about going down to Atlanta -- I should rephrase that. Mr. Cloud talked to Mr. Strong about going to Atlanta. But they not only shared the common plan, but they also shared money. Mr. Strong, in particular, loaned Mr. Cloud, fronted Mr. Cloud some money so Mr. Cloud could do something with these transactions.

But when you look at the factors as to what creates a common scheme or plan, you have to look, of course, at common victims, common accomplices, common purpose and similar modus operandi.

As Mr. Meyers argued earlier, that happened in this case. It was one large conspiracy because the primary victims in this case, the immediate victims in this case were the banking institutions and the mortgage bankers. The institutions provided the money. Some of them -- some of those institutions met with the actual definition of financial institution; some of those institutions did not necessarily meet the legal definition of financial institutions but they still were the lenders. Those were the common victims.

But also common victims in this case were the collateral victims who were in neighborhoods where several of these flips were going on, but where the multiple

co-conspirators would have been targeting a similar area of Charlotte, the impact that a neighborhood would have from multiple flips in a neighborhood from the various promotors would have caused those individuals to be common victims.

To a certain extent some of the investors who, admittedly, kind of came in as conspirators ended up being victims, but the Court is not looking at the investors as common victims, but it's looking at the lending institutions and it's looking at neighborhood and communities which were affected by these promotors going into certain geographic areas of Charlotte and Mecklenburg County and some of the surrounding counties.

The common accomplices is very straight forward here. The attorneys were involved with all the promotors, the mortgage brokers, the recruiters, the underwriters, false account verifiers such as Ms. Phillips. The promotors shared these individuals, and they shared these individuals because they had to find people that had fiduciary duties that were willing to cheat. Therefore, it made sense for a promotor to go to another promotor's, for example, closing attorney like John Lee and Leon Orr, because they knew that John Lee or Leon Orr would not look behind the transaction, which the closing attorney has a fiduciary duty to do.

So the common accomplices are central here. There are only a handful of attorneys who are going to risk their

license to practice, much less imprisonment, to facilitate these mortgage fraud schemes, or mortgage fraud transaction.

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And there clearly was a common purpose. Despite the defenses argument that there was no intended loss here, there was really an intent to defraud lending institutions and to run away with that spread. To take that spread money and to it away. If there truly was no intent to cause a loss to a financial institution or to an investor, then the defendant would have done what he did not do, and that was stay tied close to these investors when they were calling him up and complaining to him that they were getting foreclosure notices. This defendant and the other defendants would have done their best to keep the investors from being responsible for deficiencies in foreclosure, or for even allowing the foreclosures to occur because when the foreclosure occurred, even if there was no deficiency in the foreclosure, the investor would have a significant impact on their credit record.

So there was of very much of a common purpose here from all these promotors to get a short-term quick gain from the property and then walk away from the property, either that day or within a few months, and not do any property management or anything like that.

Now, admittedly the defendant did do some property management. It's in the record. He did some of that. But

that property manager was very minor, according to the Court's recollection of the trial transcript; and a lot of it was to make the property look more appropriate for closing. But the small amount of property management he did does not offset the fact that virtually the vast majority of the properties went into foreclosure. I believe it was that 80 percent.

MR. MEYERS: That's correct.

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THE COURT: 80 percent of the transactions he was directly involved in went into foreclosure. So there was a common purpose of all these promotors.

And then there was also common modus operandi.

And the Court's already kind of highlighted that by talking about the common accomplices. The fact that so many people with licenses and fiduciary duties had to be brought in to this.

The modis operandi would be very straight forward:
You do a quick flip. You have a promotors bringing in down
payments instead of having the actual purchaser bringing in
a down payment. You have the supposed purchaser, the
investor, frequently claiming they were to be a resident.
You had a fraudulent documents created for those
individuals. And ultimately, to make it all happen, you
also frequently would bribe an underwriter, such as
Ms. Juderita Russell.

But the method of doing this, the modis operandi was extremely similar. It had to be similar because there were so many individuals of fiduciary duty that had to be brought into the scam. And since you needed so many people with fiduciary duty, you could only go to a handful of accomplices to do it; I think there was only handful of attorneys, handful of mortgage brokers, handful of underwriters and bank employees that are going to facilitate fraud, and so the fact you use the same people for all these transactions means that the method of operation of each transaction, of each illegal flip, was very, very similar, if not identical.

So with all those findings of fact, based on preponderance of the evidence, and after the Court's review of the methodology used by the Probation Office to reach the actual and intended losses in this case, and basing those on an objectively reasonable process, not a subjective process, the Court believes that the Presentence Report of approximately \$10 million, specifically \$10,052,875, is the intended loss to lenders. That is comprised of the 3.33910 -- \$3,339,106 that the Probation Office estimated from Mr. Cloud's properties alone. The 2,943,433 intended losses for Mr. Bryant -- excuse me, from Mr. Strong; 2,695,586 from Mr. Bryant; and 1,160,750 from Mr. Henderson.

All of these other co-conspirators' loss amounts

were reasonably foreseeable to the defendant because he was so -- he was interacting and sharing the scheme, the accomplices, the methodology with his fellow promotors.

The Court does find that the money intended to be received, minus a fair proxy for the value of the house, is a reasonable and objective method of doing the calculations in this case.

Now, that's the Court's finding of fact.

I still can't determine the loss amount for purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines until we go through the unintended victims in this case; that's the external loss to the communities.

MR. MEYERS: One piece of clarification, Your Honor. I did not hear the Court say, and I may have missed it, I want to make sure I understand the Court's finding properly, that the Court finds that the Defendant Cloud intended that approximate \$10 million in losses. I think the Court sort of put it in the passive voice --

THE COURT: Yes. The Court does find the defendant -- as a matter of fact, by preponderance of the evidence, the Court finds the defendant, William Cloud, reasonably foresaw and intended a loss of \$10,052,875.

All right. Any other clarification?

MR. MEYERS: No, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Tate, any questions or

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clarifications? 1 2 Just note our objections. MR. TATE: No. 3 THE COURT: All right. Let's go to -- all right. Let's take a 15-minute recess. And is it possible we would 4 be able to finish by 1:00. I don't know. 5 MR. MEYERS: I believe so, Your Honor. 6 7 with -- we have, I should say, about 30 minutes of Victim Impact Statements to present to the Court. I met with 8 9 Dr. Cowan last night. I think he'll be fairly quick and I 10 can speed it up if the Court's familiar with his report. THE COURT: Yes. I've read it entirely. 11 12 MR. MEYERS: I think we can certainly present what we have left in that amount of time. 13 14 THE COURT: The defense has evidence also. 15 All right. I had a 1:30 appointment with visitors 16 from an Russian delegation that were coming here to 17 Charlotte to talk to lawyers and judges, and I believe it's 1:00 or 1:30. I certainly want to the maintain that, 18 19 because that's hard to reschedule since the Russian 20 delegation will be returning home. If we push up to 1:30, 21 then we'll have to continue the sentencing. Let me rephrase 22 that: We have to finish the sentencing at a later date, 23 which would probably be Friday. MR. MEYERS: We could meet after the Court's --24 THE COURT: Well, you're probably not aware, 25

Magistrate Judge Toliver Davis passed away this past
weekend, or I think on Friday, and his funeral is late this
evening in Forest City. So after I meet with the Russian
delegation, I'll be heading to his funeral. Judge Davis
retired a decade ago, but he was a distinguished member of
this court.

MR. TATE: Your Honor, just two things by way of

MR. TATE: Your Honor, just two things by way of scheduling. We do have out-of-town witnesses we would like be able to put on, get him back to his home today.

THE COURT: We understand.

MR. TATE: For scheduling purposes, I have scheduled a long overdue vacation beginning tomorrow and will be out of court next week or so.

THE COURT: We could maybe do it late tomorrow afternoon. Tomorrow was -- I'd have to do it by 4:00. We might be able to do it late tomorrow. Let's see where we end between 1:00 and 1:30. We'll recess to just 12:15. Ten minutes.

(Recess taken.)

MR. TATE: Judge, are we on the record?

THE COURT: Yes, we are.

MR. TATE: Let them just say a couple things about scheduling, if I can.

I understand you weren't aware of the what was going on occur this afternoon with the Court's schedule --

THE COURT: And none of us anticipated Magistrate Judge Davis's death.

MR. TATE: Yeah. What I was going to suggest, and I spoke to Mr. Meyers, he has an out-of-state witness and I do, too, that has plane reservations this evening. If he could put on his expert and we could put ours on, even out of turn, so that he could be free not have to come back at a later time. That's what I would propose and hopefully get that done by 1:30. In terms of my personal schedule, I have what they use-or-loss time.

THE COURT: Right. I understand that.

MR. TATE: I'm going to be actually taking off the balance of the year trying to resolve some of that time.

THE COURT: Mrs. Blackmon told me that this starts tomorrow morning for you. Well, and we can have your experts testify, and then we could continue this to January.

MR. TATE: I hate to do that, you know, I have been trying to take this for sometime, for a year; haven't been able to because something always comes up.

THE COURT: We all knew this was to be a lengthy sentencing. I originally anticipated blocking a whole day, but I talked to both counsel and both you have you all said it's a half day, and so I then planned a half day.

MR. TATE: I think we both said a whole day. I kind of remember the e-mail exchange. Am I right, Mr.

Meyers?

MR. MEYERS: I thought we asked for whole day. We had an intervening conference in which Mr. Cloud had written a letter, and it may be that that's what the Court's referring to.

THE COURT: See, I think that's what happened.

When we the status conference. I thought counsel said it was a half day, because originally I'd planned on whole day, and you said a half day and so we did that planning. And it's too late now. I could have moved the Russian delegation until late in the day, but they're schedule is set.

MR. TATE: Well, what happens is, and the reason I kind of wanted to focus and get the experts out so we could get out by 1:30 because otherwise me and Mr. Meyers, arguing back and forth, it's the majority of the time.

THE COURT: I agree. And both of the experts are about the issue at hand?

MR. MEYERS: Yes, they are.

THE COURT: And I also want to clarify. I referred to this as unintended victims, and I should rephrase that: It's collateral victims is a better phrase because victimization doesn't have to be specifically intended by a defendant, but the defendant has to have some recognition that the collateral damage will be broad. So

when I use the term "unintended victim," that was a bad use of the word "unintended." It should be "extended victims" is the better term. Extended victims. And it's referred to in the Presentence Report as external loss to the communities. So with that said, let's go forward with the experts.

MR. MEYERS: Thank you, Your Honor.

I'm going to talk to Mr. Tate. I had 30 minutes, as I said. I'm to only going to play the first 15 minutes which is directly relevant to what the expert will testify to, and he may reference it during his testimony.

This is from folks who lived near houses that were foreclosed as a result of the counts of conviction. These are interviews of relevant statements from these folks.

THE COURT: These are only from foreclosed houses that were actual counts --

MR. MEYERS: That's right, Your Honor. And in the video we're going to indicate where they were a neighbor of which house it was, so I'll play for the government, now -- I'll refer to this as Government's Exhibit 102.

THE COURT: Just for the record, all the exhibits both parties referred to are admitted in a sentencing. You don't really have to say it but I am saying it; they are all admitted.

(Videotape played.)

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1 MR. MEYERS: The United States would call Spencer 2 Cowan.

SPENCER COWAN

being duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. MEYERS

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- Q Good afternoon, Dr. Cowan.
- 8 A Good afternoon.
 - Q For the sake of time, instead of asking you all the specific questions we talked about yesterday, would you just summarize for the Court your position, where you are, and some of your education experience?
 - A Yes. My name is Spencer Cowan. I'm senior research associate at the Center for Urban and Regional Studies at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. I received my Ph.D from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in city and regional planning, and JD from the Boston University School of Law.
 - Q Dr. Cowan, have you been retained by Department of Justice in this case?
- 21 A Yes, I have.
- 22 Q Are you compensated or your work?
- 23 A Yes, I am.
- 24 Q How much are you compensated?
- 25 A \$150 an hour.

- Q Does your compensation depend in any way on your findings?
 - A No, it doesn't.
- Q I want to get clear, first, in a very summary fashion,
 with the Court's permission, about what you're not here to
 testify about. You're not here to testify about the fraud.
- 7 | Right?

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- 8 A No, I'm not.
- 9 Q In fact, you didn't pick the list of properties you 10 analyzed, did you?
- 11 A No, I didn't. They were furnished to me by the United 12 States Attorney's Office.
 - Q So you are here simply to take the data you were given and to estimate the external losses to the communities using that data as your assumptions?
- 16 | A Yes.
- Q Please summarize for the Court, as a broad overview,
 what research is out there that's relevant to quantify the
 collateral damage from foreclosure?
 - A At the time I prepared the report, there were five principal sources I used. There was a study by Dan Immergluck and Geoff Smith on the impact of foreclosure to starts on nearby property values. There was a study by Lin, Rosenblatt & Yao on the impact of foreclosures in the
- 25 Chicago PMSA, the largest statistical area.

There were reports by Apgar and Duda, and by Moreno on the impact on communities; how much tax revenue they lost and how much it cost them in additional services to secure properties and keep them secured. And one study by Shlay and Whitman of abandoned properties, the Impact of Abandon Properties in the City of Philadelphia.

- Q Is this research all peer review, Dr. Cowan?
- 8 A Yes, it is, which is the standard or this type of effort.
- 10 Q Now, Dr. Cowan, does the research indicate whether 11 there is, in fact, collateral damage from foreclosure?
 - A Yes, it does. It consistently finds that there's statistically significant collateral damage in terms of negative impact on the property values of nearby properties and costs to the community.
 - Q Is there any serious dispute among researchers about whether this is true?
 - A No, there isn't.

- 19 Q Is there any serious dispute among researchers about 20 whether this negative collateral impact is a quantifiable?
 - A No. Different researchers use different methods or different data resources, but there's no dispute about the ability to quantify it.
 - Q Dr. Cowan, your report describes three kinds of damage that result from foreclosure. Would you list those three

kinds of damage for the Court, please?

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A The first is the damage to nearby property owners from reduction in value of their properties.

The second, as I said, is the cost to the community in the terms of securing properties, maintaining them, additional policing. And finally there's lost tax revenue.

Q Would you summarize for the Court, please, Dr. Cowan, why it is the research posits there's a negative pecuniary impact on the nearby homes from foreclosures?

A Different researchers have different theories. Lin, Rosenblatt and Yao, for example, posit that these properties in foreclosure can get into the appraisal chain and be used as comparable sales. Immergluck & Smith in an another study found that they contribute to foreclosures in the neighborhood; contribute to an increase in crime.

These are properties that are traditionally undermaintained. They begin to be evidence of blight that's obvious from the streets -- as you heard the neighbor saying you can tell which properties are deteriorating, and a deteriorated property along a street will tend to be a negative amenity and reduce values.

Q What, if any, effect does increased crime from abandon properties have according to researchers?

A If increased crime in neighborhood is associated with decrease in values, it makes it harder to sell properties,

1 and it can lead to further increases in crime.

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- Q Dr. Cowan, why would there be a tax loss that results according to the peer studies?
 - A People who are in a foreclosure process generally don't have enough money to pay their taxes. They can file tax liens but they're not always collectible. The owners may end up in bankruptcy, and frequently it's just not worth the effort or doesn't yield enough money. So Apgard and Duda estimate that the loss of about a little over \$500 per foreclosure.
 - A Well, the government's -- sometimes properties, when they are foreclosed, they are left vacant. The new owner doesn't always secure them properly. Even if they are secured, they may not be maintained properly.

You heard about the grass growing, the rodent infestation. Properties, even if they are secured, vandals can break in. They can have parties. Properties can become the victim of arson, or sites for drug activities or drug-related activities.

Q And Dr. Cowan, I think you mentioned in your report you had relied on one study which wasn't foreclosure-specific, but looked at the effect of abandon properties in nearby neighborhoods. Why did you rely on that study as well?

A The Shlay and Whitman study was the only one I found at

the time that evaluated the impact of multiple negative properties within a single neighborhood.

All of the foreclosure studies, particularly Lin and Immergluck, both spoke of the impact of a single foreclosure or foreclosure start. Shlay and Whitman quantify the impact from multiple abandoned properties, and then they found a nonlinear relationship, so that a second abandoned property didn't have the exactly the same impact as the first, and they found it decreased with the number of abandoned properties.

I used that to adjust for the situation where there were multiple foreclosures within a single neighborhood.

- Q Well, Dr. Cowan, what community does Shlay and Whitman study?
- A They studied Philadelphia.

- Q Dr. Cowan, if you would, now please summarize for the Court some of the variables that you took into account in your analysis, namely, what variables affect the amount of collateral damage that can result from foreclosure?
- A One consistent finding is that the distance matters.

 Both Immergluck and Lin found that the impact decreased with distance. They find -- because their findings were as a percent of the property's value, you'd need to know the values of properties nearby, and the number of properties affected. They found it affected an area, specific area, I

- defined radius, so I had to determine the number of properties within that area.
 - Q And what are some of the other factors beside distance?
 - A Distance and time within which the foreclosure
- 5 ccurred. Lin, specifically, found greater impact if
- 6 | foreclosure occurred within two years than in a period from
- 7 | three to five years. But they did find statistically
- 8 significant impact as long as five years after the
- 9 foreclosure.

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- 10 Q Address, if you would, how density an/or value might
- 11 affect the impact?
- 12 A The impact occurs over a certain area, and so the
 13 density affects it because it affects the number of units in
- 14 the impacted area.
 - If the area, for example, a 100-meter circle, is about seven acres, depending on the density of development, there may be seven houses at one unit per acre; it would be 28 if it's four units per acre.
 - Value affects it again because the impact is a percentage of the value. So a decrease of 1 percent or 5 percent or 8 percent is based on the value of the properties. And so I needed to find the -- a way to assign value to the properties within the area.
- 24 Q Dr. Cowan, I want to step into your methodology now.
- 25 I'm not getting -- I know the Court wants to move quickly,

so I'm just going to --

THE COURT: And let me add, I have great respect and reverence for Magistrate Judge Davis, but I think he would agree that justice should be done, so I'm not going to go to his funeral after all.

But I still have this commitment with the Russian delegation, so we'll recess when we recess and we'll come back at 4 p.m. And I hope my support staff can help me as much as you can; and we'll stay until we finish. So if I need to get back up clerks or anyone, you need to start making arrangements for that. Is that already with the parties, we reconvene at 4:00 and go until we finish?

MR. MEYERS: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

BY MR. MEYERS

Q Dr. Cowan, I'm still going to move quickly because I'm assuming the Court's familiarity with the report --

THE COURT: The Court read the whole report yesterday, and its very familiar with it, but the Court really appreciates Dr. Cowan going through this summary of his report.

BY MR. MEYERS

Q Thank you.

Dr. Cowan, I want to show you now what's referenced as Table 3 in your report, which is on page 16 of your report.

Your report being Docket No. 24-1 in the record here.

And showing you Table 2, I would ask that you please explain for the Court how you created Table 3 and its relevance, please?

A Table 3 -- and it's not on this screen, I'm looking over the clerk's shoulder -- is basically a way of converting the distances given in the peer-reviewed analysis converting them to acres. Because this is from the Lin, Rosenblatt and Yao study.

They differentiated the distance in hundred-meter increments, finding statistically significant impact out to a range of 900 meters, but converting that to square meters isn't really helpful because we think of area in this country in terms of acreage.

So the first column is defined circle or ring. The next is the area within that ring in acres converted from square meters. The next is based on the overall average density for all of the properties in question; 61 foreclosures. How many units were in those various -- the circle or the various rings out to that distance.

So, for example, in the circle within a 100 meters of the 61 properties, it's 7.8-acre area, had 401 units, averaging about eight units in that closest in circle. As you can see it progresses out. Because the rings get progressively larger, more and more units get included.

I want to take you now to table -- excuse me, let me 1 2 ask you, then, Dr. Cowan, how you determined the value of the units that would be affected in those rings as you 3 4 described it? For each of the 61 foreclosures, I checked the address 5 against the Census block group for the 2000 Census. 6 7 Census block group is the smallest area at which I could get census data on the value of houses within that area. 8 9 Please describe what a block group is? 10 A block group is the smallest aggregation the Census 11 has for financial data, and it consists some -- usually 12 between 500 and 1200 houses would be in a block group. The next level up would be the Census Track, and then to the 13 14 county level. So the block group is the smallest and what I 15 feel is the most comparable to an individual neighborhood. 16 So what did you take from the block groups? 17 Identified, as I said, each block group, and I used the 18 median house value. Median is the 50th percentile, which 19 means that half the houses in the block would be worth more; 2.0 half the houses in the block would be worth less. 21 Why do you use the 2002 Census data instead of 22 different estimated data, for example? 23 The Census data set is the one that is consistent 24 across jurisdictions. And so where I was dealing with 25 different jurisdictions, different states, it provided me a

consistent, constant, reliable source of data that I could use. It will tend to understate the values later because the 2000 data I believe are actually 1999 values.

So for foreclosures in, say, 2003, 2004, the actual value would probably be higher, but those kind of data at that small an aggregation are not available.

- Q So would that have the effect of underestimating or overestimating the collateral damage?
- A It would underestimate it because one of factors is it's a reduction in a percent of the value, and if the value is lower, then the amount of the reduction would be lower.
- Q So you took that conservative approach here?
- 13 | A Yes.

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- 14 Q Did you make any adjustment for multiple foreclosures
 15 in a single block group?
 - A Yes. There were instances, there were as many as four foreclosures in a single block group among the 61 properties.

Using the Shlay and Whitman study, I estimated the decreasing impact to try to come up with a formula as closely as I could would approximate their results, which simply was that the second foreclosure within a block group would have half as much an of an impact, a third would have as third as much of an impact; so there would be a decreasing impact of more foreclosures within a single block

COWAN - DIRECT 1 group. 2 You did that on the basis of the Shlay and Whitman 3 study? Α Yes. 4 THE COURT: Can I -- I have several questions. 5 Are these four foreclosures that would be in this 6 7 one block group you might have found, were they all in Mr. Cloud's properties directly or one of the other 8 9 co-conspirator promotors? 10 THE WITNESS: Your Honor, I --THE COURT: Well, do you know how he broke that 11 12 up? These were all Cloud-only 13 THE WITNESS: 14 properties. There were 61 that I ended up including, 15 because of other limitations in the studies that I wanted to be precise. 16 17 For example, the Lin, Rosenblatt and Yao used conventional mortgages; that would be single-family and 18 19 one-to-four family. So if there were five or more family 20 units, those would not have been included; not that there's 21 no impact, but because they weren't included in the study, I 22 didn't include them in my calculations. 23 THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MR. MEYERS: Just to be clear for the Court and for the record, Dr. Cowan's report references property by

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number 1 through 94, and those numbers correspond exactly to the Presentence Report.

So he did not actually estimate the losses for properties that were reasonably foreseeable to Cloud and part of the conspiracy are handled by -- Henderson, he, again in order to be conservative, although 89 million doesn't sound like a conservative number, we really only looked at the collateral damage just from Cloud himself; the properties that he had a direct hand in.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

BY MR. MEYERS

- Q So Dr. Cowan, I stole a little bit of your thunder there. Let me ask you to skip to the conclusion, please, which is what was the total estimated loss to the neighborhood from foreclosures four years back.
- A Based on the 61 foreclosures that were full foreclosures, and using the method I described, I found total losses to the properties to total 89,600,000, I believe.
- Q Dr. Cowan, I would to take you now to Appendix C, which
 I believe sets forth your conclusion to support that
 89 million with the methodology described in your report.

Does the first page of Appendix C, which is listed as page 28 of 41 in Docket No. 224-1, does that represent the properties that you looked at that were actually foreclosed?

A Yes. Those are the properties in the data set I was given, with an identifiable street address and a foreclosure date. So these I know were actually foreclosed. These aren't just foreclose starts, for example.

Q I want to take you now to page 31 of your report in Docket No. 224-1, and ask you to please describe what's listed here.

A The first column is the property number. The next is the data that was used.

There were five properties where, when I went to the block group or tried to find the property address, the Census for 2000 did not have that address listed. In that case, it indicated to me that it was a new development that was not in existence as of the 2000 Census, and to avoid the bias that would come from using a block group that didn't have the development in it, I used the Census track, which is the next largest.

But then the third column is the land area. In the Census it's calculated in square meters, but I did a conversion. Also, the number of single-family housing units, that's single-family detached/attached, or one-to-four family that would be eligible for a conventional mortgage for each block group for a Census track is appropriate, and then the average density in units per acre. So, for example, in the first one, the average was .93 units

1 per acre throughout the block group.

- Q Dr. Cowan, I now want to take you to page 32 of
 Document 224-1 in the record, and ask you to please describe
 for the Court what is listed here?
- A First column again is the property identification. The second is the median value for single-family houses in the area in the block group. The next is simply multiply the density -- average density per acre by the number of acres in the area.

So the first three columns are for the circle around the foreclosed property, zero to hundred meters.

For the first property, 7.3 units were impacted. That's about 7.8 acres and about 9.3 units per acre.

Based on the Lin study, the level of the impact was a decrease of 8.7 percent, for a period of up to two years.

Based on that median value and the number of units impacted, multiply -- came out to a total loss of property value in that first hundred meter circle of just over 52,000.

The next column going to the next ring out; from 100 meters to 200 meters. Again, taking area times the density; number of units impacted; the impact level from the Rosenblatt and Yao study, and then multiply that by the median value to get -- and this progresses out through the remaining rings out to the largest ring they found statistically significant impact, was out to a radius of

- 1 900 meters.
- 2 Q In other words, Dr. Cowan, as you get close in, there's
- 3 | a greater impact, .087 percent, but there's fewer units.
- 4 A Yes.

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Q And as you get further out, there is a lesser impact of, for example, .047 for 100 and 200 meters and --

7 THE COURT: Let me just make sure I understand 8 this.

So when you look at the number, negative 52,115, go back to the prior page, which is the impact within a hundred meters to property one, that means roughly each of those seven properties devalued about what \$4,800, \$5,000?

THE COURT: All right. I just wanted to understand. 52,000 refers to all seven properties.

THE WITNESS: Yes.

THE WITNESS: Yes. That's the sum total of impact within that radius. But if you look down --

THE COURT: Almost 9 percent devaluation of the median properties.

THE WITNESS: Yes. If you look down to properties 8, 10 and 11 -- I mean, 8 and 10 and 15, you can see where these were properties that were in the same block, group which you can tell by the fact they have the same median value -- and I've decreased the impact from 8.7 percent to 4.35 to 2.9 -- in other words, to estimate

1 | the declining impact that Shlay and Whitman found.

THE COURT: All right.

BY MR. MEYERS

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Q Using this methodology, you found the total of approximately \$89 million in collateral damage to the victims?

A Yes. From those 61 foreclosures.

Q Dr. Cowan, I don't know if you noted yet, but Mr. Guy Cecala is here. Have you read his report that critiques your work?

A Yes, I have.

Q One of the things he claims that your research is flawed because it relies on a study of depressed crime-ridden areas of Chicago during the late 1990's. Did you read that critique?

A Yes.

Q What is your response, please?

A I consider it not to be an accurate reflection of the -- or characterization of the works on which I relied.

The Immergluck & Smith study was of foreclosure starts in the city of Chicago, not foreclosures; and based on research I've done in another project, about half of foreclosure starts actually ends up in foreclosures, which means that half of the properties that Immergluck & Smith studied, the borrower was still in possession of the

- property, so they would not have been vacant or abandoned.

 They are spread through the city. There were over 3,200 foreclosures starts and 9,000 transactions for comparison purposes.
- Q So Dr. Cowan, 32,000, that's not just in one neighborhood?
 - A No, that's -- that's certainly not just one neighborhood. Even more the --

9 THE COURT: Wait a minute. You said 32,000.

10 THE WITNESS: 3200.

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MR. MEYERS: 3200. Excuse me.

A The Lin study is actually based on foreclosures but it's foreclosures throughout the Chicago PMSA, Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area, which consists of Cook County, which is Chicago, and eight additional counties in Illinois.

I just checked this morning, and according to the 2000 Census, Lake County, which is immediately to the north of Cook County, the median family income as a little over \$76,000 a year, compared to the national average of 50,000, just over 50,000. So I would not consider Lake County by any stretch of the imagination a disadvantaged area of the City of Chicago.

- Q So the Lin studies was how many counties?
- 25 A Eight -- excuse me, nine counties.

- Q Nine total counties, only one of which was Cook County,
 and only a part of Cook County is obviously the City of
 Chicago, and only part of the City of Chicago is one
 crime-ridden neighborhood?
 - A Yes. Well, there may be one than one crime-ridden neighborhood in the City of Chicago.
 - Q Fair enough. So why is that not then an adequate critique of your work?
 - A To suggest that the studies of one or a few select disadvantaged, crime-ridden neighborhoods in Chicago simply is not an accurate reflection of the dataset upon which those two studies were based.
 - Q And are you aware, Dr. Cowan, because you are a researcher in the housing studies field, are you aware of any economist, anyone in the housing field that thinks the studies upon which you relied may not be used outside of Chicago?
 - A No. There are critiques that suggest that Chicago may be different in some respects, but there are no studies I know of, and I try to keep track of them, that suggest that the negative impact wouldn't be comparable; that there would not be some measurable impact. It may vary depending on density. It may vary depending on the housing market, but that's not a question pf whether there's a negative impact.

- Q Dr. Cowan, you used Lin for your findings of \$89 million primarily. Is that correct?
 - A Yes.

- Q And Lin studied those nine counties in PMSA in the
 Chicago. What is the density the Chicago's PMSA compared to
 Mecklenburg County?
 - A The unit density is slightly higher in Mecklenburg

 County, very slightly, but it is slightly higher. So over

 all, Chicago, of course, the City of Chicago is much denser

 than Mecklenburg County, or the surrounding PMSA, but the

 surrounding a counties are predominantly suburban.
 - Q So in other words, the geographic studies by Lin is a actually less dense than Mecklenburg County?
- 14 A Yes, it is.

response to that?

- 15 Q Dr. -- or excuse me, Mr. Cecala actually also claims
 16 that your study is flawed because it's largely theoretical.
 17 It's not based on actual neighborhoods. What's your
 - A I did not go and examine the properties. I did not have them appraised. According to my calculations, based on the 61 foreclosures, they were approximately 32,000 units affected. And it simply was not within the scope of what I could accomplish to do a full appraisal or examine those. This is a fairly standard methodology used by nationally recognized organizations, such as the Center for Responsible

- 1 Lending to use, median value, and average unit densities.
- Q In other words, you can do economics in housing studies without taking a ruler to every single house?
 - A Yes.

- Q Dr. Cowan, you have also been here today and have you seen that, in fact, there was quite a good deal of actual losses for many of these houses?
 - A Yes. I think the statements that were shown are fairly typical of exactly what the research has indicated, which is deterioration of the properties, criminal activity, cost to the community in the terms of having to come in and rectify some of the situations, visual blight inhibiting other properties owners from being able to sell.
 - Q Mr. Cecala also claims, Dr. Cowan, you're study is flawed because he looked at zip codes that were relevant in this area, and the zip codes overall rose in value by 34 percent, whereas your block groups -- he's claiming that a better method than your block groups. Could you respond to that.
 - A The zip codes are useful because they are a way that economic data are aggregated, but they are very much larger areas. I would say a zip code of 10,000 units would be fairly common because they determine postal delivery routes. On the other hand, I don't think a neighborhood that would be affected by foreclosure as encompassing ten thousand

- units. The block group, again generally from 500 to 1,000
 units, maybe 1,200; some are larger, depending on how the

 Census is operating and whether they get broken up. But the

 Census tries to keep them fairly small, and I think at a

 scale that I would consider as a housing policy person, more

 indicative of neighborhood characteristics than a zip code
- 8 Q Multiple neighborhoods; dozens, if not more,
 9 neighborhoods in a zip code?
- A Yes. My zip code, in fact, I am in Chapel Hill,
 something in excess of four miles from my post office. It's
 on the other side of town.
 - Q Dr. Cowan, you also have conclusions regarding tax loses regarding your report. I'm going to let those speak for themselves. I'll turn you over to cross-examination now.

THE COURT: Mr. Tate.

CROSS EXAMINATION

19 BY MR. TATE

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would be.

- Q Dr. Cowan, your report, is it largely theoretically?
- 21 A Yes.
- Q Did you study any actual properties and what happened
- 23 during those foreclosures?
- 24 A No, I did not.
- Q Now, with respect for the underlying data you used, was

- 1 it based largely on communities in the Chicago and 2 Philadelphia?
- A The data on impact, the two studies, the Immergluck and
 Lin studies were based in Chicago, but the data I applied in
 using the findings from those studies to determine the
 collateral damage were based on the block groups for each of
 the 64 foreclosed properties.
- Q Okay. Now, with respect to the Philadelphia
 communities, did Philadelphia factor into your analysis?
- 10 A No, they didn't. I used the Shlay and Whitman study
 11 only as the way of estimating the declining impact of
 12 multiple foreclosures within one neighborhood.
 - Q And you certainly are aware that Chicago and Philadelphia, the home values, the depreciation rates, the foreclosure rates are substantially different than that for Charlotte and Mecklenburg County?
 - A I really didn't look into what the median home values would be in different neighborhoods in Chicago, so I really couldn't tell you whether they were all that different.
 - Q And you didn't look at that when you made the comparison between that and the PMSAs in Chicago, did you?
- 22 A I did not.

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Q Because you didn't do that, you can't tell to any degree of educational certainty that those figures are accurate, can you?

A Yes, I can, because I'm using the finding from peer review studies that indicate the amount of the impact. That impact is across a variety of properties, with a variety of housing types, densities and values.

So when I say, for example, using the Lin study, that within 100 meters of a foreclosed property there's a negative impact of minus 8.7 percent, that's across all of the properties they studied which vary in value and housing type. And so I would say it was fairly applicable to the kind of mixed housing stock that would be almost anywhere.

- Q But that study wasn't of Mecklenburg County, was it?
- 12 | A No.

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- 13 Q It wasn't of Gaston County, was it?
- 14 A No.
- Q And it's in the north. Is that right? They have different tax rates in the north, in Chicago?
- 17 A Yes, they do.
- 18 | Q And they are substantially higher, aren't they?
- 19 A I don't know what the tax rates are in Chicago, but I
 20 would imagine they would be higher.
- 21 Q But you didn't go study, when you made your analysis,
- 22 you didn't factor in any of the differences in the tax
- 23 | rates, did you?
- 24 | A The tax rates were -- I believe would be a factor in
- 25 the study in terms of their padomic (ph) analysis of the

- impact on housing prices, because the tax rates would vary 1 between -- among, for example, counties in the Chicago PMSA, 2 so that would become a control variable that would be taken 3 into account in assessing the overall impact. 4
- I'm asking what you did, Doctor. You didn't adjust the 5 findings of your study based on any differences in the tax 6 7 rates between Mecklenburg County and Cook County, Chicago?
- No, I didn't. I didn't think it would be appropriate. 8 Α
- 9 And, in fact, isn't it true, if you know, that Cook 10 County, Chicago, has about three times the crime rate than Mecklenburg County?
- 12 I don't know that. I didn't research it.
- 13 Q You didn't factor that in as part of your analysis?
- 14 Α I didn't research it. No, I did not --
- 15 Q But you did --
- 16 Α -- put the crime rate --
- -- what you consider the crime rates? 17
- 18 Α No.

- 19 Q You did not?
- 20 Α No, I did not.
- 21 You didn't say crime rates affected the value of 22 property?
- 23 Crime rates effect the value of property. That much I know from my community development and housing research. 2.4
- 25 But I did not factor it in in terms of the impact of the --

- impact on value that a foreclosure would have. If it was considered, it would be considered as part of determining what the impact was based on the Lin or Immergluck studies.
 - Q Which dealt with Chicago?
- 5 A Yes.

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- Q Not Mecklenburg County?
- 7 A Not Mecklenburg County.
- 8 Q So you don't know what those factors are for
- 9 Mecklenburg County, do you?
- 10 A No, I don't.
- 11 Q Now, with respect to the foreclosures that you studied,
- 12 sir, did it differentiate between foreclosures caused by
- 13 | fraud or by foreclosures by somebody just losing their job?
- 14 | A No.
- 15 Q So the study of foreclosures had absolutely nothing to
- 16 do with fraudulent foreclosures, did it?
- 17 A I don't know whether any of the foreclosures in the
- 18 study was as a result of fraud, so I can't differentiate.
- 19 Q And the foreclosures, the 61 properties that you
- 20 | discussed as being related to Cloud, how do you know they
- 21 | are related to Cloud?
- 22 A That was in the dataset that was provided to me by the
- 23 United States Attorney's Office.
- 24 | Q So you're simply relying on something somebody else
- 25 || told you?

- 1 | A I'm relying on the dataset that I was provided.
- 2 Q You didn't review any -- of those 61 properties, any
- 3 foreclosures to see whether they were actually connected to
- 4 ₩illiam Cloud or not, did you?
- 5 A That was not what I was engaged to do.
- 6 Q So your answer is no?
- 7 A No, I did not.
- 8 Q Now, with respect to the Cloud properties, do you know
- 9 whether or not prior to going into foreclosure, two or three
- 10 | other people may have actually lived in or owned the house?
- 11 A Again, I was operating with the dataset that I was
- 12 provided that the indicated that these were properties
- 13 associated with Mr. Cloud, and given there was a foreclosure
- 14 date, that they went into foreclosure.
- 15 Q Well, did you know whether or not Mr. Cloud was a party
- 16 to the foreclosure or whether it was some other third party?
- 17 A I don't know who foreclosed.
- 18 | Q And you don't know why they foreclosed either, do you?
- 19 A No, I did not.
- 20 | Q Did you review any neighborhood track in connection
- 21 | with those 61 properties were you found multiple
- 22 | foreclosures in one neighborhood?
- 23 A Yes.
- 24 Q What neighborhood was that?
- 25 A I don't remember the neighborhood. I was looking at

- block group data, and I remember that, in fact, I believe 1 2 there were 61 foreclosures. There were 51 affected block groups or tracks, which would indicate there was some 3 overlap, and I think the largest single number of 4 foreclosures within one block group was four.
- Now, you don't have any specific information that those 6 7 properties are connected to William Cloud?
- From the dataset that I was provided, yes, all 61 were 8 indicated as associated with Mr. Cloud and exclusively with Mr. Cloud. 10
- Did you do any study of abandoned properties of those 11 12 61 of which percentage of those properties had been abandoned? 13
- 14 Α No.

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- 15 Did you do any specific studies of the actual neighborhoods involved in those properties? 16
- 17 Other than comparing -- other than the Census data in terms of property value and unit density, no. 18
- 19 And of course, the Census data was outdated. 20 from 2000, wasn't it, or 1999?
- 21 It's published in 2000. I believe it's actually -- they indicate that the housing value data is 22 23 1999, or in 1999 dollars.
 - And did you factor in the fact that housing price values are rising at 34 percent between 1999 and 2004?

- A As I mentioned, using the 2000 data would tend to understate them because of the appreciation. But, no, I did not adjust the values upwards to reflect what statistically might be over a large area a price appreciation, but I don't know the situation for specific neighbors in Charlotte or in Mecklenburg County, or in any of the other affected counties.

 Q And did you review the specific sales or foreclosures
 - And did you review the specific sales or foreclosures of those properties to determine whether they actually foreclosed for more money than they are actually valued at at the time?
- A No.

- Q So, in essence, your study could include figures that don't take into account the fact that the homes are actually foreclosed on or higher rates than the actual loan amounts?

 A The studies don't suggest that the sale price of a
- specific foreclosed property affects the impact. They say their studies of a foreclosure within this radius, during this period of time has on average a certain statistically significant impact on the value of nearby properties.
- Q But, of course, that wasn't specific to any of the properties in this case, was it?
- A No. It was based on the study of several thousand transactions in Chicago and in Chicago PMSA.
 - Q In a totally different state?

- 1 A Yes.
- 2 | Q That study, of course, for the properties back in the
- 3 late 1990s, weren't they?
- 4 A The Immergluck and Smith was. The Lin, Rosenblatt and
- 5 | Yao I believe was 2003 and 2006.
- 6 Q Okay. Didn't that study 19 foreclosures and abandoned
- 7 properties from 1997?
- 8 A That would be the Immergluck and Smith study, not the
- 9 Lin, Rosenblatt and Yao. The Lin, Rosenbaltt & Yao study, I
- 10 believe -- and I'm recalling, it could be 2002, but it
- 11 was -- I think it was 2003 and 2006.
- 12 Q Okay. And what neighborhoods did that study?
- 13 A That studied all neighborhoods throughout the Chicago
- 14 | Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area, which as I said is
- 15 Cook County and eight additional counties to the northwest,
- 16 and east -- south of Chicago, because there aren't to many
- 17 | neighborhoods to the east of Chicago.
- 18 0 Because it's in the lake?
- 19 A Right.
- 20 Q Now, with respect to that study in 2006, did it factor
- 21 in foreclosures?
- 22 A Yes. It was of the impact of foreclosures, not just
- 23 foreclosure starts.
- 24 Q But not through 2006. Right?
- 25 A Yes. Including 2006. I believe their dataset was

1 | foreclosures and real estate transactions in 2003 and 2006.

Q Now, did your study take into account any specific distances between homes and 61 properties that you were told are attached to Bill Cloud. Did it take into -- let me strike that.

Did your study, the methodology you used take into account the distances between the actual 61 properties that you were asked to look at?

A It did to the extent that, as I showed and explained in the appendices, Appendix C, each ring, at a distance, intervals of a hundred meters, which is the interval that Lin, Rosenblatt and Yao used has a different and declining impact with distance.

So, for example, within the hundred meter radius circle there was one level of impact. From one hundred to two hundred meters, there's a lower level of impact, and so on out, 200 to 300 meters.

O I understand.

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- A So it does take into account the distance.
- Q But they are measuring the density of homes in Chicago that are closer together than they are in Mecklenburg County, aren't they?
 - A I used the density in Mecklenburg County. And the density in Mecklenburg County is actually slightly higher than the density in the area studied by Lin, Rosenblatt and

- 1 | Yao.
- 2 Q Now what -- from what year density in Mecklenburg
- 3 County did you use?
- 4 | A 2000.
- Q You compared that to the density in Chicago which was
- 6 taken when?
- 7 A Also from this 2000 Census. I used the 2000 Census
- 8 data to get the area and number of housing -- single-family
- 9 housing units, actually conventional housing units, and it's
- 10 | a simple arithmetic calculation.
- 11 MR. TATE: Thank you. No further questions.
- 12 THE COURT: Redirect?

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

14 | BY MR. MEYERS

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- Q One question, Dr. Cowan. You were asked a lot about
- 16 Chicago versus Mecklenburg County. You presented an
- 17 economical analysis, one based on economics. Are you aware
- 18 of any differences in human nature or economic behavior
- 19 between Mid-westerners and Carolinians?
- 20 | A No, I'm not.
- MR. MEYERS: I have no further questions, unless
- 22 the Court has questions of Dr. Cowan.
- THE COURT: No, Dr. Cowan, I've read your report
- 24 | very thoroughly, and I appreciate your testimony.
- 25 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: We'll recess until 4 p.m, and I 1 2 presume we'll allow your expert to testify so he can make an evening flight. 3 4 Anything before we recess? 5 MR. MEYERS: No, Your Honor. 6 THE COURT: All right. Then I'll see everyone at 7 4:00. (Recess taken.) 8 9 (Court reconvened at 4 p.m.) THE COURT: It's now 4:01, and we're reconvening 10 after recess. 11 12 Dr. Cowan finished testifying. For convenience of the defense, would you like to call your expert, Mr. Cecala. 13 14 MR. TATE: Cecala. 15 THE COURT: Thank you. I apologize for 16 mispronouncing your name -- or do we continue with the 17 government's presentation? I'll leave it up to you, Mr. Tate. 18 19 MR. TATE: If the government has more -- since 20 we're now on such a tight time frame --21 THE COURT: Then the government can continue. 22 All right, Mr. Meyers. 23 MR. MEYERS: Thank you. That's what the 24 government would present in terms of the evidence. 25 In the Government's Sentencing Memorandum it

addresses why it believes this damage to the community is both properly cognizable under the Guidelines and was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant, Cloud.

To be clear, the government contends that the Court could address the losses to the community in one of two ways or perhaps both of two ways.

The first is by including it as part of the 2B1.1 loss calculation, which is recommended in the PSR, which the government endorses.

Second -- there's really three ways -- the Court could depart upward pursuant to United States Guideline 5K2.5, and that's addressed on page 66 of the Government's Sentencing Memorandum. That is an encouraged basis for departure, according to the Fourth Circuit, for losses that are not adequately taken into account within the Guidelines.

And third, the corporate upwardly vary in order to address the impact to the neighborhoods.

We believe Dr. Cowan's testimony, the study was important to give the Court a realistic assessment of what, exactly how much damage to the communities did result from the defendant Cloud's conduct.

So the, first, I would like to address whether or not the Court may take into account that kind of loss to the communities in --

THE COURT: These are legal argument, right?

	COWAN - CROSS
1	MR. MEYERS: Yes, they are.
2	THE COURT: I feel like I should first go through
3	evidence and argument first.
4	MR. MEYERS: I think that makes sense.
5	THE COURT: So the government has no other
6	evidence to present on the issue of collateral damages.
7	MR. MEYERS: No additional besides the trial
8	testimony, testimony of the Dr. Cowan, and the PSR.
9	THE COURT: All right. Mr. Tate, what evidence
LO	would you like to present?
11	MR. TATE: At this time we call Guy Cecala.
L2	Judge, I don't know if you could hear it, but there's like a
L3	hum.
L4	THE COURT: I do hear the hum. It hasn't bothered
L5	me but I hear it. Do we know the source of the hum?
L6	Florescent light probably needs to be replaced.
L7	GUY CECALA
L8	being duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:
L9	DIRECT EXAMINATION
20	Q Good afternoon. Can you state your name and for the
21	record can you spell it.
22	A Sure. Guy Cecala. C-E-C-A-L-A.
23	Q And what do you do, sir?
24	A I'm CEO and publisher of a market research firm and
25	publication company based in Bethesda, Maryland.

For 25 years we've tracked the mortgage market. Our clients are mostly large lenders, people like Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, but also government agencies. We track all aspects of the mortgage market, from mortgage underwriting, mortgage servicing, mortgage securitization, mortgage fraud. You name it, we cover it.

Q And what is the name of that company?

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- 8 A Inside Mortgage Finance Publications, Inc.
- 9 Q And did you provide this market research analysis to lenders?
 - A They are our primary customers because we charge a lot for it.
 - Q Now, have you reviewed certain documents in connection with this case?
 - A Yes. Yeah. Specifically you asked me to review the reports you got from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac regarding losses related to certain properties.
 - Q And have you been able to discern who the lenders were in at least the 94 properties that were identified to you?
 - A In most cases, yes, lenders identified and in a number of cases the service is also identified.
- 22 | Q And are any of those lenders your clients?
- 23 A All the big ones are: Countrywide, which is now part 24 of Bank of America. Chase. Wells Fargo. Most of those
- 25 | lenders at one time or another were customers.

- 1 Unfortunately, a number of them are out of business now.
- 2 | Q Well, specifically J. P. Morgan Chase, is that one of
- 3 your clients?
- 4 A Yes.
- 5 Q How about Bank of America?
- 6 A Yes.
- 7 Q Wells Fargo?
- 8 A Yes.
- 9 Q City Financial?
- 10 A Yes. Those are also top four mortgage lenders in the
- 11 country, both in terms of originations and servicing.
- 12 | Q Fannie Mae?
- 13 A Yes.
- 14 | Q Freddie Mac?
- 15 | A Yes.
- 16 Q How about the Treasury Department?
- 17 | A Yes.
- 18 Q The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation?
- 19 A Yes. Most of the banking agencies, as well as the
- 20 Federal Reserve Board.
- 21 Q Have you ever been certified or asked to serve as an
- 22 expert on financing and lending practices?
- 23 A Yes. Well, first of all, I do it all the time in terms
- 24 | of the media. I do two, three interviews a day with
- 25 newspapers, radio stations, or television stations. I've

- also consulted with congressional committees, but mostly
 behind the scenes. I don't testify at the hearings. I give
 them information for their analysis.
 - Q What type of issues have you been previously asked to serve as an expert on?
 - A Mostly due to the mortgage crisis and what caused it and the meltdown; role of securitization, role of subprime lending, that type of thing.
 - Q How about fraud. Fraud?

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- A More recently, yes. We've done -- we do a series of training audio conferences. We did one this year on mortgage fraud, you know, specifically what lenders can do to prevent it from happening and in analyzing at least the current crop for mortgage fraud we're seeing in this country.
- Q Is part of the information you provided trends and statistics on mortgage fraud and foreclosures?
- A Yes. Very much that because it's very much part of the mortgage market these days.
 - Q Have you over the years tracked the foreclosure rates in various parts of the country?
- 22 A Yes, although there are other services that do it, we 23 provide analysis on top of what they do. Most of the best 24 foreclosure analysis is published by the Mortgage Bankers 25 Association.

- 1 Q Now, have you ever testified in federal court as a 2 expert?
- A I did one of these last month in Federal District Court in Asheville. I can't remember what district it is.
- Q Aside from that, how have you rendered expert services in these areas?
- 7 A I also served as an expert witness in a civil suit 8 brought against Chase.
- 9 Q And who retained you in that case?
- 10 A A private attorney, but basically Chase.
- 11 | Q That was representing Chase?

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- 12 A Yes. It never went to trial. It settled.
- MR. TATE: Your Honor, we'd ask that Mr. Cecala be designated as an expert witness based on the Rule 16.
 - THE COURT: Well, I think we -- don't we have to show some academic training?
 - MR. TATE: No. It can be based on experience and expertise.
 - THE COURT: Well, we haven't had any discussion about methodology or peer review process or anything.
 - MR. TATE: The Rule 16 notice sets forth what he will testify to. It was not objected to by the government, and that's what we contend to have him testify to now. I don't know what more I can ask him.
- 25 THE COURT: Ask him about his -- whether he has

any degrees in finance, accounting, taxation. What his degrees are to.

BY MR. TATE

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- Q What is your level of education, Mr. Cecala?
- A I have a bachelor of arts degree from Boston College,
 with major in English and political science. I've got a
 master's degree from the University of Maryland. That was
- 8 for journalism.
- 9 Q Now, this Inside Mortgage Finance magazine, explain to
 10 the Court, if you will, the level of expertise; what is it
 11 that lenders rely on that you tell them?
 - A Most of it is market analysis. We're probably the largest source in the United States of rankings of lenders in term of that origination, mortgage servicing. We break it down by product type. We do it nationwide. We don't do it on a state or regional level, but we do it so a national level. That's primarily what people do.

We also analyze mortgage legislation or mortgage-related legislation coming from Congress, as well as any regulation that's coming from the Treasury, Federal Reserve Board or any of the banking agencies.

- Q For 25 years, have you tracked lending practices and lending trends?
- 24 A Yes. That's our core business.
- 25 Q As part of your core business, do you have an intimate

- understanding of underwriting policies and practices of the
 various lenders that are your clients?
 - A We have to closely follow -- we have publications that deal just with underwriting.
- Q Okay. Do you unless deal with retail mortgage lending.
 Do you report on that?
- 7 A Yes. That's part and parcel of the whole market, 8 basically wholesale and then retail.

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- 9 | Q What's the difference between retail and wholesale?
 - A Retail is basically when you get a mortgage from the bank office, when you go to a Bank of America office and you have applied for a mortgage there.
 - Wholesale is primary going through a mortgage broker, who, in turn, sells that loan to Bank of America or a Wells Fargo or a Chase. Generally the mortgage broker doesn't have any ability to fund the loan. He's just acting effectively as remote loan officer.
 - Q Now, with respect to underwriting policies between the time period of 1999 and 2000 --
 - THE COURT: Well, wait a second. What are asking him to be an expert in?
 - MR. TATE: What I notice on -- I don't have it right in front of me -- but in our Rule 16 notice we notice what his -- what he would be testifying to.
- 25 THE COURT: All right. And mortgage financing

practices, risk to lenders, and concept of the securitization of bundling of loans. All right. But not in collateral damage from an bundle of foreclosures?

MR. TATE: We also submitted a report on him regarding collateral damage where he did a market trend analysis --

THE COURT: He did a page and a half, and there's no support whatsoever of data support. I think you've shown he is an expert in mortgage financial practices, risks to lenders and securitization. I don't think you've shown he is an expert in collateral damage from the results of the series of foreclosures in a given geographic area.

MR. TATE: Let me ask him, before we move for the introduce of that report, let me ask him -- I was first going to have him qualified then go into it. I can start off with that and lay a foundation for both the admission of that report and his opinions.

THE COURT: Mr. Meyers?

MR. RANDALL: I can address that, Your Honor.

The government would object to the foundation that's been laid on the issue before the Court at this time which is the collateral damages in this case.

We don't believe there's been a sufficient foundation laid for Mr. Cecala to testify to the collateral damage, to take that kind of issue with Dr. Cowan findings.

There's been no foundation that Mr. Cecala has economic background; real estate, accounting, statistics, anything that would be qualify him to be able for provide an assessment, a quantitative assessment of collateral damage to a neighborhood or to question Dr. Cowan's report at this time. I wouldn't take issue with the general items that Your Honor's previously stated, but I don't think those are relevant to the issue before the Court at this time.

THE COURT: Do you need to do some more voir dire?

MR. TATE: Yes.

BY MR. TATE

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- Q Mr. Cecala, at my request, did you undertake a study and prepare a two-page report with respect to collateral damages?
- 15 A Not actually collateral; looking at the actual damages
 16 in geographic areas caused by the alleged foreclosures or
 17 whatever, yes.
- 18 | Q And as part of that review, did you review the report 19 of Dr. Cowan?
- 20 A Yes, I did.
 - Q And did you review other records in relation to the 94 properties that are identified in that report?
- 23 A Yes, I did.
- 24 Q What specifically did you do?
- 25 A Well, I worked with your office in doing it, but

1	basically went through ever property that was identified in
2	Dr. Cowan's report, and tracked the home values during that
3	period from 1999 to 2004, and also from 2004 to 2009, to see
4	if we could see if there were any market losses on those
5	individual properties, as well as the surrounding zip code.
6	Q And what was the methodology that you used?
7	A It was very straight forward. In using the analysis,
8	broke the time period up into two five-year chunks, taking
9	the available data that was available on that specific
10	property, and just looking at exactly what they said
11	happened to that property value during that period.
12	THE COURT: Okay. You just said your analysis was
13	specifically of the property value, not collateral damage.
14	So you didn't even analyze
15	THE WITNESS: No, the
16	THE COURT: the consequences.
17	THE WITNESS: Well, I looked at the individual
18	property and then also looked at the zip code that property
19	was in. So I guess by that extension you could say it was
20	collateral damage because that's basically what Dr. Cowan's
21	report is, except he was using Census blocks instead of
22	THE COURT: Right, he was.
23	MR. RANDALL: Your Honor, you may have done that
24	analysis. I don't think a foundation has been laid to
25	suggest he's qualified at this point for the analysis

THE COURT: Where is the -- do you have the report supporting that? You have a page and a half report here, but do you have the data analysis, all the individual properties, anything like that?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

THE COURT: Where is that?

THE WITNESS: I've got a copy of it in my briefcase if you'd like to see it.

THE COURT: Yes, I would, if possible. Has the government received a copy of this?

MR. RANDALL: We have the same thing Your Honor made reference to, the two-page report.

THE COURT: It's an expert report and it has not been turned over to the government?

MR. TATE: There is no report, Your Honor. You asked him about the underlying data.

THE COURT: Right. Well, so you're saying this is the whole report.

MR. TATE: That's his report. The data he used was the property addresses and the values -- and the values of -- tracked values of those properties over those period of years individually. And his report indicates he used public report -- public data records, and then if the Court would allowed me, I'll be very clear how to get it.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, sir.

1 | Appreciate it.

THE WITNESS: I don't believe anybody asked to see that other than you.

(Hands document to judge.)

THE COURT: All right. The Court's been handed
Change in Value for Collateral-Related Properties. I think
this needs to be added to the record.

MR. TATE: That's fine.

THE COURT: All right. The government needs to be given a copy of this.

Ms. Blackmon, if you could go make copies.

I think we need to take a ten-minute recess while the parties look at this, so let's recess until 4:30.

(Recess taken.)

THE COURT: All right. The Court believes this Change of Value for Collateral-Related Properties, the spreadsheet should be part of the expert's report.

The Court will ask the government if it needs more time, because this should have been turned over a long time ago. If the government does need more time, we'll continuing this sentencing hearing. If the government doesn't believe it needs more time, we'll continue today.

MR. RANDALL: I think we're prepared to go forward right now, Your Honor. Obviously, I think I'll need additional time for cross-examination with respect to this

since we didn't have it before. We agree with the Court that it's a final report that we should have had to prepare for cross examination today. Given the fact, the last hour, we're certainly prepared to go forward, Your Honor. We're prepared to cross-examine. We'd just ask for some leeway to cross-examine; that it might take longer than anticipated.

THE COURT: The Court does believe Mr. Cecala is an expert in mortgage financing practices, risk to lenders and securitization and the bundling of loans. The Court is just not convinced by the evidentiary presentation right now that he is an expert in the analysis of collateral damage from bundles of foreclosures in an area. You might be able to convince the Court of that with further voir dire, but at this point you haven't.

He clearly is an expert in what I just read, and there's no dispute about that. But that's very, very different than what Dr. Cowan is an expert in as a Ph.D. in urban and regional planning, and the specific peer review analysis he used. There's just clearly a dramatic difference in the types of expertise of these two the witnesses. Not saying that this expert is not an expert. He is. But not in the issue before the Court, collateral damage. Dr. Cowan is an expert in the issue of collateral damage, and so the Court wants that to be clear on the record.

MR. TATE: Let me, just for the sake of the record as well, the government in this case, unlike me, did not file a Rule 16 notice of Dr. Cowan at all and we asked for one. Dr. Cowan as far as I know has not ever been designated as expert in collateral damages. I don't even know what the term means. What's at issue is here is exactly what Mr. Cecala is an expert in, which is housing prices and the valuation of housing prices and it's impact by foreclosures.

THE COURT: But on a grand scheme nationwide, where he's following market trends, not on the specific issue of collateral damage to designated bundles of properties that, you know, based on literally meter-differences from the foreclosed property.

I mean, specificity with which Dr. Cowan prepared this report and the peer review methodology he used is dramatically different than what has been presented to the Court.

I want you to explain to me scientifically, using the social science and peer review process that Dr. Cowan has used, how this extremely talented expert, Mr. Cecala, in market trends, market analysis, which is very important to his clients, is the same as doing the specific collateral damage analysis that's been done by Dr. Cowan.

MR. TATE: Certainly. Your Honor, I'll go to

1 that.

What Dr. Cowan did not do was do it with any specificity, even if you just look at the cross.

What he did was he used statistics based on a study 12 years ago in Chicago; did not study a specifically -- Cloud property specifically, and track what happened to that specific neighborhood, to that specific house. That's exactly what Mr. Cecala did. And Mr. Cecala is --

THE COURT: But you're mixing apples and oranges.

No one disputes he did a specific analysis of each house. That's the direct damage. It's the next step that's critical, and that's what's abundantly clear to this Court. The next step is collateral damage.

And the collateral analysis, from this expert's report, is by zip code; not by the specific analysis of meter distance, up to a hundred meters up to 900 meters away; just short of a kilometer away. And using zip code is really quite unscientific. I mean it's ten thousand units, as Dr. Cowan said, you can have four foreclosures in ten thousand units and it has absolutely no scientific or statistical impact. And that's why this report is highly suspicion.

And I'm very uncomfortable with even accepting that this is useful to the Court under just a basic

relevancy analysis because it's based on a zip code comparison.

Ten thousand units. I mean, of course, you've got foreclosures and ten thousand units it's going to show no collateral damage whatsoever versus if it's 20 units in neighborhood, or 40 units in neighborhood, and you have four foreclosure, or even one foreclosure, it's going to have a dramatically different impact.

MR. TATE: They didn't look at that single foreclosure in that Census track analysis. I think the Court --

THE COURT: Can you look me in the eye and tell me that the next-door neighbor to a house that was foreclosed did not have actual direct collateral impact. That's what your expert concludes. You can't consciously look me in the eye and say that. Right? The next door neighborhood that was within 50 to 100 meters of the foreclosed house did not have direct impact. We had video presentations of that, both --

MR. TATE: But we don't know when those videos were taken.

THE COURT: Oh, Mr. Tate.

MR. TATE: We just don't. I mean, what that proved was nothing.

THE COURT: No. Mr. Tate, it proved an awful lot.

People said the impact on their ability to resell their 1 2 house. MR. TATE: Did they even try to resell their 3 house? 4 THE COURT: Okay. 5 MR. TATE: Did they even try to resell the house? 6 7 THE COURT: My solution here is we continue this case, this sentencing, and we do -- let there be a more 8 9 thorough review of this report. Because I just don't see how -- I'm giving you a second opportunity Mr. Tate. I 10 don't see how you can credibly use a zip code analysis 11 12 because it's such a massive number of units. MR. TATE: I was going to do that from 13 Mr. Cecala's testimony. We'd be happy to provide a 14 15 supplemental pleading. 16 Now let them just say this in my defense. 17 Mr. Cecala noted to the Court we gave it to you and nobody had requested this. We hadn't. This is the first time I've 18 19 seen it. 20 Mr. Cecala is so highly regarded in mortgage 21 finance --22 THE COURT: Absolutely. MR. TATE: -- I didn't ask him. I took his 23 conclusions. I accepted his conclusions. I didn't ask him 24

the underlying data. This is really the same kind of chart

that was contained in Dr. Cowan's reports, just numbers just like his.

THE COURT: No, I mean I agree. I mean, there's no doubt Mr. Cecala is an expert in certain areas, and possibly he's an expert in this area. But I don't see how a zip code analysis of comparison -- it's just too huge an analysis. I mean, of course, a handful of foreclosures in a whole zip code is not going to cause there to be a noticeable decrease of value every house in the zip code. They are going to go up in a growing economy, but the street the foreclosure is on, the couple of blocks that that foreclosure is on, the immediate community, it's going to be felt very painfully and that's what the Court needs to understand.

MR. TATE: Your Honor, if the Court would just hear me out on this issue. I'm not quarreling with the Court.

But with Dr. Cowan's report it's less specificity because they are not dealing with real numbers. It's theoretical. He admitted based on theory. It's based on theory. Guy Cecala used publicly available data that measures --

THE COURT: No. No. No. You were right for each one of the actual properties, he used public available data, all right, to say this was the devaluation of this property

or it might have been -- might have not been an actual loss on a particular property after it went into foreclosure, but that's not the point.

It is -- he still had to then make a comparison of that foreclosed property for certain group of properties.

And when you're using -- if you use a zip code, yes there's data out there as to this zip code between this period and this period, from 1999 to 2004, appreciated this much.

Now, no one is disputing that. That's -- I'm sure there's ample data out that there supports all of that. But that doesn't measure the impact of the foreclosures because you're going beyond where the damage is. The damage is in the neighborhood. It's not in the whole zip code.

MR. TATE: How would the Court parse foreclosures. Let's say for instance that sake or argument Cloud-related foreclosures in the same neighborhood where people lost their job, how would you parse that out from those foreclosures he had nothing to do with; a foreclosure around the corner that's foreclosed because of a divorce. This is a more specific way of doing it. If Mr. Cecala were allowed to testify, he would say this is what the lenders rely on to note.

THE COURT: I can't give you a specific answer to that, but I would think -- I would think you would say, "Okay. We're looking at this bundle of properties within

500 meters, and there were two foreclosures within that five hundred meter radius, and one was a result of Mr. Cloud's activities, and the other was the result of someone who lost their job.

When you know that, you can do an understanding, you can account for that two variables. But you're still doing -- defined radius where the collateral damage is going to have measurable impact -- do we zip codes? Do we use the whole county? Do we use the whole state? The collateral damage is never going to be measured in the whole state or the whole county. That's virtually impossible. And zip codes is still too broad.

MR. TATE: What I'm saying, Your Honor, is that Dr. Cowan's report doesn't do that. Exactly what the Court said it should do --

THE COURT: I think Dr. Cowan report does. It starts with one hundred meters. That's the first level.

MR. TATE: But it doesn't talk about what houses were foreclosed in that 100 meters.

THE COURT: Well, within a hundred-meter range I seriously doubt you're going to have two houses in foreclosure in a hundred meter radius. It's possible, but that impeaches his bottom line of 89 million, and brings it back to 84 million or whatever -- but it doesn't -- it doesn't mean the peer reviewed methodology is wrong.

MR. TATE: There was no peer review of his report.

THE COURT: No. No. No. The methodology is peer reviewed.

MR. RANDALL: Judge, I think that's the key point, if I may interrupt.

I think the first issue here is that the government laid a foundation through Dr. Cowan that his methodology has been approve through peer review, and the articles that he's relying upon has been affirmed through peer review process. And he's laid that foundation and testified that he implemented that peer review approved well regarded methodology to come up with his conclusion. The government's problem here with Mr. Cecala is the defense hasn't laid a foundation that he's applying a generally accepted, scientifically proven peer review methodology for his results.

THE COURT: Right. Because he's using too large of a comparison in a zip code.

MR. RANDALL: Yes, sir.

Having said that, Your Honor, the government is fine with going along and letting Mr. Cecala testify to this methodology. We'll handle it on cross-examination why we think this isn't sufficient.

MR. TATE: Well, at this point, Your Honor, we feel disadvantaged because we filed a Rule 16 motion of more

than a year ago, and filed a supplement a couple days ago. The government never filed an objection. They never filed a counter to our Rule 16. We didn't challenge their expert. Now all of a sudden, you know, they're saying that we haven't laid a sufficient foundation. We'd like an opportunity to go and have Mr. Cecala, work with Mr. Cecala to get that and to get whatever the Court feels is sufficient to make a proper ruling that it needs to be.

MR. RANDALL: Judge, Mr. Tate was provided with all the necessary reports, underlying documentation associated with Dr. Cowan's report well in advance of trial, as opposed to sandbagging him on the day of the hearing with a witness on stand. We didn't have access to any of his information, as opposed to Mr. Tate, who has had a full report from Dr. Cowan, and ample opportunity to prepare cross examination of --

MR. TATE: All we have is his report. We don't have his underlying data.

THE COURT: That is it. He went through -- took each property, and then he applied the radius across the board, so his underlying data is right there. How is it not there? I mean, I look at this three pages as equivalent to about his 15 for 20 pages of spread sheets.

MR. TATE: But they are not dealing with any of the properties. They are dealing with something --

THE COURT: Well, except they would dispute that enormously. I mean, he said he went through 61 foreclosed properties, and then he did analysis away from each property. And he wasn't looking at actual loss to that property. He's looking at the collateral damage of devaluation of the property around there, and he's looking at the increased cost of public services, such as increased law enforcement, and ending in the loss of revenues in taxes.

MR. TATE: I believe, and I would stand on this, that the people who best value and look at devaluation of properties are people in the home finance business, the people in the lending business that rely on Mr. Cecala; not academics talking -- and the question would be do any --

THE COURT: Wait. You're saying a Ph.D. in urban and regional planning is -- who my understanding of Ph.D. programs, has actual training in methodologies and statistical analysis and all these other things that go with a Ph.D. program, isn't qualified to give an expert's opinion on neighborhood devaluation? I mean, that's what he's spent

MR. TATE: The question is do the people -- if this is about losses, do people that rely -- who relies on that type of methodology in determining collateral losses?

I haven't heard of anyone that's relied on his opinions for

1 | that.

THE COURT: Well, you haven't yet showed anyone that has relied upon this witnesses opinions on the area of collateral damage.

MR. TATE: I was trying to but --

THE COURT: Are you saying in Nashville he testified to collateral damage?

MR. TATE: Certainly, from what all he testified to, in Nashville, I was just getting out of the fact he was qualified as an expert there. He's routinely relied on to talk about -- very, very --

(Simultaneous conversation.)

those market trends analysis of mortgages. I totally understand that. But he said he's doing nationwide analysis so he could provide it to his clients. Because I understand the Bank of America's and the Wells Fargo's of the world want to know market trends and analysis in mortgages because that's one of the businesses they are in. But that's not the measurement of collateral damage from a foreclosure on a particular street or in the neighborhood.

MR. MEYERS: May I make clear the government's position with regard to the procedure here?

THE COURT: You all wanted to go forward.

MR. MEYERS: We want to go forward.

We believe that the Court's analysis of
Mr. Cecala's a methodology and his analysis is the correct
one. That's why we preempted it with Dr. Cowan. We believe
the Court will reach all those conclusions.

For purposes of the record, however, the defendant we believe should present Dr. -- or excuse me, Mr. Cecala's testimony so it's out there. We think the Court will properly analyze it having heard from Dr. Cowan. We believe that Mr. Cecala should say what he's going to say. We think the Court will reject it --

THE COURT: Might current concern, though, I have been asked to qualify him as an expert, and he is an expert within certain fields without a doubt, but I have been asked to qualify for as an expert on an issue before the Court, and I don't know that he's an expert for the issue of collateral damages.

MR. MEYERS: And I don't want to tag team the Court, because Mr. Randall has this witness, but I think the Court could refuse to certify him as expert and still hear from him on that subject matter. That way the record will be quite clear, and the Court could evaluate his testimony accordingly.

THE COURT: The Court's going to reserve on the certification of him as an expert. Mr. Tate, I'll let you continue. All right.

But you understand the Court's concern is the breadth of the radius here, and that has -- because it gets back to my core question of you: Can you honestly tell me the next door neighborhood to a house that was foreclosed did not have collateral damage from that foreclosure?

Because that's what the conclusion is here: there's zero collateral damage. And that, quite honestly, has to be a preposterous conclusion. All right. So continue.

BY MR. TATE

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- Q Mr. Cecala, as part of your duties as publisher of inside these financial magazines, do you track housing prices?
- 13 A Yes, we do.
- Q Do you track the evaluation of housing prices due to foreclosures?
- 16 A Yes, we do.
- Q Do you do that as a measurement to an individual property or communities?
- 19 A Individual properties.
- 20 Q Okay.
 - A I might add that the concept of damage to communities is not widely accepted. It's not accepted in the mortgage industry, and I'm not aware of any real lawsuits or a legal basis for recognizing collateral damage either.
- 25 Q Do the lenders, the lenders that are your clients, do

they rely on those type of damages in a making risk 1 assessments or in doing home financing? For instance, did 2 you observe if any people saying they might have a hard time 3 selling their house because of the foreclosure next door? 4 But again, we only track actual damages that a 5 lender reports. When a lender foreclosures on a property, 6 it's a mathematical calculation on exactly what their loss 7 is and whether they want to lend in that area again. 8 9 My question to you, Mr. Cecala, is with respect to -were you in the courtroom when they played the video of the 10 people talking about difficulties with the house next door 11 12 having rats? 13 Α Yes. 14 And one in particular mentioned that they didn't put 15 their home up for sale because they thought it might effect the values. 16 17

Is one of the things you do is rely and track what foreclosures in a neighborhood would have on the impact of financing another home to purchase or selling a home?

Not specifically, no.

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- Now, how would you -- how do foreclosures impact a particular neighborhood in general?
- In much the way that, you know, people describe it. You know, the property is abandoned and the place goes into disrepair. Other people see it in the neighborhood.

- 1 it has, you know, very negative consequences, particularly
 2 if you're trying to sell another property in the area.
 - Q Now, the study by Dr. Cowan, did you review that study?
- 4 | A I did.

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- Q Did it concern abandoned properties?
- A I think on several occasions the research he referred to, that his analysis was based on, reported that it was very much reliant on abandoned properties.
- 9 Q Now, with respect to the 94 properties that you studied involving Mr. Cloud, do you know if any of those properties were abandoned?
 - A I don't have any information specifically on whether they were abandoned, no.
 - Q Now, is there a relationship as to what happens to a home before foreclosure and what happens before foreclosure?
- 16 A Before and after?
- 17 | Q Yes. In terms of value of a house.
- A Well, it depends. You know, one of my analysis was
 basically looking at foreclosures in the time period this
 took place, which was 1999-2004, versus foreclosures in the
 last five years. It's dramatically different.
 - Housing market, mortgage market conditions, it has an impact on what happens. In the 1999-2004 period was one of the most prosperous periods in the history of this country in terms of home price appreciate and availability of

mortgage finance.

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As a result, you know, home prices nationwide increased about ten percent, and North Carolina increased about five percent a year in those areas. And, also, simultaneously foreclosures were like half a percent; very, very low.

Again, dramatically different from what we're seeing today.

Q And would the period of 1999 to 2004 be different from like 1997?

- A Well, yes.
- Q And in terms of the housing markets in Chicago and Charlotte, what can you tell the Court the differences between those markets?
- A Well, you know, obviously Chicago tends to be a more urban area, but certainly, even in the terms of densities, significantly different from North Carolina and the areas around here. The type of dwellings is different. The type of people who live here, they employment base is completely different. There are a lot of differences. Housing tends to be very localized and very regional, and it's hard to make generalities about one trend in one area versus another.
- Q When you're making a market analysis like for one of the lenders in this case, do you rely on that specific market or somewhere else?
- A Well, we practice mostly the national market because we

- don't have the expertise all the time to do specific market conditions. But we wouldn't try to say that we knew what the mortgage lending market was Chicago versus New York or some other area.
 - Q Now, you've heard the Court's concerns about your testimony as opposed to Dr. Cowan's. What's the primary different between you and Dr. Cowan?

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- 8 A I do market analysis. I describe what he does as more of an academic analysis.
 - Q Now, with respect to tracking a damages based on a

 Census block, do you have an opinion as to whether zip codes

 would be more reliable or less reliable?
 - A First of all, the first question in terms of damages, any analysis I provided did not attempt to analyze actual damages since I don't know what collateral damages are in the area. All I tried to do was provide a very basic analysis of what happened to home prices in those areas, specifically of the properties that were identified as Cloud properties, and also in the surrounding area.
 - Q And did you use zip codes or census tracks for that?
- 21 A I used zip code because that was the only thing 22 available.
 - Q And do you have -- do you know if zip codes -- are you saying Census tracks would not have been used?
 - A Census blocks is a much smaller scale and would be the

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- best to use, but if you have to balance whether you have the most detailed information in the time period involved with the level of scale you use, it's a tradeoff. My feelings was it would be better to use zip codes rather than no analysis at all for the surrounding area.
- Q Why would zip codes be better in your opinion?
- A Well, because zip codes are available. You have housing data exists very much on a monthly basis now for zip codes, because that's what everybody has access to. Census blocks tend to be tied to the Census data which doesn't come out very frequently.
- Q Now, between the period 1999 and 2004, what specifically can you tell the Court about the values and the zip codes where these properties are located in connection with Mr. Cloud?
- A Well, there wasn't -- during that period, there wasn't one zip code where the properties were located that went down in terms of value during that five-year period.
- Q Of the properties that you studied, was there a particular number that actually ended up in foreclosure?
- A Once again, I didn't have any specific information on what was a foreclosure sale and what happened to be a property that wasn't in foreclosure.
- Q With respect to -- were there 11 properties that you found that were in foreclosure?

- A There were 11 properties that actually saw a decrease in value during that period; I guess roughly 11 out of 80 or something the properties I was able to identify. I think they were like 98 or whatever properties. We didn't have data on all those. Roughly 80 or something of them, 11 went down in actual value during that period from 1999 to 2004.

 Q And what happened to the other properties, the other 66 properties?

 A They were up in value, and as group, the average was up
 - A They were up in value, and as group, the average was up 60 percent during that five-year period, even factoring in the ones that went down.
 - Q I ask you to take a look at your report, page 2. I want to ask you some questions about that, where you discussed the foreclosed property, revealed that not even one area experienced a drop in average home values in 1999-2004. Explain how you came to that conclusion?
 - A You're referring to the last paragraph?
- Q Yes. Your last paragraph where you speak of a drop in average home value between '99 and 2004.
 - A Well, again, looking at the zip codes where all the Cloud properties were located, not one of the zip codes recorded a drop in home value between 1999 and 2004.
 - Q Now, let me ask you about your -- do you report or hold seminars as well with lenders on mortgage fraud that affects value of foreclosures?

- A Yes. It's a big mortgage industry issue and we held
 one -- the last one we did was in July.
- Q And now in terms of payments made to lenders after a fraudulent mortgage, what do you normally see in terms of when there's fraud, do you see a period of time that the foreclosure occurred between?
 - A What's very common in mortgage fraud, and what tends to expose mortgage fraud is that the mortgage goes in default very, very quickly. In some cases -- in many cases, none of the mortgage payments are even made.
 - Q And typically what is the time frame that you receive foreclosure after the time that the transaction takes place?
 - A Generally the mortgage industry standard is six months; that if you can make it past six months, a lender or investor like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, is less to require you to buy back a mortgage if it's defaulted in that period. One year certainly; two years, very much so.
 - Q When -- have you studied or been involved with matters where there are inflated appraisals?
 - A Yes, I'm familiar with it.

- Q And what do you typically see in a case where there are inflated appraisals in terms of foreclosures?
- A Larger than normal losses. Losses that basically that appear instantly because the property is worth so much less than the appraised value.

Q Now, with respect to -- did you read as part of your review, did you review records submitted by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac?

A Yes. I believe you asked Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to produce their loss statements, which is generally what most people in the mortgage industry do, whether you're a lender or whether or not you are Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, they happen to have some of the best records, but every property they take ownership of, they have detailed statements on how much they incurred in expenses and what they ended up with by the time the foreclosed property was sold.

In the Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae cases, and some banks, too, we're not talking about a foreclosure sale -- once the property is foreclosed, they take ownership of it. It's called real-estate owned, or REO. And that's what you tend to see advertised in newspapers these days. When somebody says, "I'm bidding on a foreclosed property" or "I'm buying a foreclose property," most of the time that isn't a property that's being sold at a foreclosure auction, it's one the lender has actually acquired and is selling after the fact, or an investor like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

Q Let me stop you so I show you what been marked as -- let me show you what's be marked as Defendant's 2 and 3.

MR. TATE: May have I approach, Your Honor?

1 THE COURT: Oh, of course.

Q Ask you to take a look at these. Ask you if you recognize these documents.

(Hand document to witness.)

- A Yeah. These are the two reports that -- Fannie Mae produced one, and Freddie Mac produced one, too. I think you subpoenaed them or asked them to produce documents showing basically what their losses were and the source of the losses, if any, in on each of the properties that they had an interest in.
- 11 Q And did you review those records as part of your 12 preparation in testifying today?
- 13 A Yes. I looked at them before, sure.
- Q In addition to those records, did you review a disk provided by Fannie Mae?
- 16 | A Yes.

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- 17 Q Do those charts accurately summarize the records that 18 you used?
- A Yes. These printouts -- the disks are basically spreadsheets that are stored on a CD and whatever, and these are printouts from them.
- MR. TATE: I move for admission of Defendant's Exhibit 2 and 3.
- 24 THE COURT: Any opposition?
- MR. RANDALL: No, Your Honor.

1 THE COURT: They will be admitted. 2 (Defendant's Exhibit No. 2, 3 received.) BY MR. TATE 3 Sir, first of all, I want to ask you to look at the 4 spreadsheet submitted by Freddie Mac. Of the 94 properties 5 associated with Cloud, does it indicate how many properties 6 7 they purchased -- number of properties they purchased? Well, they show one foreclosure on a SunTrust mortgage 8 9 one, and I'm not sure what the designation of "C" means 10 other than perhaps closed. The majority of the properties are listed as before me in terms of the loan status, which 11 12 means the mortgage is not delinquent or in default, and foreclosure was not initiated on the properties. 13 14 And how many properties are in that status? 15 Six of the nine. 16 And are you able to discern from -- first of all, do you have a copy of what I just gave you already up there at 17 the desk with you, those charts and summary? 18

- 19 I've got it right here. Yes.
- 20 Let me ask you about Fannie Mae, do you see how many 21 properties Fannie Mae reported a loss statement or profit 22 statement on?
- 23 Well, they have a loss category column on all the properties, and that's one of the columns that they have 24 25 is the loss column.

- Q And did you review the profit and loss statements from Fannie Mae?
 - A Yes. And Fannie Mae's case it shows the majority of the property they did not take a loss on.

- Q Now, let me ask you to explain for the Court how it is Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac would end up with a particular home that was involved in a Cloud transaction; how would they ever take ownership of that home?
- A Well, first of all, a loan that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would purchase is considered a conforming mortgage.

 Generally in the mortgage industry considered a prime mortgage since that's virtually the type of loans they buy.

They buy them and bundle them into mortgage securities, which they sell with basically a government guarantee all over the world.

As part of the agreement Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac have with the lender, they basically have to certify that the loan meets their underwriting standards, meets all appropriate state and federal law requirements, that the appraisal was done in a correct fashion. Basically verifying the quality of the mortgage.

Q Now, with respect to the homes that are assumed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to Chase Bank, did you hear testimony that Chase Bank's underwriting system was used to approve those loans?

- And a number of the loans, yes. 1
- And what is Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac's underwriting 3 system?
- Both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, since the middle of 4 the 1990s, have used an automated underwriting system. 5 Fannie Mae's is called Desktop Underwriter, and it's pretty 6
- underwriting system, but basically a black box. Nobody 8 It takes a bunch of 9 knows exactly what the variables are.

much what's known in the mortgage industry as an automated

- different factors in, such as a credit store, debt-to-income 10
- ratio, loan-to-value ratio, how much reserves the borrower 11
- 12 may have, and factors it all in and comes out with approved,
- not approved, caution, but basically results in that a 13

agreement to buy that, or how does it works?

- 14 mortgage broker or lender can type in the information and
- 15 get results right away.

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- 16 And if Fannie Mae approves a particular loan, let's say 17 based on information provided by the broker, what happens to the home? Is it sold then to Fannie Mae or is there an 18
 - Well, when they make a loan and it goes through one of these automated underwriting systems, it's basically given preferential treatment, because Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are confident it meets their underwriting standards.
 - So generally once those loans go through, they go into Fannie Mae security. Fannie Mae guarantees the credit

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quality. Charges the lender an annual guarantee fee for that. If the loan-to-value ratio is above 80 percent, it has to carry private mortgage insurance. And that all goes into the equation of when there's a loss or when something goes wrong.

Q For instance, like Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, the loss profits statements that you've viewed, if they report no loss, would you be able to discern whether or not they forced a lender to -- like for instance in this case, Chase, to buy back any of their loans?

A I didn't see that in the first time looking at it that there was any column for whether there was a loan required to be bought back.

As a practical matter, it wouldn't show up on any one of these sheets unless Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae took ownership of it. If they required the lender to buy the loan back, it would be the lender's responsibility to foreclose on the property, and it wouldn't show up here at all. Because the lender would be forced to buy it back based on the unpaid principal balance at the time. So if it was \$150,000 loan, Chase would have to pay back a \$150,000 loan to Fannie Mae and then they get the title to the property.

Q So the fact that Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac handled a particular foreclosure, would that conclude that perhaps

- they did not send the loan back to the bank alleging a fraud
 was involved with that particular loan?
 - A Yeah, almost assuredly. Again, if they find any evidence of fraud, that's grounds for repurchasing the loan.
 - Q Is that something that Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac routinely does?

- A They do very aggressively, yes, particularly in the current market environment.
- 9 Q Is that a contractual relationship between them and the lender?
 - A Yes. Under their seller agreements, it's caused -- or, you know, they are responsible for preventing fraud.
 - Q Let me ask you briefly about the role of a broker in terms of obtaining the home loan. What is the broker's relationship to the lender and the broker's responsibility?
 - A The mortgage broker is effectively an independent contractor in terms of their status. Their affiliation with lenders basically was known as sponsorship, so Chase would sponsor a number of brokers, basically authorizing them to originate loans on their behalf. But the broker doesn't have any money to actually make the loan, so dependent on Chase, or a larger lender actually funding the loan, they effectively act as a loan officer.
 - However, during this time period, 1999 to 2004, the rules governing what a broker could do and can't do were

much more liberal than they are today.

For example, during this time period a broker routinely ordered appraisals for the lender on the lender's behalf and the lender authorized brokers to do that. In the current environment, basically since last summer, no one would allow a broker to do that.

- Q But during the period of these loan's origination, a broker was allowed to contract it's own appraisals?
- A The brokers basically had a lot of leeway during that period to do a lot of things.
- Q Could an ordinary consumer, like say in this case,
 Mr. Cloud, who was purported seller of a house, would the
 lender rely on them for an appraisal?
- A I don't see any way that's possible. As you might imagine, lenders require that they basically choose the appraiser, and they have a list of approved appraisers that they authorize. They sometimes delegate that responsibility to a broker, but in no case would you allow a party to the transaction, either the buyer or the seller of the property, to select an appraiser because they obviously have a conflict of interest.
- Q And if a lender were aware of that, based on your training and experience, would they approve the loan?
- A I don't think so, because if there was a problem with it, they would be required to buy it back based on a

fraudulent appraisal or a bad appraisal.

- Q Now, one of the things I brought up in this hearing is the concept of yield spread premiums. Can you explain to the Court what yield spread premiums are and what they were during the period of 1999 to 2004?
- A Yes. To clarify, we're talking about yield spreads here. We're not talking about the yield spreads involved in flipping the property, which is kind of what's been involved in these cases.

Yield spread premiums are a fee that mortgage brokers collect by basically charging higher interest rates than market conditions allow. For example, in the current market environment, if you have -- the prevailing rate is 5 percent, then a mortgage broker sells Chase or somebody else a loan with a 5 and a half percent, he gets paid extra for originating that high rate interest loan.

It's a controversial practice that the Department of Housing and Urban Development is currently in the process of trying to eliminate, and it's very rarely even disclosed on documents, like a HUD-1 Settlement sheet.

- Q Since you've referenced the HUD-1, and there's been some discussions about the HUD-1 Settlement sheet and what's required, who is the HUD-1 Settlement sheet designed to protect?
- A The HUD-1 Settlement sheet, just like the good-faith

estimate, are part of disclosures given to borrowers required under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act.

They are basically aimed at protecting borrowers from being hit with fees or charges that they didn't know about. It's trying to make them very aware of the mortgage process, what they need to know when they go to closing, how much they are going to pay in closing costs, and basically what they have to pay.

- Q Is the Settlement Statement in any way designed to protect the interest of the lender?
- A No. Only that it's a disclosure requirement that if they screw it up, they're held liable for it, and someone like HUD or a civil plaintiff could sue them.
- Q But the Settlement Statement is designed to advise the buyer, is that right?
- 16 A Yes. That's the sole purpose of it.
- 17 | Q Is it a consumer document?

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- 18 A Yes, to protect the borrower in a mortgage transaction.
- 19 Q Do lenders rely on the Settlement Statement in any way
 20 in making a decision to fund the loan?
- 21 A No. Because the underwriting decision has to be made
- 22 probably at least a month or two before a HUD-1 is produced.
- In most cases, a HUD-1 is only produced at closing; some cases, a day or two before.
 - Q As far as you know, is there any requirement that --

for instance, some money that's going to be given to the buyer, be on the HUD-1?

MR. RANDALL: Your Honor, I would object to this on relevance. We're pretty far afield from the issue before the Court now as being collateral neighborhood damages. I don't know if this is relevant to the Court's inquiry at this point.

MR. TATE: Your Honor, as the Court is aware, we're putting on evidence at sentencing, and part of the evidence we've put on is the financing, and we believe it's relevant to Mr. Cloud's culpability, which the Court would have to decide in terms of whether he's a leader or organizer. There's been some references that Mr. Cloud did some things.

I think he's asking for some water.

(The witness is given water.)

THE COURT: I'm allowing the question because it could be useful in some other issues before the Court. It doesn't seem directly relevant to collateral damage, but it is useful in understanding the ultimate purposes of HUD-1.

But even though, as you said, they are not relied on by the lender, aren't they relied on by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae in doing a securitization?

THE WITNESS: It becomes the only, final record of the mortgage transaction and that's why it's important too.

THE COURT: It's ultimately relied on by the ultimate lender, which is the secondary mortgage market.

THE WITNESS: That's the only paper trail they essentially have of what transpired with the mortgage.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

BY MR. TATE

Q Now, with respect to appraisers, who is responsible for obtaining appraisers? Is the appraiser an fiduciary of the buyer or seller or someone else?

A Generally that responsibility relies solely with the lender who's originating the loan and taking responsibility for funding the loan.

As I mentioned, during this time period, they routinely delegated it to someone like a mortgage broker, but that's -- if you did a retail origination through Bank of America office, it would be the loan officer who would actually order the appraisal.

Q And is that on an approved list, approved by the lender or someone else?

A Generally each lender will either keep an approve appraiser list, or they'll require certain certifications for appraisers. They have to have certain -- basically certifications, whatever, I think there are two or three for different appraisal groups and you have to be certified and tested on that.

- Q Now, in the instance, whether it would be Fannie Mae,
 Freddie Mac or Chase, or any other lender, in the event that
 a home is sold at a value higher than what it's actually
 worth, based on your training and experience, what would
 they do with that loan?
 - A I'm not sure I understand what you're asking.
 - Q Well, if there was a fraudulent appraisal, would Fannie
 Mae or Freddie Mac take the loss on that? Would they keep
 the house?
 - A No. They would kick it back to the lender. To answer your question, nobody knowingly wants to make a mortgage for a value that's worth more than the house. And that's the purpose of appraisals, is to make sure you don't run into that situation.
 - Q Now, with respect to -- do you know -- did you hear the term used in this hearing, the term "flipping"?
- 17 | A Yes.

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- 18 Q And what do you understand that to mean?
 - A Well, it's a common term, particularly in real estate over the last ten years, where somebody tries to buy a house and then turn around as quickly as possible and make a profit on it, basically capitalizing on the rapid home price appreciation we've seen in the country over the last ten years. It was a lot earlier to do five years ago than it is to do now, for example.

Q As far as you know, does the lending industry consider flipping illegal or is it an approved type transaction?

A I wouldn't use the word "approved." It's not illegal, and it's fairly common.

During 2005, 2006, roughly a third of the property sales in the United States involved some kind of investor or second home, so it's always been a huge hunk of the housing market in this country. It's a lot less now, but historically it's been a big number.

Q Explain, if you will, the value of a home that's in the foreclosure, and is held by a bank. How is it that a person like Mr. Cloud can buy that home at one price, for instance \$100,000, and then sell it as \$164,000. How is that --

MR. RANDALL: Your Honor, I'm going to object at this point. There's no evidence, no record these kind of transactions took place in the underlying trial testimony.

When Mr. Tate tried to do this earlier today, I think the Court addressed that with Mr. Tate. There's no indication these particular transactions took place in this case.

THE COURT: What are you referencing, Mr. Tate?

MR. TATE: What I'm trying to reference is the suggestion earlier that if you buy a house in foreclosure, that it's necessarily -- that because a house is in foreclosure --

THE COURT: Right. Do you have -- but point to one of the properties that was actually presented to the jury, point to any of the 93 properties; point to any one of them that was -- Mr. Cloud acquired during a foreclosure start.

MR. TATE: Well, I'm going to ask you to make a list. There's a spreadsheet I have passed you that had -- that has foreclosure dates on there.

THE COURT: No, not foreclosures at the end.
We're talking forecloses at the beginning when Mr. Cloud acquired the property.

BY MR. TATE

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- O Take a look at Maribel Lane. 1601 Maribel Lane.
- 14 A That's No. 6 on the list.
- 15 THE COURT: Do you have it?
- 16 MR. TATE: It's this one.
- 17 Q I believe that's what it says. Are you looking at the loan spreadsheet?
- 19 A Yes. I was trying to share with -- No. 6.
- 20 THE COURT: I'm looking at the wrong spreadsheet.
- 21 | Which exhibit number is it?
- 22 MR. TATE: It's Defendant's Exhibit 3. 1605 --
- 23 | it's the same one I e-mail to the Court.
- 24 THE COURT: I thought that's what I'm looking at.
- 25 And I have 314 East 4th Street.

MR. TATE: That's the short one. It looks like it's the government's.

THE COURT: No. This one end in Q. The government's end in X. Can I see that?

(Hand document to judge.)

Maybe I'm mistaken. I see now. All right.

It is the same one. This one, the copy I have, which I printed this out this weekend, has two series of numbers on it based on the spreadsheet nomenclature. And this one that the witness is using only has -- does not have the X and Y axis of the spreadsheet.

Now I see it is -- it's the same data, but it's just I have the columns as X and Y on it, and that's what was confusing me. So I see it. It's on row 9 of my spreadsheet, but it is property No. 6. All right. So you may continue.

BY MR. TATE

- 18 Q For instance, 1609 Maribel, do you see that, sir?
- 19 A I do.

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- Q Now, do you see where that property, the purchase of that property appeared for February 7th, 2000?
- 22 A Correct. And the foreclosure date's March 23rd, 2004.
- Q First of all, is it significant that the foreclosure date is four years later?
- 25 A Well, it would be very unusual to have a fraud case

- where the mortgage didn't default within the first six months, if not year, so to have it go four years without it defaulting is very unusual.
 - Q Does that mean someone is making payments on it?
- A Yeah, that's exactly what it means. Somebody was making the mortgage payments.
 - Q If you purchase a property that is in foreclosure by a bank, based on what you know about lenders, are they trying to get the full market value of a property?
 - A No. All they are looking to recovery is the loan amount.

THE COURT: Plus cost.

THE WITNESS: Yeah. Foreclosure cost or whatever, too. And they are specific legal requirements. They have to post in the newspaper things that this house is being sold at foreclosure, and they put down the amount that it's being sold for.

In many cases, the amount is so low that the bank actually acquires the property, and then proceeds to sell it. But I think we talked about this earlier, if they sell it for more than the amount owed, they have to share the proceeds with whoever owned the property to begin with.

Q In the foreclosures that you reviewed provided by Fannie Mae, did you show where they sold the house for more and had to share in the profits with anyone?

A No. It -- well, no, because I guess Fannie Mae took ownership of the property, so anything that Fannie Mae did, took place on a post foreclosure basis. We don't know exactly what happened during the foreclosure sale, but Fannie Mae acquired the property, became part of Fannie Mae's holdings of real estate.

Q Now, with respect to abandoned properties, once a house

Now, with respect to abandoned properties, once a house goes into foreclosure, who is responsible for -- you heard testimony about grass being long, the pool not having a tarp over it -- who is responsible, based on your training and experience, for the upkeep of a property once it's in foreclosure?

A Basically the mortgage servicer takes responsible for it on the behalf the investor. I'm very familiar with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac do, and I can tell you not one of these properties was ever abandoned because Fannie Mae actually fixes up the properties.

Fannie Mae is the largest purchaser of United States of carpet, of appliances -- everything, because they have a huge business, unfortunately, they have to fix up the properties and resell them. They maintain it. Hire people to cut the grass and everything else.

THE COURT: So Fannie Mae is the victim. Fannie Mae ends up having a lot of damages.

THE WITNESS: Except for if they acquire the

1 property, the first thing they do is a try to maintain it.

2 THE COURT: Right. But that's what I'm saying.

Fannie Mae then has to shoulder a cost it never intended to shoulder.

THE WITNESS: Exactly. And that should be reflected in this sheet that was provided.

BY MR. TATE

was no loss?

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- Q Of all the profit and loss statements that you reviewed, was it your testimony in the majority of the cases that the homes you reviewed purchased by Fannie Mae there
- 12 A On the Fannie Mae cases, yes.
- 13 0 And with Freddie Mac?
- A Freddie Mac only had looks like one case. The rest are considered performing, which means they are still
- guaranteeing the mortgage and nothing has gone wrong with it as far as they are concerned.
- 18 Q Let me ask you about certain lenders. There was
- 19 discussion about a different -- whether they are subprime.
- 20 Do you have a chart provided by the government says "Cloud
- 21 Properties" that shows the various lenders in this case?
- 22 A Yes.
- 23 Q I ask you to take a look at that.
- MR. TATE: Mr. Meyers, what was the government's exhibit that you use?

MR. MEYERS: This is the attachment to the Presentence Report.

MR. TATE: So this wasn't admitted in here as attachment to the Presentence Report?

BY MR. TATE

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- Q Is this the 94 properties that you studied, list of the compilation of the 94 properties you studied, Mr. Cecala?
- A Yes. This list of 94 properties, clearly the Fannie
 Mae ones are supposed to be a subset of the -- and the
 Freddie Mac too.
- Q Let me ask you about some of these other lenders on here, and ask you what you can tell the Court about their lending practice.

MR. TATE: And the reason I'm going into this,

Judge, is to -- as far as irrelevant conduct and the common
scheme and plan as opposed to the evidence adduced at trial.

BY MR. TATE

- Q I'm going to ask you to look at property No. 4, Fleet Mortgage Company. What can you tell the Court about Fleet Mortgage Company's underwriting standards?
- A Fleet Mortgage doesn't exist now. I believe it was acquired by J. P. Morgan Chase. But it's basically a prime lender who had made mostly Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac type loans.
- Q And would they use the Desktop Underwriting system?

- A Anybody who wants to sell a loan to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is pretty much required to use that.
 - Q What about Countrywide Home loans?

- 4 A Countrywide Home loans also falls into that category.
- 5 During the time period here it was Fannie Mae's largest
- 6 customer, but they do make a variety of different loans, and
- 7 I can't tell from this whether it went through one of their
- 8 | subprime units or a different type of unit.
- 9 Q How about City Financial Mortgage?
- 10 A City Financial is the subprime lending unit of City,
- 11 City Bank, and it only does subprime loans.
- 12 Q Now, with subprime mortgages, were there different
- 13 underwriting requirements of subprime mortgages in regards
- 14 | to the type of the documentation that you need?
- 15 A Generally, they have less documentation, and you pay a
- 16 | higher interest rate for that, and generally made available
- 17 | to people with less than perfect credit.
- 18 0 Was is a NINA loans?
- 19 A Well, that's kind of a slang expression for no income
- 20 | no asset verification. And I guess that's probably the most
- 21 | liberally underwritten mortgage out there. When you
- 22 | basically take a borrowers word for their income and/or
- 23 | their assets and you don't verify anything. It's generally
- 24 | reserved for somebody with a high credit score and/or a
- 25 substantial down payment. But we've seen that it was also

- used with people who didn't have particularly high credit

 scores and didn't put any money down. Those loans defaulted

 very quickly.
 - Q Crossland Mortgage?

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- A They are primarily a jumbo mortgage lender but
 basically a prime lender too. They sell loans both Fannie
 Mae and Freddie Mac.
 - Q And Nations Credit Financial, looking at specifically
 1601 Maribel property, No. 11, where Nations Credit
 Financial is listed as the lender. Can you tell the Court
 about Nations Credit?
 - A Primarily a subprime lender. Generally anybody with Financial is a finance company, and most of the subprime originations were originated through finance companies, even if they were subsidiaries of banks.
 - Q And did they require any documentation at all?
 - A I don't know in this specific case what the documentation was. But they, you know, ran the whole spectra. They did have loans that had minimal or no verification of income or assets.
 - Q And is there any way to tell with this particular property what type of -- whether they required any verification that they --
- 24 A Not based on what's on this sheet, no.
- 25 Q How about First National Bank of America?

- 1 A A prime lender, as far as I know. Associates is on 2 there, Associates Home Equity. They are a subprime lender.
 - Q Associates is a subprime, and they were involved with 2949 Morgan Street?
- 5 A Yes.

of that.

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- Q Postal Mortgage Services, specifically property 37,
- 7 Eastwood Drive, the address that was discussed?
- 8 A Can't make any specific judgment on that.
- 9 Q Do you know, have you ever heard of Postal Mortgage
 10 Services?
- A Yes. They are a small lender, though, and they don't
 fall on our radar screen. Generally, we track the largest
 hundred in the United States, and they clearly fell outside
- 15 O How about National City Mortgage?
- A Yes. They were subsidiary of National City Bank in
 Cleveland. They have since sold, but they were a
 combination lender. They did prime loans as well as
 subprime, and reduced documentation loans. Again we can't
- 20 tell from this specifically what the loan was.
- 21 Q Option One Mortgage?
- 22 A Virtually all subprime.
- Q Now, directing your attention to these property -beginning property 59 at Forsyth County, North Carolina, I
 see the appearance of a lender by the name of the First

- National Bank of Arizona. Is there anything significant about First National Bank?
- 3 A Yes. They are what we call an Alternative A lender.
- 4 Basically reduced documentation is most of their business.
- Q The type of documentation we talked about in terms of asset verification, income verification, a lender like First
- 7 National Bank of the Arizona require that type of
- 8 documentation?
- 9 A It would certainly be reduced if not the kind of loan
 10 Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac would buy. It's generally what
 11 you'd have to package it into private securities. But,
- again, without seeing the specific loans documents, I don't
- 13 know how much income they verified or what.
- 14 Q What about Aurora Loan Services?
- A Almost the exact same type of operation. It was bought by the Lehman Brothers and still exists today.
- 17 | Q Credit Home Lenders?
- 18 A Another exclusively subprime lender.
- 19 Q Lehman Brothers you just mentioned, what is Lehman
- 20 Brothers?
- 21 A Lehman Brothers is a defunct investment banking firm,
- 22 | but like many Wall Street firms probably between 2005 and
- 23 | 2007 bought up a lot of subprime and reduced documentation
- 24 | lending operations which were having financial trouble.
- 25 They obviously thought the credit crisis would blow over and

- 1 | that would be a good investment. A bad move.
- 2 | Q How about Argent Mortgage Company?
 - A Again, a subprime lender.
- Q Directing your attention to property 86 down in Atlanta that has the name Alan Thompson associated with reference to a number Long Beach Mortgage, what can you say about Long
- 7 Beach Mortgage?

business.

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- A It's the subprime lending arm that used to be part of
 Washington Mutual, and I think it's got Wells Fargo -somehow Wells Fargo ended up with the mortgage. I'm
 guessing that given the date when it was originated, it was
 part of Long Beach and Long Beach since went out of
- 14 Q First Horizon, Nova Star, property 190.
- A First Horizon is a prime mortgage. They were bought by

 Nova Star, but again I can't tell you anything specifically

 about that loan.
- Q Now, with respect to lenders like Chase who cut these loans and then sold them to Fannie Mae, how did lenders -how did they make their money? Did they make their money by
- 21 selling the loan portfolios or how did they make money?
- 22 A It depends on type of the loan and it also depends on
- 23 the time period, and the time period we're talking about
- 24 here 1999 to 2004 was really the period when subprime
- 25 | lending took off.

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handle the proceeding.

And one of the reasons subprime lending took off is because it was more profitable for lenders to originate loans, that you couldn't make much money or any money on a Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac. You made your money in the servicing of the loan, meaning the payments collected each month from borrowers passed through investors. subprime loans, you had a lot of opportunity to make money at the front end, securitizing it and servicing it down the road provided nothing went wrong. How that does a lender make money servicing a loan after they sell it? They collect the monthly payments, say 100,000 loans, they'll collect roughly \$20 a month. That will be their fee for passing on their monthly payments to investors. But how do you make money on \$20 a month? Well, you pretty much have a factory-type of operation. You send out bills on an automated fashion. You have got machines in the back room that slice open envelopes and take checks out. It's pretty much just how you can process payments that you receiving from borrowers basically in an envelope. It's designed to collect the payments. designed to actually pursue foreclosures or call up

borrowers and do any modifications, which is one of the big

problems we're running into now. No one was set up to

- 1 | Q Do you have to deal in significant volume of those --
- 2 A It's an economy-of-scale business. As I mentioned
- 3 before, J. P. Morgan Chase is the third largest mortgage
- 4 server in the country, and to make money they have got to do
- 5 | literally trillions of dollars worth of loans.
- 6 MR. TATE: No, Your Honor.
- 7 THE COURT: Mr. Randall.
- 8 MR. RANDALL: Thank you, Judge.

CROSS EXAMINATION

10 BY MR. RANDALL

- 11 Q Good afternoon, Mr. Cecala.
- 12 A Good afternoon.
- 13 Q It's been a long day and we'll try and stay focused on
- 14 | a couple of issues here, sir.
- 15 What I'd like to address with you first is the
- 16 collateral impacts.
- 17 As far as your educational background, sir, I discussed
- 18 this a little bit before, but you have a BA in English and
- 19 political science. Correct?
- 20 A Correct.
- 21 | Q Master's degree is in journalism?
- 22 A Yes.
- 23 Q You're not a trained economist. Is that right?
- 24 A That's right.
- 25 Q That you are not a trained statistician?

- 1 A Although I took graduated level statistics, no, I'm 2 not.
- 3 Q You don't have a degree in real estate accounting?
- 4 A No, I do not.
- Q You don't have any formal degree in a quantitative discipline?
 - A No.

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- Q And your current position right now is it's CEO and publisher of Inside Mortgage Finance publication.
- 10 A Correct.
- Q As part of your professional responsibilities with that organization, do you ever personally perform quantitative assessments to determine collateral losses associated with
- 15 A Not specifically, no. I do analysis but not as -- in 16 terms of collateral damage, no. As I mentioned before,
- that's not really a recognized concept in the mortgage industry.
- Q It might be at issue for the Court, sir. If you could just answer my questions, sir, I'd appreciate it.
- 21 A Sure.
- Q Are you familiar with the peer review journal articles that were referred to by Dr. Cowan earlier in his testimony
- 24 today?

property foreclosures?

25 A I am. I've actually read some of them.

- 1 Q Have you read the Immergluck and Smith External Cost of
- 2 Foreclosure, the Effect of Single-family Mortgage
- 3 Foreclosures on Property Values?
- 4 | A No.
- 5 Q Have you had read the Immergluck and Smith Impact to
- 6 | Single-family Mortgage Foreclosures on Neighborhood Crime?
- 7 | A No.
- 8 Q Have you read the Lin, Rosenblatt and Yao article on 9 Spillover Effects of Foreclosures on Neighborhood Property?
- 10 A Yes.
- 11 Q And have you read Apgard and Duda, an article on
- 12 collateral damage, Municipal Impact on Today's Mortgage
- 13 | Foreclosure?
- 14 A Yes.
- 15 Q Are you familiar with any of the peer review articles
- 16 related to those journal articles I just asked you about,
- 17 peer review data?
- 18 A I'm very familiar with the peer review process and what
- 19 | it involves in terms of producing the research.
- 20 | Q Are you familiar at all with any of the peer review
- 21 | that went out with respect to these particular studies or
- 22 | articles?
- 23 A Not beyond the fact that I know peer review went on.
- 24 | That's all.
- 25 Q Can you cite to the Court any academic literature that

- would support criticism of the methodology that Dr. Cowan employed in making his findings in this case?
 - A No. I don't have any criticism of the methodology, by the way.
 - Q That's good to know. Thank you.

And I think you testified earlier -- I think you testified earlier, sir, the report that we received today, this spreadsheet, for lack of a better term, that we were provided during the break, this was not an effort on your part to ask you to determine any neighborhood collateral damage. Is that right?

A It was an attempt to show what happened to zip codes where Cloud properties were located. So to the extent you could track a decline in property values, potentially you could attribute it to a Cloud property foreclosure. But I think you've pointed out that it's very hard to have one foreclosure impact a thousand houses or whatever maybe in the zip code.

Q Well, let me ask you, sir, essentially what you did here was these are results that you found of appreciation of the housing market. Is that essentially what I've characterized here?

A I think it tries to capture appreciation, but it's actually change in property values. It uses repeat transactions. For example, if you have a five-year period

- and you've got a property located in there, if it sold two or three times, or refinanced once and there was a record of a new mortgage being put out with an appraisal on it, it captured that. So to some extent it's as close as you're going to get to actually tracking property value over a time period over a designated area.
 - Q You're not aware of any literature that would support this methodology in terms of apply it to a loss assessment for collateral damage in foreclosures?
- 10 A No, I'm not.
 - Q Are you aware of any peer review of this methodology to take these numbers and apply them to an assessment of collateral damages in neighborhoods as a result of the foreclosures?
- 15 A No.

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- Q Let me just ask you, sir, so I understand what we're portraying here at this table, you have a category, I just direct your attention to a category where it says "property for five years" as the one of the first quantitative data points.
- 21 A Okay.
- Q How did you derive that number, sir? Please explain
 for the Court and for my own benefit how that calculation
 was made?
- 25 A On the property, you're talking about?

- Q Yeah. It says "property five years." I'm guessing that's a five-year period of time that's analyzed in some way?
- A Yeah. The available data out there generally tracks
 properties in five-year blocks, so a property value five
 years means 2004 to 2009, because that's the last five
 years. What happened on that property's value in the last
 five years, you skip over and you get --
 - Q Let me ask you one more question on that point.
- 10 A Sure.

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- 11 Q So you would take into consideration all the property
 12 transaction of the sales of that property within that
 13 five-year block?
 - A Keep in mind, I don't take it -- this is again what's available there. You plug in your home address and you pick a time period, it will tell you what it thinks happened to your property value during that time period. I don't make any judgment on whether that's accurate or anything else.
 - Q But that would reflect certainly the transactions that Mr. Cloud had been involved in with respect to the properties listed here?
 - A Correct. The actual specific property address, yes.

 We plug in the property address, it tells you whether you have enough information to come with changes in home price value.

- So if we're dealing with a property that Mr. Cloud has 1 2 dealt with and purchased it and sold it on the same day, there was some appreciation associated with that sale, that 3 number would impact your calculation or this particular 4 number you've put in your table?
- Correct. And, again, it's over a five-year period. 6
- 7 Yes, sir, I understand.

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- You know, foreclosure or whatever happened there is 8 9 basically a snapshot of one day or a much shorter period of 10 time.
 - As a hypothetical, if a individual, say Mr. Cloud in this case, purchased a property on one day in that five-year time frame and sold it at 125 percent appreciation in the same day, that 125 percent appreciation would go into this calculation?
 - Correct, as would a foreclosure after the fact where it sold for half that price.
- If it foreclosed within that time frame? 18
- 19 Within that five-year time period, yes. It would have 2.0 for 1999 to 2004 to be captured by this.
 - Let's turn to the zip code analysis for the five-year period of time. What types of properties does that account for? Next column date.
- Beg your pardon? 24
- 25 Next column of data I'm referring to.

- A Yeah. This is all single-family housing. It would cover condos, but wouldn't cover any multifamily housing.

 And it's the same thing, you know, you put the property in,
- 4 the information, you ask for the changes in that for five
- 5 years, you have the option of selecting that zip code.
- 6 Again, it's all done through a computer program.
 - Q And would that then -- that number would include the entire zip code for the particular property line it's on?
- 9 A Correct.

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- 10 Q That would certainly be a wider universe of properties
 11 than what Dr. Cowan and folks had done, his study with
 12 respect to the neighborhood?
- 13 A No question.
- Q And then the "property ten year" would be the same type of calculation as you described the property in five years,
- 16 | sir?
- A Right. Property five years, the last five years;

 18 property ten years is the last ten years.
- Q So every transaction with respect to that property would be accounted for in that calculation?
- A Correct. And as you can see, normally there's not many properties in the United States that go down in value over ten years. Here you see some that did mostly because the last five years has been so bad.
- 25 Q What is the next column, sir?

- A That's a calculation of the property during the first five years. As I said before, the information that you capture is done in five-year segments. You theoretically can't go back and say give me 1999 to 2004. What you can do is get 1999 through 2009 and subtract out the last five years, so that's what programmed in there. It's just a subtraction of the ten-year value from the five-year value.
- Q Okay.

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- A And the same goes with the zip.
- 10 Q Okay. I understand.
 - So again, for our focus here today, sir, the particular property for the five years and the particular property for the ten years, that would include all the transactions that Mr. Cloud would have engaged in with his respect to that property within that respective period of time?
 - A Correct. Not just his involvement, anybody else who bought the property or whatever during the period. It is property-specific, not borrower-specific.
 - Q Did you examine any appreciation rates in any other zip codes for comparison purposes outside of the ones provided that Mr. Cloud was involved in?
 - A No, I did not.
- Q Did you examine any substantive code beyond this? Did
 you have any data that allowed you to go into a more finite
 level than a zip code level?

- 1 A Nope. Not available.
 - Q Sir, I want to address with you just for a few minutes the appreciation that you talked about.

Again, is it fair to say that those numbers are not adjusted for fraudulent transactions at all? In other words, you didn't back out -- identify fraudulent transactions and back those out of the sample survey.

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- A No.
- Q So if transactions were closed with overappraisals performed, then those numbers would be included in the statistics that you provided?
 - A It doesn't actually use the appraisal. It uses the purchase value. So if your home sold for \$150,000 one year and then two years later sold for 170, it would calculate the appreciation based on those two transactions. If there was a foreclosure, that would have to show up eventually as a purchase or some other transaction that would take that value and drop it down. Most likely would drop it down.
 - Q Okay. But the sale had resulted from a reliance of time over appraisal, that sale would be reflected in the numbers?
- 23 | A Correct.
- Q Now, you did mention with respect to we were talking about the appraisals, I think you mention -- did you say on

- direct-examination it would not be proper for the seller to be providing the appraisals?
- A Yes. It would be very unusual and legally inappropriate.

- Q So if there's evidence in this case where that, in fact, occurred with respect to the defendant, that would be legally inappropriate?
 - A And certainly it would be grounds for having to repurchase the loan and the lender not exercising their authority or jurisdiction over the appraisal process, yes.
 - Q Let me move, sir, to talk a little bit about foreclosure numbers. I think you testified to just some general foreclosure statistics, sir. Reading from your report, and correct me if you said something different today, but from the report I think you said only about two, 2.7 percent of prime mortgages, the type at issue in the Cloud case, in the country were delinquent at all, and just .56 percent were actually in foreclosure. Are those accurate numbers?

A Yes, except for I will tell you that the analysis I was doing was based on looking at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac sheets, as well as Dr. Cowan's analysis of essentially prime mortgages. Obviously, when we went through the list of who the lenders were on other properties, it does show there was subprime reduced documentation loans, clearly nonprime

1 mortgages in there. And I didn't put those numbers in 2 there. Those would be higher.

Q I understand. Those numbers would be somewhat higher.

But you're aware in this case, testimony earlier in Dr. Cowan's report showed 61 foreclosures with respect to the Cloud properties out of 74 that had closed, reflecting somewhere in an 80 percent foreclosure rate. That would be considerably higher than the number that you reported nationally. Is that right?

- A That would be a phenomenally high foreclosure rate.
- Q Sir, staying on the collateral damage, we talked about the statistics and the numbers a little bit, but with respect to the neighborhood collateral damage, assuming a property purchased by an individual foreclosures as a result of a fraud related to the case, you're not suggesting that foreclosure would not have a negative impact on the surrounding neighborhood, are you?
- A No. Generally foreclosures have a negative impact on them. All I attempted to do was try to look at the neighborhood, even if it was too large an area or whatever, but the zip code to see exactly what happened during the time period in question to the overall property values.
- Q And that certainly wouldn't address whether -- even if you had an appreciation for the zip code, that wouldn't address a slow appreciation resulting from negative impacts,

1 | would it?

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- 2 A No, it would not.
- Q And also if individuals who are living in an affected neighborhood, I think you said on direct examination with the foreclosure happening in a neighborhood, you might
- 6 expect some kind of adverse repercussions?
- A Oh, sure. If the property is abandoned and everything else, it has a negative impact selling the property.
 - Q In some cases wouldn't you agree, sir, it may be difficult for individuals effected in that neighborhood to even sell the property?
 - A Yeah. In the situation we saw in the television, particularly in the current market environment where everything is bad enough as it is, yes, it would be enough to keep somebody out there.
 - Q Those numbers would not be reflected in the statistics you provided?
- 18 A No, they would not.
- Q And even if in the neighborhood -- even if a neighborhood continued to appreciate to some degree, a foreclosure in the neighborhood may cause a slower
- 22 appreciation in that neighborhood. Isn't that possible?
- 23 A Yes. It really depends on the time of the foreclosure.

If you have a foreclosure and the property is abandoned, and

25 that type of thing, that's where you see the huge impact.

There's some neighborhoods in good times when you have a foreclosure and nobody even knows it was a foreclosure because it was done so quickly and the property values were strong enough to support it.

Q Sir, I want to address with you just briefly also the Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac numbers you were provided. And let me just make sure I understand where those came from.

MR. RANDALL: If I could, may I recover Defendants 2 and 3 from Mr. Cecala?

THE COURT: You may.

- Q I'll put this on the screen. Have they been marked?
- 12 A That's the one I'm trying to find. No. This is the 13 same one.
- 14 0 That's different?
 - A Freddie Mac. It says "Freddie Mac" at the top. The other two I guess are both Fannie Mae.

MR. RANDALL: Your Honor, may I ask Mr. Tate mark these. I think I was referring to them as 2 and 3 and I'm not certain which is which because they're not marked. I just don't want to be inaccurate in the record.

- Q Anything else he provided to you?
- 22 A No.

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- 23 Q That's everything?
- A Other than I think this was from yours, the top
 properties, and this was the original exhibit that we were

1 | talking about.

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- 2 | Q That's from the PSR. We'll take that at this point.
 - A That's all I've got.
 - Q All right. Thank you, sir.

I'm showing you what's been marked as Defendant's

Exhibit 2. Put that up on the -- now, Mr. Cecala, did you

actually create this spreadsheet or was that provided to

you?

- 9 A No, I did not create it. It was printed out off of the 10 CD that I saw.
 - Q So this was provided to you by the defense team in the case already prepared in this way?
- 13 **A** Yes.
 - Q I just want to clear up one aspect. I don't want to spend a whole lot of time because I think it's somewhat collateral to our collateral discussion, but I want to clear up one point to you, because I don't want to let it stand there.

If you could just scroll to the right. I think what we see in the first column, unpaid balance. Is that right, sir? UPB. And the second category is current unpaid balance?

A Right. Normally the first one is at another period of time, either at origination or perhaps when the property was acquired, that's why sometimes there's a difference,

- 1 | sometimes there's no difference.
- 2 | Q Okay. And if we scroll a little bit more to the right,
- you see there are categories of other costs that appear to
- 4 | Fannie Mae?
- 5 A Sure.
- 6 Q And those include accrued interest, legal fees, taxes?
- 7 A Basically, they are paying for everything a homeowner
- 8 would do, plus fixing it up. You can see repairs in there.
- 9 Everything else.
- 10 Q Let's get to a couple key categories here that show "MI
- 11 proceeds, " is that mortgage insurance proceeds?
- 12 A Correct. That means there was some sort of claim,
- 13 | insurance claim, that Fannie Mae put in to the mortgage
- 14 | insurance company, and the mortgage insurance company paid
- 15 | it out, just like you would a homeowner's insurance claim or
- 16 an auto claim.
- 17 Q That would certainly be a loss to the mortgage
- 18 | insurance company in that case, is that right?
- 19 A Yes.
- 20 | Q Could that be resulting from the detection of
- 21 | fraudulent activity, sir?
- 22 A It could be in this case, but mortgage insurance
- 23 companies are like Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the insurance
- 24 policy that you get is generally voided in cases of fraud,
- 25 and they require the lender -- they won't pay, basically.

- 1 Q Now, the net sale of proceeds is the next category.
- 2 | That would be the sale after the foreclosure?
- 3 A Yes. It's net, so it generally means after they took
- 4 | all those costs and everything else out of it. It wouldn't
- 5 | include the MI proceeds. Well, I'm not positive. I
- 6 generally don't think it includes MI proceeds, but I don't
- 7 know for sure.
- 8 Q Okay. And "other receipts," sir. What is that
- 9 addressing, the "other receipts" category?
- 10 A It's basically a miscellaneous category. If they
- 11 collect any money from any other source that shows in there,
- 12 | it's hard to imagine why you would see like 133,000, 188,000
- 13 | in there --
- 14 Q It is for me. That's why I was hoping you could
- 15 | explain that for me, sir.
- 16 A I'd have to ask them why you would have something like
- 17 | that. Sometimes it's based on lenders paying something in
- 18 because Fannie Mae went after them and said, "We can't
- 19 require you to repurchase it, but you know this was a bad
- 20 | call."
- 21 Q So it's a recoupment of funds from the lender.
- 22 A Yes.
- 23 Q Let's scroll to the right just a little bit. Total
- 24 | receipts are calculated there and I believe we have to go to
- 25 the next page for the calculation.

- Mr. Cecala, did you calculate that economic gain/loss column there?
 - A No. I'm looking at the same spreadsheet that was provided to me.
- Q Yeah. I just saw it on Friday, so I have only been working with it a couple days so you can probably help me through it. We're going to have to flip back between these last two pages, unfortunately. Does it appear to you, as it appears to me, that that number is calculated by subtracting out --
- 11 A You'd have to ask, you know, Kevin who actually put the 12 numbers together.
 - Q I'd like to but, unfortunately, I'm required to ask you.
 - A That's true. I'm sorry.

- MR. TATE: We didn't prepare this chart. That was something prepared by Fannie Mae. It has their name at the bottom of it. Those are Fannie Mae records.
- A Normally that's the way it's done. Whatever they give him, I'm assuming Kevin, or his office, did not insert other columns or do calculations. Normally, any spreadsheet like this that Fannie Mae, a lender, would produce would have a credit loss number at the end that showed you, you know, for their accounting purposes what they ended up losing or making on this property.

1 | Q Let me just ask you this and maybe simplify things.

If you were actually to look at the -- this would only reflect the loss to Fannie Mae after taking into account the judgments for the other receipts and the mortgage insurance proceeds. Correct?

- A Correct. This is Fannie Mae's private accounting of it, basically.
- Q So if the losses shows particular number for Fannie
 Mae, those have already been adjusted because they have been
 compensated to some degree by these other means shown in
 detail?
- A Presumably, yes.
- 13 | O So that loss lies elsewhere?
- 14 | A Correct.

MR. RANDALL: Thank you, sir. That's fortunately the only point I wanted to make with you with respect to the Fannie Mae documentation.

THE COURT: Mr. Tate, redirect?

MR. TATE: Yes. Your Honor, at this time we would move to introduce as well in connection with those charts, which are Defendant Exhibit 2 and 3, the business record affidavits of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac certifying their records and their spreadsheets.

THE COURT: All those for formalities of trial are not required here, so you don't need to have all the

certifications. They are admitted. They are admitted, the certifications on this.

MR. TATE: Thank you, Your Honor.

(Defendant's Exhibit No. 2, 3 received.)

REDIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. TATE

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- Q Mr. Cecala, in addition to the spreadsheets produced by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, did you also review a disk?
- A Yes, at least in Fannie Mae's case. Fannie Mae's spreadsheet information was provided on the CD.
- 11 | Q And the CD, did it contain individual loss statements?
 - A Yes. It had, I think, a sheet for each one of the properties. I didn't print it out. I don't know if you printed it out, but yes. Generally the sheet we just saw on
- the screen is a summary, and they have individual ones. You
- 16 know, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have great paper work on
- 17 all of this stuff.
- 18 Q Now, with respect to the information submitted by
- 19 | Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac on the properties that Cloud --
- 20 | I'll use this term the Cloud properties that he purchased,
- 21 | Mr. Randall pointed out a number of instances where it shows
- 22 | "report payments from mortgage insurance." Did you see
- 23 | that?
- 24 A Yes.
- 25 Q And in the field of mortgage finance, would a mortgage

- 1 | insurer pay a claim that they deemed to be based on fraud?
- 2 | A No.
- 3 Q And why not?

loan, either.

- A As I said before, generally the mortgage insurance contract basically says they don't have to pay in cases of fraud, just like more insurance doesn't have to pay in the case of fraud. If they knew it was fraud, they -- or there was evidence of fraud, they tried to find a way and wouldn't pay the claim. Neither would Fannie Mae in fact acquire the
 - Q In addition to the mortgage insurer, are you aware of whether or not Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have provisions within their contracts for various things like Chase and others, that if there was fraud involved, they, in fact, would force that bank to buy the loan back?
 - A I don't know. I don't know what the statute of the limitations is. I think there's a time period that if you don't discover fraud for two years, for example, or whatever, you're not going to be able to bring that up. It's called seasoning the loan. Basically, if the loan performs for I think at least two years, you would be hard-pressed to say, hey, there was mortgage fraud and it somehow compromised the ability of loan to perform.
 - Q Now, of the documents that you reviewed for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, did it suggest to you in any way they had

- recouped money from the lenders by selling the loan back to them, or making the lender buy the loan back?
- A No. In fact, it was just the opposite. As I said
 before, they wouldn't even show up on that sheet if Fannie

 Mae had required them to buy the loan back, because it
 basically takes the whole transaction out of Fannie Mae's
- basically takes the whole transaction out of Fannie Mae's hands and becomes the lender's problem.

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- Q Now, that box that Mr. Randall showed you where it said "other income," was it your testimony that there's money to be made in terms of making fees on servicing of loans as well?
- A Yes. But I'm pretty sure that wasn't reflected in that column there. This is just basically related to disposing the property or whatever else.
- Q Did Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as far as you know, bundle these type of loans and sell them as mortgage-backed securities?
- A Basically 95 percent of all loans are Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac purchased -- in fact, they don't even purchase the loans. In these cases, Chase comes to them with a bundle of loans. Fannie Mae says we'll put a guarantee on that security, and you can go ahead, Chase, and sell that security. We call it a purchase transaction, but effectively it's Chase issuing the security, and Fannie Mae putting it's Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval on it.

And would they make income from the sale of that 1 2. bundle? That's one of the ways they profit from it. And 3 they also pay a guarantee fee to Fannie Mae for the life of 4 5 the security. Who pays that fee to Fannie Mae? 6 7 Chase. We're using Chase's an example. It would vary anywhere from in this time period ten to 15 basis points of 8 9 the total mortgage amounts, and amounts to almost another 10 mortgage insurance policy. Thank you. No further questions. 11 MR. TATE: 12 MR. RANDALL: Nothing. 13 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Cecala, you may step 14 down. Thank you very much. I appreciate it. 15 THE WITNESS: Am I free to leave? Because I have a 8:00 flight. 16 17 THE COURT: Can we release the witness? MR. TATE: Yes. 18 19 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 20 THE COURT: You're very welcome. 21 Anymore presentation on collateral damage by either side? 22 23 MR. MEYERS: No, Your Honor. 24 MR. TATE: No, Your Honor. I do have two 25 witnesses.

THE COURT: But not on collateral damages.

MR. TATE: No.

THE COURT: All right. Good. Let me make my conclusions on the false amount issue, and then we'll take a 15-minute recess.

First, I want to thank Mr. Cecala as he leaves. I thought he was extraordinarily honest, and his integrity shows because he acknowledged certain very critical points in his testimony.

He did not dispute Dr. Cowan's methodology. He admitted right up front that foreclosures have a negative impact on neighborhoods, admitted just a few moments ago. He actually said that a Census block radiation analysis is probably better than a zip code, but he had zip code access, and so he used zip codes. And he acknowledged specifically zip code analysis that one foreclosure in a thousand units would have little measurable impact.

Those are all extremely honest statements of the defense's experts, and I do want to say that he is truly an expert in the analysis of collateral damage.

After hearing all his testimony, I apologize for cutting Mr. Tate off. He's both an expert in mortgage backed securities and mortgage trends, but also in collateral damage analysis. And I thank you, sir, as you depart. And I want to make sure you catch your plane. If

it's at 8:00, you better head to the airport.

THE WITNESS: Thank you.

THE COURT: Now, Dr. Cowan on the other hand is just as extraordinarily qualified expert. Clearly his resume shows he has the training and academic study to do the analysis of the impact on foreclosures in communities. Both his master's in Urban and Regional Planning from the University of Florida, and his Ph.D. in City Regional Planning from the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, support that, but in particular, his actual experience focusing on housing and community development issues.

His analysis appears to the Court, and the Court finds as a matter of fact, seems to be extremely thorough in detail, and it is based on methodology, which the defense's own expert acknowledged was not in dispute.

What really is the issue in determining collateral damage is radius. And I think it's just common sense that a next-door neighbor to a house that's foreclosed has collateral damage. It comes from all the factors that Dr. Cowan spoke about.

The impact of disrepair on the house. The impact on the immediate fair market value of the immediately adjacent homes. Because when a house goes into foreclosure, that comparable that's created for purposes of real estate appraisal is down and it brings down all the houses in the

comparable appraisal zone.

So no one can credibly dispute that the next-door neighbor to a foreclosed house doesn't have a direct and some level of measurable damage in a short-term period. And that's what we're talking about.

If we talk about a five-year term, everything is going to appreciate; in an appreciating economy, everything is going to appreciate. So if a neighboring property from foreclosure five years later is going to be up, the foreclosed house five years later is going to be up, and we've loosely been talking about five years, not realizing that some of these houses we're talking not about a five-year period on these houses, both the foreclosed houses then and neighboring houses, we're talking about maybe a one- or two-year period of each of those houses.

Certainly collateral damage analysis, we're talking about what happens in the next year or two, not over five years or ten years. Because it's clear they are going to appreciate, particularly as Mr. Cecala said, of a five-year period where we had extraordinary appreciation in the national markets and in North Carolina of five to ten percent. Five percent for the most part in this region, annual appreciation.

So you can't say over a five-year period that there's no damage, because over a five-year period the

damage didn't occurred; the damage occurred three or four years before, and the measurable damage is what's over that short-term period of a couple of years.

And then the lagging of that; what would have really been the property value five years later? It probably would be much higher than it was if it hadn't had a sudden drop from the foreclosure.

So we're talking about -- so that's my factual finding about the five-year analysis, the ten-year analysis. We need to be looking in a short time frame when we're talking about collateral damage, but more importantly is the radius analysis.

The Court finds Dr. Cowan's expert report highly credible and acceptable an analysis of collateral damage.

But that's only the first step. The second step is not the expert's report but what's reasonably foreseeable to this defendant.

Dr. Cowan's report uses a methodology that is well-recognized through peer review in the community of -- in the academic community, and we find out from Mr. Cecala, even in the nonacademic community with regard to collateral damage -- let me say that community is the basically the neighborhood impact community, so to speak, that arena.

So as I said, the report is credible, but all the information in the report is probably, in this Court's eyes,

not reasonably foreseeable to the defendant, Mr. Cloud.

The report includes impact 800 to 900 meters from the foreclosed home. That's almost a kilometer. It's -- 900 meters is over a half mile away. And it seems that's it's not reasonably foreseeable that a defendant -- this defendant, Mr. Cloud, or any defendant involved in mortgage fraud, would perceive of collateral damage a half mile away.

But it's just common sense, and triers of fact can use their common sense, that an analysis of what's on the street -- understanding what's on the street where the foreclosure is, is the area where there's going to be collateral damage.

And we have an analysis of zero to 100 meters, and an analysis of 100 to 200 meters. 200 meters is a little less than two football fields. Two football fields seems to be a street. There are streets a lot longer than that, but there are very, very few streets that are shorter than 100 meters.

So the Court finds as a finding of fact, using the methodology of Dr. Cowan, that properties within 200 meters were collaterally damaged by these foreclosures. The Court doesn't know that number, but it's in front of the Court because it's on pages 32 and 33 of Document 224-1, and the Court asked the government to add up those two columns.

And, therefore, it's clear the Court is not trying

to reach a result of a certain number, because the Court doesn't know what the number is and because we're talking about two columns of 93 numbers, what that number is seems to be objectively reasonable as a reasonably foreseeable amount of collateral damages a person involved in mortgage fraud would see occur; that is, the block or street where the foreclosure is is going to have collateral damage.

All right. That's the Court's finding of fact, so the government needs to add up those two columns. Once those two columns are added up, we add it back to the \$10,050,000 figure that the Court found earlier as the intended loss from the co-conspiracy; \$10,052,875, plus those two columns. That's the Court's finding of fact is the loss amount in this case.

All right. We'll take a 15-minute recess. (Recess taken.)

THE COURT: Has the United States added up those two columns?

MR. MEYERS: We have, Your Honor. Luckily, we had an IRS special agent in the spectator area, and the price for his attendance was adding the numbers up.

We got to \$9,157,815, which would bring the total loss to \$19,210,690.

THE COURT: All right. That's the Court's finding of fact, that dollar amount. That's the threshold for what

CECALA - CROSS 7 million and 20 million? 1 MR. MEYERS: That's right, Your Honor. 2 THE COURT: All right. The Probation Office has 3 concluded a 22 level enhancement for more than 20 million. 4 Does that reduce it to a 20-level enhancement? 5 MR. MEYERS: That's correct, Your Honor. 6 7 THE COURT: So that changes 35 for paragraph 24 down to 33. Is that correct? 8 9 MR. MEYERS: I believe so, Your Honor. I focused 10 on the file. I think it would be a 39. 11 THE COURT: I'm saying paragraph 24. 39 or 41? 12 Are you talking about paragraph 32? MR. MEYERS: The Court sustained the defendant's 13 14 objection for obstruction of justice, and the Court allowed 15 the government's objection for base offense level. So I think the Court starts at a 43, goes down minus 2 for 16 17 instruction and then minus 2 on the loss. THE COURT: So total offense level -- so 32, 18 19 paragraph 32 now is a 39; and as we said before, paragraph 20 28 is now a zero. Paragraph 24 is a 33. So we still have 21 to do a role in the offense and that's it. 22 MR. TATE: Sophisticated means and more than one 23

million in gross receipts.

THE COURT: Oh, all right. Let's do those before we do role and offense, because they are still part of the

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loss amount calculation.

What's your argument this was not sophisticated?

MR. TATE: We would rest on your pleadings, but

other than under the crime that they proved at trial

essentially involved a mortgage broker, who would be -- gone

to a straw buyer, basically as Mr. Cecala said was used, a

desktop underwriting system, reject it or deny it; reject it

not enough assets, income, whatever it was.

And I think Mr. Greene's testimony was that in instances where Mr. Cloud would talk to straw buyers, Mr. Cloud would come back and by whatever document was needed to justify the loan on behalf of the buyer. Not be particularly sophisticated about that.

There was -- Mr. Cloud, of course, one of the considerations was whether one was in a fiduciary relationship or if we believe he was not. It was the lenders who controlled the broker, an extension of the lender who drove the appraisal process, the ability to underwrite, ability to undermine the credit bureau -- to do all the things necessary to effectuate the loan.

I described Mr. Cloud in regard to the sentencing and despite the fact that he was trying to engage in sale of real estate, he was unlicensed, wasn't particularly educated in the field, there wasn't much he could do without the licensed professionals in this case, whether it be the real

estate agent, the brokers, the appraisers.

THE COURT: Is this your argument for sophistication or for a role of the offense?

MR. TATE: Both. Kind of goes hand and hand. It's sophisticated means.

What the courts have looked for was whether there was extensive undertendency to avoid detection of the offense. And the cases I cited, they all involve use of shell corporations; otherwise disguise who was involved.

Here it's very clear, it's a tracing, that's why I investigated the case. Mr. Cloud made no attempt to hide the ability with no shell corporations. On the surface they appeared to be legitimate dealings, and I think to a large extent he believed they were. There -- even though there was sufficient evidence he engaged in the fudging of documents, there's nothing particularly sophisticated about that.

So for those reasons, including his culpability and overall scheme, there really wasn't much he could do to make go without on broker. We believe the sophisticated means enhancement would not be appropriate.

THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Meyers.

MR. MEYERS: Thank you, Your Honor.

First, the sophisticated means enhancement hinges on the offense, not the defendant's conduct. That's made

clear in 2B1.1(b)(9)(C), which says the offense otherwise involved sophisticated means. But that's just a legal point. In reality the defendant employed all the sophisticated means and his conduct was the most sophisticated.

On page 32 of the Government's Sentencing

Memorandum it notes nine instances of sophisticated means
that have been recognized by courts as sophisticated, and
they were employed by the Defendant Cloud in this case.

So on page 32 the government notes the defendant Cloud purchased cashier's checks for down payments in the names of the straw buyers to mislead others about the true source of the funds, putting the straw buyer's names in the remitter line to make it appear as though the straw buyers had bought the check.

Defendant Cloud created phoney lease agreements, a quite sophisticated document that he used creating fictitious names of people who didn't even exist, find this person's true address per the lease agreements to make it look as though they were renting their own residence.

Phoney verification of deposits. They hired Amy Phillips who actually worked at Bank of America to answer the phone and say, "Yes, this person had a deposit here in this amount." You saw that in the case of Rodney Thompson in particular.

Phoney verifications of employment. The conspiracy involved false verifications of where people worked. Falsified tax return of straw buyers Robert Moore the Defendant Cloud created. The testimony is quite clear that Defendant Cloud was in possession of the true tax return. The Defendant Cloud returned the false tax return to Kim Dauria. Gift letters. The Defendant Cloud suggested that to Kim Dauria. The Defendant Cloud supplied one of these in this case. Use of a bank insider to verify phoney verifications I discussed already.

False appraisals that misrepresented the true owner of the property. And the numerous incidents that straw buyer's names being forged on the real estate documents. The Court will recall there was testimony the Defendant Cloud was forging the straw buyer's name on documents. Co-conspirator Greene testified about that.

This is very close to numerous cases that the government cited in its sentencing memorandum. For example, the *Septon* case, Eighth Circuit, 2009, affirming it when there were loan applications with forged signatures, forged Notary stamps, altered tax returns, pay stubs, fake gift letters, bank statements and bank notes very similar to this case. The case of *Wright* involves purchasing a cashier's check in someone else's name.

THE COURT: I've read your brief. You don't need

to go through all those cases.

MR. MEYERS: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: The Court finds after hearing all the trial evidence that there was sophisticated means employed by the defendant in this conspiracy.

As Mr. Meyers has pointed out, there were numerous acts specifically by the defendant that showed his level of knowledge of real estate transactions, real estate closings, and that he facilitated a whole series of fraudulent acts for each of these flips. It wasn't -- didn't happen just once, it happened for all these flips, that he personally facilitated things that required a high degree of sophistication and knowledge of real estate closing.

Memorandum at page 32. The Court adopts those, but the Court beyond that also looks at the fact that the defendant was the promotor who brought all the licensed individuals to the table, and it took a high degree of sophistication to convince people with licenses and fiduciary duties to commit fraud to bring -- I think the most sophisticated person at the table is the promotor who can take people who have licenses and get them to put those licenses on the line for just a modest amount of money, basically the regular fee those individuals would have received at an honest closing, when he's walking away from chunk of change that comes from

the spread between the two transactions. So there's ample record evidence supporting sophisticated means.

The next disputed issue is 1 million gross receipts from financial institutions.

The Court has already made a finding of fact earlier about the intended loss amount of 10,500,000. I need Mr. Tate to explain to me why that isn't sufficient to supported \$1 million in fraud to financial institutions.

MR. TATE: Gross receipts first, and then, again, we had adopted and ask the Court to rely on our pleading where we outlined our position on that.

First of all, the majority of the lenders on this list do not meet the statutory definition of a financial institution.

of financial institution, and clearly there's one for bank fraud; there's also one for money laundering. But isn't there a separate one for purposes of Sentencing Guidelines and what's specifically is the definition of financial institution for the purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines, because I thought that was a broader definition than say for bank fraud.

MR. TATE: I think in term of "gross receipts," I think the gross receipts necessarily include gross receipts from the lending institution themselves, and that doesn't

take it to the fact that Mr. Cloud did not receive the gross receipts. It went to the buyer for the purchase of the house which was collateralized as well. And, of course, notwithstanding our objection to the inclusion of several of these properties roll into conduct, we don't believe there was one million in gross receipts.

THE COURT: Thank you.

PROBATION OFFICER: The definition for financial institution is under Application Note 1, third one down, and it does broaden the --

THE COURT: Right. I'm reading that also. I had the 2009 version of the Guidelines, brand-new, but -- so I think I'm reading from the wrong Guidelines. Actually, no. I'm reading from the right Guidelines based on my ruling this morning. Well, let's see, the conspiracy continued up to 2000 -- into well into 2005; continues to January 2006. Is there anything improper about using the 2009 Guidelines? Was there is a change in the definition of financial institution?

PROBATION OFFICER: I have the 2002 Guideline and it's exactly the same definitions.

THE COURT: All right. The definition of financial institution not only includes the definitions found in the various statutes the Court's referred to, but it is a broad definition, including investment companies,

brokers and dealers registered or under the SEC, which doesn't apply here. It uses the very important phrase "any similar entity whether or not insured by the federal government." That's the big distinction. And I think in bank fraud in particular, the institution has to be insured by the federal government. But under the Sentencing Guidelines, the definition of "financial institutions" does not require the entity to be insured by the government.

MR. MEYERS: That's correct, Your Honor.

That's now changed under the new statute, Section 21, which was passed late last year, so it wouldn't apply in this case, now makes bank fraud of any home mortgage loan, that definition has been added in part because of the mortgage fraud problem. I would agree with the Court's analysis.

The one thing I would note, because I do think the Court does need to find the defendant himself derived more than million dollars from those financial institution. I would just point to Exhibits 125-A1 through 125-F2 which were admitted at trial, our exhibits, checks to the defendant himself total \$1.3 million.

THE COURT: Can you digitally flash those before the Court? You're saying you don't have one chart adding up those checks.

MR. MEYERS: No, Your Honor. I think it's clear

from the record, those checks are in evidence, 125-A1, through 125-F2. 1.5 million. It's in the Presentence Report.

I would also note the application note for this is found in the 2009 Guidelines, the yellow book, at page 94, Application Note 11, it says it includes all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, which is obtained directly or indirectly, as a result of such offense, certainly the defendant derived lots of real estate as well. I don't think it's even a close call that he got more than a million dollars worth of not just checks, but real property and other items from financial institutions in this case.

The defendant himself, part of his argument today is that, "I obtained lots of property from foreclosing banks." That's in furtherance of the fraud, supports the finding in this case, though it's not necessary since we have more than million dollars in checks alone.

THE COURT: I missed that number in the Presentence Report. What paragraph is it in the Presentence Report?

MR. MEYERS: I'm sorry. I don't now that the 1.35 is in the Presentence Report. It may be.

THE COURT: I don't think it is. Because I wouldn't be sitting here asking for all this presentation of evidence if it was in the PSR.

1 MR. MEYERS: I would be happy -- I have the 2 I would be happy to put them on the screen for exhibits. the Court. I think the government filed this memo 3 October 8th, 2009, more than two months ago. I don't see 4 the defendant challenging that those checks add up to more 5 than 1.35 million. 6 7 THE COURT: I understand that, but still do me the favor of flashing them before my eyes so I can see every 8 9 one. I can read fairly quickly. 10 MR. MEYERS: All right. 125A-1. THE COURT: Are you going to type in each one 11 12 every time? 13 MR. MEYERS: Yes, sir. 14 THE COURT: All right. There's got to be a 15 quicker way to do this. 16 MR. MEYERS: I think they are in evidence, Your 17 Honor. 18 THE COURT: Let me ask Mr. Tate: Mr. Tate, do you 19 dispute the authenticity of those exhibits? I know you can 20 dispute the intent behind them, but do you dispute the 21 authenticity? 22 MR. TATE: Your Honor, to be honest with you, 23 without seeing them, I don't have any direct memory of them

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from the trial. I don't really know what they are. But I

don't think the Court needs me to stipulate to it, the Court

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can make its findings. Our position is set forth in our 1 sentencing memorandum as to why we don't believe it's more 2 than one million. 3 4 THE COURT: I understand your legal position. I'm not disputing that. 5 MR. MEYERS: Just would be clear, these were 6 7 admitted at trial. They are evidence. THE COURT: I understand that. 8 9 MR. MEYERS: The authenticity I don't think was in 10 question. 11 THE COURT: Put Agent McNeely on the stand and let 12 me him testify to it really quickly, and Mr. Tate can cross. MR. MEYERS: As to the number? 13 14 THE COURT: Yeah. 15 MR. MEYERS: I don't know that he's added it up, 16 Your Honor. Literally he hasn't. I added it up. I put it 17 in the Sentencing Memorandum. It's just arithmetic. I think, you know --18 19 THE COURT: I understand it's all in the exhibits 20 but you said what has been added I guess --21 MR. MEYERS: This, Your Honor, would be easier. 22 have a solution: Which is I have the exhibit list which 23 lists the amounts.

24 THE COURT: You do?

MR. MEYERS: I can put the exhibit list -- it has

	CECALA - CROSS
1	never been questioned as whether the amounts to Cloud are
2	correct. Would that sufficient?
3	THE COURT: Did Special Agent McNeely put together
4	that exhibit list?
5	MR. MEYERS: No, sir. It's what the attorneys
6	put together the exhibit list.
7	THE COURT: Sometime. Sometimes the agent will do
8	it for you.
9	MR. MEYERS: Not in my cases, Your Honor. I would
10	be happy to put this in front of the screen.
11	THE COURT: Put the exhibit list forward because
12	the documents backup the exhibit list.
13	MR. MEYERS: Yes, they do, Your Honor.
14	THE COURT: And the documents are in the regard.
15	MR. MEYERS: 125A-1 is a check for \$10,392,22.
16	125A-2 is a check for \$13,483.68.
17	125A-3 is a check for \$23,584.
18	125A-4 is a check for \$27,190.
19	125A-5 is a check for \$2,309.10.
20	125A-6 is a check for \$300s.
21	125A-7 is a check for \$30,240.
22	125A-8 is a check for \$18,000.
23	125A-9 is a check for \$10,960.
24	125A-10 is a check for \$19,608.63.
25	125A-11 is a check for \$33,630.

	CECALA - CROSS
1	125A-12 is a check for \$19,719.82.
2	I should note that all of the checks I'm reading
3	were to Defendant Cloud from the attorneys' trust accounts.
4	125A-13 is a check for \$28,445.03.
5	125A-14 is a check for \$94,996.80.
6	125B-1 is a check for \$7,058.50.
7	125B-2 is a check for \$46,130.49.
8	125B-3 is a check for \$16,928.41.
9	125B-4 is a check for \$15,606.01.
10	125B-5 is a check for \$8,651.
11	125B-6 is a check for \$11,446.13.
12	125B-7 is a check for \$4,782.50.
13	125B-8 is a check for \$26,850.
14	125B-9 is a check for \$4,353.
15	125B-10 is a check for \$69,851.26.
16	125B-11 is a check for \$17,399.11.
17	125B-12 is a check for \$2,959.08.
18	125B-13 is a check for \$23,550.57.
19	125C-1 is a check for \$28,136.36.
20	125C-2 is a check for \$27,709.59.
21	125C-3 is a check for \$45,766.
22	125C-4 is a check for \$65,009.
23	125C-5 is a check for \$63,080.05.
24	125C-6 is a check for \$4,309.33.
25	125D-1 is a check for \$38,211.99.

CECALA - CROSS 125D-2 is a check for \$33,318.25. 1 2 125D-3 is a check for \$17,504.62. 125D-4 is a check for \$46,349.77. 3 4 125D-5 is a check for \$42,346.98. 125D-6 is a check for \$13,496.06. 5 125E-1 is a check for \$23,090.92. 6 125E-2 is a check for \$44,025. 7 125E-3 is a check for \$26,858. 8 9 125E-4 is a check for \$1,000. 125E-5 is a check for \$51.647.55. 10 11 125E-6 is a check for \$46,825. 12 125E-7 is a check for \$53,368.23. 125E-8 is a check for \$2,970.32. 13 14 125E-9 is a check for \$48,127.78. 15 125E-10 is a check for \$500. 16 125E-11 is a check for \$500. 17 125E-12 is a check for \$1,000. 125E-13 is a check for \$19,049.76. 18 19 125E-14 is a check for \$500. 20 125E-15 is a check for \$22,660.09. 21 125F-1 is a check for \$2,440.03. 22 125F-2 is a check for \$84,504.26. 23 The government submits that those checks add up to 24 more than a million dollars. 25 THE COURT: Thank you.

Anything else?

MR. TATE: Specifically with respect exhibits 125D-1 through E1, D1 through D6, the checks from the Whitley's trust account, I believe it was the testimony of the Attorney Whitely that there was nothing untoward about the closings in those cases which he cut those checks to Mr. Cloud.

And one of the elements is not just that he received a receipt, but that the receipts were derived from unlawful activity. And we would just point that out as a basis to our objection, at least to those.

THE COURT: D 1 through D6.

MR. TATE: Yes.

THE COURT: D1 through D6.

MR. MEYERS: Not true, Your Honor. She did say that originally when called to the stand. The Court will recall in cross-examination the government showed her the kickback checks and she states she was unaware, and stated definitely that made those transactions fraudulent. In fact, the jury convicted the defendant Cloud of 134 Redwood Lane, 3101 Fair Oaks Drive, 7423 Monaco Drive, Counts Two, Three and Four, I believe all of which were Whitely transactions. So the jury disagreed with the defendant's direct examination of that attorney.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Certainly when the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt as to those substantive counts, the Court's not going to second-guess the jury.

Furthermore, the Court does recollect the testimony as Mr. Meyers did summarize, and it does appear to the Court that those were fraudulent proceeds from financial institutions.

Anything else, Mr. Tate?

MR. TATE: No.

of the evidence that the defendant did harm financial institutions under the definition as found in the Sentencing Guidelines of Financial Institutions in excess of \$1 million. And that was directly -- directly caused by the defendant, and then the defendant directly benefited from that. It wasn't any of his co-conspirators.

All right. So the Court overrules the objection as to the harm to the -- million-dollar harm to the financial institutions from which Mr. Cloud benefited. Just the use the right term of art, it's \$1 million in gross receipts from one or more financial institutions, and the defendant did derive approximately \$1.3 million gross receipts from one or more financial institutions.

That covers all of the paragraph 24, Section 2B1.1 calculations? Is that correct? Is there any other

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1	objections with regard to the paragraph 24, Section 2B1.1
2	calculations?
3	MR. MEYERS: I don't believe so, Your Honor.
4	THE COURT: All right. So now we go to the other
5	enhancements, and I think the only one left is role in the
6	offense. Correct?
7	MR. MEYERS: Yes, Your Honor.
8	THE COURT: All right. There's no I don't
9	believe either party well, Mr. Tate, you had some
LO	presentation of evidence. Does it apply to this?
11	MR. TATE: Yes. We also filed a written
L2	objection.
L3	THE COURT: Yes, I have that right here. It's
L4	page 14 of your Sentencing Memorandum.
L5	MR. TATE: We'd rest on your case.
L6	THE COURT: Oh, all right.
L7	And the government's argument begins page 35 of
L8	its Sentencing Memo.
L9	Does either party want to add anything to the
20	factual record?
21	MR. MEYERS: Not unless the Court has any
22	questions.
23	THE COURT: No. Any other argument? Just your
24	pleadings. All right.
25	The Court's said earlier today that the promotor

is the individual who puts together all of the key individuals necessary to commit mortgage fraud transaction. The promotor recruits a recruiter who recruits investors, so that's -- so the promotor both finds recruiters and indirectly the investors. The promotor finds the closing attorney, promotor finds a mortgage broker, the promotor finds a real estate appraiser, the promotor finds frequently a mortgage underwriter such as co-defendant Juderita Russell. The promotor is not a licensed individual but is the person that brings all these licensed individuals together, and most importantly the promotor finds the property.

So the promotor is clearly the person organizing the transaction, and the two transactions that constitute the flip. And as the promotor organizes the transaction, the promotor also is, in effect, managing all of these individuals because these individuals are acting on behest of the promotor, who is bringing the property, the transaction, and either directly or indirectly bringing the investors to a transaction.

So the Court finds as a matter of fact that the defendant was an organizer and manager in this conspiracy, and overrules the objection.

MR. TATE: Your Honor, now that the Court has made the factual finding, we would object to the factual finding

with respect Mr. Cloud. That Mr. Cloud organized the licensed professionals at the table, and specifically number two, that he found the appraisers, underwriters. We think that conflicts with the evidence at trial and we would object.

THE COURT: So noted. I thought there was ample evidence at trial he actually paid kickbacks to

Mrs. Juderita Russell. She was an underwriter.

MR. TATE: No. It was Dan Greene's testimony that he paid --

THE COURT: Oh, you're right. Mr. Greene wrote the checks to Juderita Russell. I concur.

MR. TATE: Then I think Mr. Greene's testimony also said Mr. Cloud didn't know anything about it, didn't even know which underwriters he was using.

THE COURT: I don't recall that. It might be true. It still isn't important if a co-conspiracy knows exactly who the underwriter is so long as the co-conspirator is relying on that underwriter as a fellow conspirator. It's the promotor who is still putting together the deal. The promotor that receives the largest windfall of anybody in the deal, so the promotor is the organizer and manager.

MR. MEYERS: I think the Court implied this but just since we're here so late anyway, I'd just ask the Court to find specifically that there were more five

participants --

THE COURT: In the whole conspiracy there are well more than five participants. In each single flip, in many of those there were five participants in each individual flip. But, yes, there were, over the course of the conspiracy, far more than five. There were 25 financial institutions. So that's, I believe -- weren't there at least 25 financial institutions impacted?

MR. MEYERS: Yes, Your Honor. I would refer to the number of participants, namely Kim Dauria, Michael Ryan.

THE COURT: No, I understand. But I'm saying with each financial institution -- well, I guess that's irrelevant, the number of financial institutions.

Does the government have a calculation of the number of investors to the whole course of the conspiracy with regard to Mr. Cloud's primary transactions?

MR. MEYERS: We didn't calculate that, Your Honor.

I would note that by adding up simply those that the Court has convicted, the Court gets to 15.

THE COURT: No, I'm talking about investors. Straw buyers investors.

MR. MEYERS: I did not add that up. I would say it's well over 20.

THE COURT: There were 93 properties, right?
MR. MEYERS: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And did each investor, are you saying -- I thought there were a few investors that were involved two or three times but most investors were only involved one time.

MR. MEYERS: I think that it would -- that was true, there was some runoffs. I think actually most Defendant Cloud would get them to do --

THE COURT: Two or three.

MR. MEYERS: Several. I think there was one or two would did more than that even, as -- I think Robert

Moore and Steve Mirman were some of the earlier ones who did over five.

THE COURT: So out of 93 transactions, you're estimating 20 investors?

MR. MEYERS: I think that's fair, Your Honor, which would take the Court to 35 participants. Again, these are folks who did wrong by accepting money to sign documents they didn't read. I wouldn't put them at the level of folks who were charged in this case. But I think for purposes of this analysis, the Court could conclude that. It certainly doesn't need to, unless it wishes to upwardly vary or to do an upward departure because the number of participants is actually understated by only a two-level increase, when five is what the Guidelines is intended to address.

THE COURT: We've discussed this earlier. They

are both co-conspirators and victims.

MR. MEYERS: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And the government chose not to charge them, when the government could have charged them, because the government was sympathetic towards them because they were ultimately victimized.

But there was well over five, well over five individuals not investors -- well over five what were involved in the conspiracy directly under the organization of Mr. Cloud, the Court finds as a matter of fact, and we don't have to include the investors, even though there probably were something in the neighborhood of 20. All right.

All right. Does that cover all the outstanding objections?

MR. TATE: Yes.

MR. MEYERS: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Based on the Presentence Report and all the Court's findings today, in the instant case the advisory Guidelines provide for offense level of 39, Criminal History Category I, and a Guideline sentencing range of 262 to 327 months.

Do the parties agree those are the appropriate Guidelines based on the Court's rulings?

MR. MEYERS: Yes, Your Honor, before departure,

which we think would be included in the Guidelines, technically speaking.

THE COURT: So you want to argue -- I guess you did mention it for an upward departure based on the Guidelines not properly showing the extent of victimization.

MR. MEYERS: Yes, Your Honor. Under Guideline

5K2.5, which -- the government addresses that upward

departure motion on page 66 of its memorandum, the Fourth

Circuit has held that that is an encouraged basis for

departure, and the government cites a number of cases in the

Fourth Circuit and elsewhere in which sentences were doubled

as a result of that Guideline. And we think that it's

especially appropriate here.

What the Court found was that Defendant Cloud could have foreseen some losses out to 200 meters from his conduct. But really the damage caused by the defendant, Cloud, was much, much more extensive than that. The Court found 9 million was reasonably foreseeable, and therefore found it should be 2B1.2. The reality it's a 89 million that resulted from the defendant's conduct.

When this Court is fashioning an appropriate sentence to meet not only the Guidelines, but all the requirements of sentencing, including deterrence, I think it's important for the Court to address in its sentence all that damage that's caused by the defendant's conduct,

especially given the fact we're about \$600,000 short of the next cutoff.

THE COURT: Well, I understand your argument. I'm going to deny your motion for an upward departure under 5K2.5 because the Court did find that there was \$9 million of property damage or loss that was collateral, and did factor that in the Guidelines, and the scriveners of the Guidelines chose to make them break off 20 million, not the Court; and the Court did consider that 9 million. So the Court believes an upward departure is not justified because the Court has factored that in.

MR. MEYERS: I just wanted to make sure the Court understands my argument, I think it does, but based on what the Court said, what the government is asking for is an upward departure on the basis 80 million.

THE COURT: The other 80 million.

MR. MEYERS: Yes, sir. It's 80 million not accounted for.

THE COURT: I'm sorry, I didn't understand. I didn't understand specifically you were talking about the other 80 million. You did say 89 million.

MR. MEYERS: I think that what these courts have found here --

THE COURT: But, see, the Court's earlier finding that it's harder -- the Court's uncomfortable with seeing

the defendant aware, reasonably foreseeing damages as much as a half mail away from the foreclosed property.

MR. MEYERS: I accept that ruling from the Court.

Now the question for the Court -- so that means only that

9 million which fits in 2B1.1 which requires reasonable

foreseeability. 5K2.5 is specifically designed for it as

losses not reasonably foreseeable to defendant, therefore

not taken into account in 2B1.1. Here we have \$80 million

in worth of damage not taking into account in the

Guidelines.

I want to point to the Court in particular *United*States v. Erpenbeck, which is cited and described by the

government on page 67 of the Sentencing Memorandum.

That was a bank fraud case. Advisory Guideline range was 188 to 235 months, and the district court departed upward to 300 months, adding a significant amount of time.

And the reason the Sixth Circuit said it was warranted was because of, quote, "The devastating effect of the unraveling of the fraudulent scheme had on the communities he built and sold unsuspecting homeowners. The subdivision was left in disrepair. Streets and parking lots remain unpaid. Some homeowners were left with acrid water rates."

That damage to the communities not foreseen by the defendant in this case, but real damage was relevant to making sure the sentence fully takes into account the amount

of damage caused by this fraud.

when word of this sentencing gets that out folks understand, listen, you may not think that if you didn't foresee it, it's not going to effect you. You should understand when you commit mortgage fraud, there's all kinds of unforeseen damages and results for it. And the courts in Western District of North Carolina are going to take that into account, at least to some extent, in fashioning their sentence. Because when you cause that much damage, \$80 million, you don't just get a free ride for it. Because Guidelines for it -- 2B1.1, excuse me, requires it to be reasonably foreseeable; even if it's not foreseen by you, the Court will take it account under 2K2.5.

THE COURT: I understand everything you're saying, but if you're talking about deterrence, right now we're in a range of 26 to 28 years. That's a lot of deterrence in that range already.

MR. MEYERS: It understates, Your Honor -- it understates the level of damage in this case by \$80 million in that sentence.

MR. TATE: Let me just say that they never proved the \$89 million in damages. It's all theoretical. They never proved it. We don't believe that there's \$89 million worth of damage. Mr. Cecala was right; there was relatively

2.

little damage in terms of home prices at all. We don't believe an upward departure is warranted. We just assert our earlier objection to the collateral damages.

THE COURT: I understand that, and your expert said -- did not -- did not future the methodology. So I mean your expert didn't necessarily find that as a logical calculation for collateral damage. The Court was looking at reasonably foreseeable and not all collateral damage. All right.

I understand everything you are saying, Mr.

Meyers. I understand you're saying \$80 million of

Dr. Cowan's analysis that the Court is not considering. But
the Court is considering the fact that there's substantial
collateral damage; but collateral damage, is in the Court's
eyes, on the block or the next block, up to 200 meters, and
the Court is uncomfortable saying there's collateral damage
a half mile away. I'm sure there's incidents of it, and the
experts say there is, but the Court is uncomfortable in
looking at that broadly. So the Court's going to deny the
upward departure based on the 80 million.

All right. So back to the Court's -- any other Guideline calculations departures upwardly or downwardly?

MR. MEYERS: We talked about abuse of trust earlier. I don't think that that would -- I think that would be more of a variance argument since the Court

rejected it under the Guidelines, just a preview for the Court.

And I'll take a third bite at the apple, if I can, on upward variance, or I'll ask the Court to condense all of it in one.

THE COURT: Oh, variance, we haven't gotten there.

Mr. Tate, anything else on the Guidelines?

MR. TATE: Nothing other than our motion for a downward departure. We rest on our pleadings.

THE COURT: Summarize again -- I've got it right here -- no, that's our PSR objections. There are so many pleadings in this case.

Here we go. Document 235. The Court denies the defendant's motion for a downward departure. The Court wants to quickly summarize.

The defendant argues the lending community was partly culpable for mortgage fraud. The Court doesn't dispute that there was reckless lending during this period and the oversight which should have been there wasn't, and the lending institutions really did allow those who didn't truly qualify for credit to receive credit.

However, that's analogous to me leaving my front door open and someone coming in and stealing my TV. The theft of a TV is just as criminal. I might have been negligent, but it doesn't reduce the responsibility of the

defendant. So even if the lending industry was negligent and reckless, the defendant still committed the crime. He took advantage of an industry that was being careless at the time.

The argument that the defendant deserves a departure to avoid sentencing disparity is really predicated on the fact that he did not cooperate and the others did cooperate, and cooperation is the first step in paying off your debt to society. The defendant did not chose to cooperate. The jury found him guilty. He doesn't get the benefit of cooperation. He doesn't get the benefit of pleading guilty, so he is -- he doesn't receive a downward departure based on that.

The defendant referred to this as a downward departure but he also cites the sentencing factors on that. So that means it's an alternative variance motion. We'll deal with variances in a moment.

All right. Have I covered all your arguments for departure, Mr. Tate? Did you have any other argument for departure?

MR. TATE: No.

THE COURT: All right. So based on the Court's rulings, in the instant case the advisory Guideline provide for an offense level of 39, Criminal History Category I, and a Guideline sentencing 262 to 327 months. Do the parties

agree that those are the appropriate Guidelines after considering all issues with regard to the Sentencing Guidelines?

MR. MEYERS: Yes, Your Honor.

MR. TATE: We restate our earlier objection.

THE COURT: Right. But subject to objections, are those the correct calculations?

MR. TATE: Yes.

THE COURT: Thank you.

All right, Mr. Tate, I'll allow you to make argument on behalf of your client or to present any witnesses you might have with regard to any form of variance or any anything dealing with the appropriate sentence for your client.

MR. TATE: Let them say a few things on behalf of Mr. Cloud, notwithstanding the objections here.

It seems to me that Mr. Cloud is being treated more harshly because he elected to exercise his constitutional right to a jury trial. He had zero criminal history. None whatsoever.

THE COURT: He has a criminal record, he doesn't have any criminal history points. He committed fraudulent travel, submitted travel expense forms to the U. S. Air Force.

MR. TATE: And they did not chose to charge him on

that offense.

THE COURT: No, they did. They found him guilty of a misdemeanor and he did not receive a BCD, bad conduct discharge at the time. He was punished, but he was not discharged; didn't get a dishonorable or bad conduct discharge. Confined at hard labor for one year and six months. Reduced to a grade of Airman Basic. That's true punishment under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

MR. TATE: We would suggest to the court that that's so remote in time, dating back to 1978, it appears more than 30 years ago. That really should not be an indication of Mr. Cloud's propensity to commit crimes. His ability to be rehabilitated remains.

In addition to this, Your Honor, in addition to his zero criminal history, Mr. Cloud was simply a person who I believe his role has been extremely exaggerated here.

Mr. Cloud was not the person that brought these various players to the table. These folks were very organized criminals, including mortgage brokers. They are the ones who obtained yield spreads. They're the ones that received commissions. If they did not get a loan approved, it did not happen.

As we indicated, Mr. Cloud was interested in investing in real estate. What he did was he took some pointers. He went to a broker. The broker said you need

more income. He helped him come up with that. But he's not the most culpable person here. He had no fiduciary relationship with the lender. He had no ability to get the loan approve. He had no ability to order an appraiser. He had no ability to hire underwriters or to do any of those things. And for the people who were the most culpable to receive a tenth of a sentence, based on basically pleading guilty, I think is a miscarriage of justice.

I'm not the sentencing court. I can only say what my observations are. I've represented many defendants,
Mr. Cloud is far from an criminal. In my opinion, if it matters --

THE COURT: I understand your respect for you client. You've worked with him closely over the last, I guess, two-and-a-half years. But the argument you're making really is closing argument at trial. You're saying he's not criminal; that's a jury determination.

MR. TATE: I understand that. I mean he has sustained the conviction, but one of the tenants of 3553(a) is for the Court not only to punish based on one's culpability, which I say is much less than the Court has already sentenced, but also to look at whether there's a need for rehabilitation; whether there's a need for deterrence.

Mr. Cloud is not the one that needs to be

deterred. It was the brokers and the lenders that allowed this to happen all in the name of greed. And Mr. Cloud's, he received are peanuts compared to the big scheme of things.

As I mentioned in our Sentencing Memorandum, people who made 50 million, millions and millions of dollars have not been prosecuted. They want to talk about collateral damage to the community, The Observer's story on Beazer Homes talked about all of the collateral damage; that Beazer Homes received a deferred prosecution.

And I think it's relevant to the 3553(a) analysis, part of the scheme. If it's truly about culpability, how is it that a real estate developer that sold homes,

Mr. Henderson, with inflated appraisals, none of that was considered.

These are people who were licensed professionals, who had a fiduciary duty to, not only the lenders, but also to the people they serviced. Mr. Cloud didn't have any of that.

You know, his guilt aside, clearly the jury found him guilty, but the issue is what is the just and fair punishment? And if you're considering his culpability, I don't think you become more culpable because you exercise your right to trial. All of sudden you become more guilty. All of a sudden your losses are more than anybody else. All

of a sudden your means are more sophisticated than anybody else's. They should be consistent with everybody else that was sentenced in this case. And he has been singled out, in my opinion, what appears to be because he went to trial. And that's his choice.

THE COURT: He singled himself out. I'm a little confused when you say "he was single out." The government has --

MR. TATE: He's been singled out for a more severe punishment for that purpose.

THE COURT: Well, and I understand what you're saying, but your argument is inconsistent with the philosophy of the Sentencing Guidelines provide for a 5K1.1 motion, and is inconsistent with the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 that say cooperation in the form of substantial assistance results in a reduced sentence. In the Sentencing Guidelines they say if you plead guilty, you'd get -- in his case it would be a three-level reduction.

MR. TATE: But if you're getting a 5K off of a loss amount, that's stipulated to, and the guy goes to trial, it's supposedly part of the same scheme and even less culpable, the Court finds that a loss amount ten times that, how is the loss any greater for him versus any other defendant just by the fact they pled guilty and got a 5K?

5K didn't -- off of 90 million --

THE COURT: The government argued, Mr. Meyers argued earlier today that he benefited from the stipulated amount of his co-conspirators because it was probably a lesser amount than the government ultimately could have proved against each of them, as well Mr. Cloud's loss amount because of the timeliness of the plea.

MR. TATE: We objected to the loss amount. I have expended all the energy on that I can. We don't agree with it.

THE COURT: I understand.

MR. TATE: But the bottom line is we think that
Mr. Cloud is a person who was a small-time real estate
investor that sought to get in on the real estate business.
During this time he had lawyers closing his shop for
mortgage brokers, it was so lucrative to do that. He got it
on in his mind, and I know this because I went to Rule 11
hearings with him to plead guilty, he didn't believe he was
guilty in his mind. The jury found otherwise. But he
didn't believe he was guilty because he figured if he was
going to attorneys, he's going to mortgage brokers and they
are telling him what to do, it must be okay. And that's
decisions he made. Because he made that decision, doesn't
mean that he should be sentenced on an exaggerated loss
amount or any other things.

I believe his sentence should be as equal to any other people, particularly people that had fiduciary relationships with the lenders, who dealt with tens and thousands of loans outside of Mr. Cloud.

Mr. Cloud didn't bring these people to the table. They were already at the table before he got there. There was never evidence he directed Amy Phillips to do anything. Never met her at all. Never substantiated that. He did one transaction with Don Henderson, yet he's tacked with \$3 million of things that he did that Don Henderson testified himself had nothing to do with Mr. Cloud. The same with Kenneth Strong. The \$29,000 at closing, all of a sudden he's responsible for everything Mr. Strong ever did. But, you know, those are all factors that the Court should consider.

There's no need to afford adequate deterrence of Mr. Cloud. He's 62 years old. A man with zero criminal history points. He's very unlikely to be recidivist. It's a nonviolent offense. There's people that stick a gun at someone's that get less time. That man has never committed an act of violence.

The fact that he served his country honorably in the military. His face is disfigured today from his service in the military. And those are things that you should consider.

His need for educational/vocational training.

He's done a lot of that in prison since he's been here. I mean if you look at all the factors under 3553(a), (b), (c) and (d) and it calls for a sentence of time served, and I asked for it on behalf of Mr. Cloud, measuring his culpability in this case.

I just -- it's just -- it's really appalling that, you know -- you've got home builders who hire licensed brokers, real estate people and everything else, not a single one of them has been charged. Not a single one. But then to come into court and say this man is responsible for \$89-, \$90 million to this community is really absurd to me. Considering the fact that the people who got their loans approved weren't taxed with that kind of loss. The only thing I heard to distinguished him from them is he went to trial. And the last thing I heard, exercising your constitutional right not one of the sentencing mandates.

Now, you certainly don't get the three-level acceptance of responsibility because he didn't do that. He doesn't get 5K because he didn't cooperate. We understand that.

But the problem that we have is with the -- really disparity in application of the Sentencing Guideline enhancement between him and the other people involved.

That's our issue.

With that, I'm going to rest and rest on my

Sentencing Memorandum. Mr. Cloud is happy to make response if the Court would like to hear it.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Tate. Mr. Cloud, you have the right to address the Court if the you so chose.

DEFENDANT CLOUD: I do, Your Honor.

First of all, like Mr. Tate said, I apologize for being here under these circumstances. And I did make a mistake and I apologize to the Court for that. I made a mistake in trusting the attorneys and the brokers, and I did not mean to cause any harm to the community. I left civil service to come here to start in the real estate business and I intended to stay in it until I retired, but I met the wrong people and became involved doing some of the wrong things, so I apologize for that.

But I have a gun to my head also. Michael Bryant.

That was why I turned him in. Okay. Mr. Bryant doesn't know about that. I was the one who turned people in initially that was doing bad real estate deals.

Michael Bryant and Ken Bill. I did it through the Internal Revenue Service because I was knew in the area and I didn't know anyone. But I knew that Michael Bryant was a former police officer, so I didn't know who to talk to. So I wrote the Internal Revenue Service a letter and eventually a year later they sent someone out to talk to me. And I told them what I knew was going on in the real estate

1 industry.

That is, I was still learning. But to make a long story short, I learned how to do the flip and I was doing flips, but I was doing them correctly. Then I, because Dan Greene asked me to, falsified some leases and kept asking me to, and I falsified some more leases. And I admit to that. But as far as hurting anyone, I even told the customers what had to be done and they agreed with it.

So everyone was aware of everything because I told them everything. I'm not going to hide information.

THE COURT: When you say "customers," I guess -- DEFENDANT CLOUD: Buyers.

THE COURT: What we've referred to in court as investors.

DEFENDANT CLOUD: Right. The buyer. The buyers. Everyone knew what was going on. Everyone. And they testified to that that they wanted to buy properties. So there was nothing at all wrong with what I did. As far as I knew, we were following them all on the level, as far as I knew.

THE COURT: So when you knew there were -- a fraudulent loan application was submitted you thought that was all right?

DEFENDANT CLOUD: No. When I realized they were fraudulent, it was three years later. In 2003 was when I

knew, I had gone to some training and that's when I found out that what I had done was wrong.

THE COURT: 2003 you discovered what you were doing was wrong. Why did you continue then after 2003?

DEFENDANT CLOUD: I don't remember doing any more leases after I found out that was done, and then the industry changed the way you didn't have to do leases any more.

THE COURT: Well, but I'm talking about in a loan application where the customer is checking to be a resident and you know they are not going to be a resident, did you not know that was wrong?

DEFENDANT CLOUD: I didn't do that. I didn't know that. We had take contracts, sir, contracts and residential loan application. I marked or the customer marked the correct data on that form, we turned it in to the mortgage broker.

THE COURT: No, I understand that. But if a customer marked "residential purchase" for -- to become the owner occupant, and you knew you had -- either you or Mr. Goines or someone who recruited them to be the investor, you didn't think that was a problem?

DEFENDANT CLOUD: Recruit them to get rental property.

THE COURT: Yeah. But they didn't check on the

loan application that it was rental property, they checked they were going to be a resident.

DEFENDANT CLOUD: We checked it to be rental properties. That's why none of those forms were found. They were all destroyed.

THE COURT: By whom?

MR. TATE: I think what Mr. Cloud is saying, and I don't want to cut off his allocution --

THE COURT: I -- well, I understand why you are cutting him off because he's beginning to kind of perpetrate a fraud in the court, that all these documents that were properly filled out were destroyed, and that's very interesting. I think Mr. Meyers is probably as surprised as I am to discover --

MR. TATE: No. Your Honor, I can direct you to the direct testimony from my direct examination of Dan Greene, I asked him about the handwritten application. He said he did not have them. He didn't use the "destroy." He said he didn't have them anymore --

THE COURT: So that's what he's referring to.

Okay. I'll take him at face value on that. Because I understand that Mr. Greene then did say that he didn't have a lot of the handwritten applications left.

MR. TATE: That they turned in. Mr. Greene was also clear that he would -- see, Mr. Cloud would not know

whether to check primary resident, investment property or the like. That's the broker who knows about the interest rates and things like that. The broker says, "It's not going to be approved, Bill, unless they can show how they are paying for this house that they are living in and your leasing it."

What he saying is he goes to them and says, "Hey, this is what you need to get it approved." They bring it back to Mr. Greene.

He doesn't have the wherewith all to know what's needed and what's not needed because he doesn't use the underwriting -- the underwriter. That's the broker who does that.

So that's why we took offense to when the court said that Mr. Cloud brought these people to the table. He wouldn't have the expertise or the wherewithal to bring everybody to the table. He's hustling. He's trying to get a property --

THE COURT: But you used the word that I meant.

You had he's hustling. That's it. He's hustling, bringing the people to the table.

MR. TATE: But none of this could happen without the broker.

THE COURT: Oh, I don't think anyone disputes that. Neither could it happen without the real estate

attorney. None of it could happen without someone creating some fraudulent document, whether lease or income verification or fraudulent account verification. I mean it took everyone.

MR. TATE: Just to give the Court a snapshot of his culpability, if you recall even the government's own arguments at trial was that the closing documents, the lease agreements, all that stuff was window dressing in case anybody looked. It really was not -- not relied on in any way. It was there as a backup in case anybody questioned it. But it's what you input into the matrix that causes whether a loan gets approved or not.

I think Mr. Cecala was quite clear today. He made a lot about the Settlement Statements. But the Settlement Statements really refer -- were there not to protect the lender but to protect Mr. Cloud and the buyer. That they know what they are supposed to be getting at closing. It had nothing to do with the lender. The lender doesn't rely on it at all. Mr. Cecala said --

THE COURT: Correct. The lender doesn't rely on it but the second mortgage market does rely on it and your expert said, because I asked him, and so -- and that's the ultimate lender is secondary mortgage market in virtually every one of -- on account of FHA type of loans.

MR. TATE: We agree with that.

But I say in the big scheme of things, Mr. Cloud was not the most culpable, he was least culpable. And basically he could not achieve anything he was doing without Dan Greene, Kim Dauria, all these people who essentially received a slap on the wrist. And that's the travesty that I'm discussing in disparity, even considering they plead guilty in the 5K, that they were not taxed with these collateral damages when they were the ones who were the most responsible for collateral damage.

Dan Greene created many more loans than the ones he did for Cloud. And he testified about them being fraudulent as well. That's why they knew to go to him. And that being said, I think that there's nothing -- none of the tenants of 3553 are met by a sentence of 26 to 28 years for Mr. Cloud, essentially a life sentence for this 62-year-old man with no criminal history.

I'm not the sentencing court. I can only argue on his behalf. And I do it earnestly from the heart. And I do believe every word that I've said about Mr. Cloud.

I don't think he would return to the criminal justice system. I don't think he's a bad person. And I haven't always gotten along with Mr. Cloud, you know from his letters to the Court, but I have to look beyond those differences and argue from an sense of humanity and fairness. And what I think is just common fairness, and I

think it's very unfair for him to be -- receive that type of sentence when others received a much lesser sentence whether they plead guilty or not.

He did what he did. He made some money. But at the end of the day, his houses went into foreclosure.

Nobody talks about that. His houses went into foreclosure.

He was an uneducated consumer who got those high interest rates and things he couldn't maintain as well.

So I mean, you know, he did what he did. He went to trial. But I don't think that he should be sentenced to ten times longer than anybody else.

THE COURT: And I do want to correct something. I had roughly estimated 26 to 28 years; it's more like 22 to 28 years. I think that's right. 262 months is just shy of 22 years.

MR. TATE: With that being said, I'll rest.

THE COURT: Mr. Cloud, you may finish.

DEFENDANT CLOUD: And I did learn, as Mr. Tate said, that the brokers were the ones that were in control of everything. And when I said earlier --

THE COURT: Help me, when you say "broker," you mean the mortgage broker.

DEFENDANT CLOUD: Yes.

THE COURT: There's also a real estate broker.

DEFENDANT CLOUD: Right. The mortgage broker.

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They were in control of everything. I just learned that, and that I could not do anything without them.

So I did what they asked me to do. I didn't question them about anything. Then I also did what the attorneys told me to do. When Mr. Lee asked me to bring a check in for closing, he told me that the bank had told him to do the check the way he had told me to redo it. Because the first check I took him, if the prosecution had taken that first check, first cashier's check that I got from Mr. Lee, it was seeing that, I had the clients name, my first client, I had his name on the check from my account. Mr. Lee told me to take that check back, and put my name on it and the client's down in the "remark" section. That that's the way this company wanted it. So I went back and I did that. And I did all the checks like that from that point on because that's the way he said do it. I trusted him to give me the right information. He's an attorney. The expert. So I went and did what they told me to do.

When the prosecutor came to me again and asked me to how I wanted to plead. With what he was offering me, nine to ten years, I said no, I'm not pleading to that because I felt that I was not guilty. And what did he do? Threatened me with life imprisonment. Did you not?

That's what he did. He threatened me with life imprisonment. And that's what he's making sure that he's

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doing today. He made sure he's tried to do that. But he also made a mistake. Did I file charges against him? No, I did not.

THE COURT: How did the government make a mistake in this case?

DEFENDANT CLOUD: Your Honor, we had a meeting here on November 17th and we discussed that. Did we not?

THE COURT: We did. We had a status conference yes.

DEFENDANT CLOUD: Did I file charges? No, I did not.

MR. TATE: Mr. Cloud, I have to step in, and I have some concerns about Mr. Cloud. You know, I'm not trying to cut off his allocution. I think the Court has given him a chance to allocute, but part of the difficulties in this case is -- and more recently is that Mr. Cloud's -- how can I put it, his memory or take of what things happened don't always jive with the way I recall things, and some of that appears to be coming out now.

THE COURT: Well, the essence of that pleading was to make sure you could continued your representation.

MR. TATE: It had nothing to do with charges against Mr. Meyers. I don't understand. He made that reference --

THE COURT: Well, I think there's a reference in

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that letter to both ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. And -- but the one I was concerned about of course was ineffective assistance of counsel because I didn't want to proceed to sentencing with him making a allegation. I can't specifically remember the letter, but if there is a reference to prosecutorial misconduct in there, I would have let that pass at that time because there's an appropriate time for that to be raised and it wasn't for purposes of sentencing, particularly since he was represented by you, Mr. Tate, and I knew you had the responsibility to file such a motion if you thought there was one justifying it.

So the November 17th meeting was a status conference called by this Court with regard to whether you can continue to represent him, you and Mr. Tate continue to represent Mr. Cloud. We all agree that would be appropriate. And you've done a vigorous job on behalf of your client.

Mr. Cloud, go on and finish -- unless Mr. Tate, your advising your client that he should stop.

MR. TATE: I advised him, but, of course, he has an absolute right to allocute, and so I don't want that to be an issue.

THE COURT: It is. It's up to you. Mr. Cloud, you may continue or you may not.

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DEFENDANT CLOUD: I just have some things on my mind because I feel that I have been unjustly treated.

Okay. And I really do.

With the whole real estate thing, I really feel that I have been singled out. I really do. And with that Mr. Tate, has done an excellent job in defending me and I thank him for that.

But I think the prosecution has gone overboard, really overboard in fulfilling of it's mission that they say what to do. And that's to put me in the jail for the rest of my life. That's what they had in front of five officers in a meeting. Mr. Tate was there. Five prosecutors, two postal people.

THE COURT: All right. Anything else, Mr. Cloud?

DEFENDANT CLOUD: Yes, sir.

Some of those deals were not fraudulent. A lot of them were not fraudulent. There was no fraudulent data in them. A lot of those homes, my sister's home is -- was not foreclosed. 1605 Bellguard Avenue not for foreclosed. You saw Bhula White on the screen here. That was not foreclosed on. 8601 First Front Court, that's where my sister lived. That's never been foreclosed. A lot of these properties are not foreclosed.

So my point is that information is inaccurate.

Okay. And I did statistics in school also, and I listened

to those reports and lot of them are inaccurate based on what the government gave. So with that I'll sit down. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Cloud.

All right, Mr. Meyers, Mr. Randall.

MR. MEYERS: Thank you, Your Honor.

I'd like to address first disparity arguments since that was the argument that was spent the most time on by defense counsel.

As the government notes in its memo, there's really two reasons here why there's a disparity: One, which is 5K. The second one, depends on the information available at the time of the guilty plea.

The government and Ken Bill, Ken Strong and William Phillips came to plead guilty it was 2003. We simply didn't know that much. Same is true for Don Henderson; the same was true wore Michael Bryant. It gets worse for a defendant the more information that is known. Those defendants were sentenced on less than the full amount of information. That was the strategic choice they made in the judgment of their lawyers.

That's recognized as being perfectly proper, in fact, occurring in nearly ever case. The Fourth Circuit, United States v. Pierce, which is cited at page 74 of the Government's Sentencing Memorandum. There the Fourth

Circuit said, "The defendant and his co-conspirators are not similarity situated. The defendant was sentenced based on all the evidence adduced at trial, while the co-conspirators plead guilty and were sentenced based on the government's stipulation and the information available prior to trial. The district court was required to make a reasonable estimate of loss given the available information, and the quality of that information changed over time."

That's simply what happened here. The Defendant Cloud was based upon all the information, because when you get ready for trial, you find out about more bad conduct for the defendant. That's what happened in this case, in addition to the 5K motions made by the Court.

THE COURT: Well, 5K motions and Rule 35 motions made by the government, the Court's denied them.

MR. MEYERS: If I do that again, please --

THE COURT: I don't think you need to recite that portion of your memorandum that reminds the Court of the case law supporting how, over time, during the course of investigation, loss amounts get more severe, drug amounts get more severe, whatever the amount is because during the investigation the government learns more.

I'd like to you focus on Mr. Cloud's assertion that he turned in Mr. Bryant and Mr. Bell, or Bill, Mr. Ken Bill; that he wrote a letter to the Internal Revenue

Service.

MR. MEYERS: There's simply no evidence of that, Your Honor. I think I would have seen it before now. I think it's simply a flat misrepresentation to the Court at this point.

MR. MEYERS: I think, Your Honor, to the extent that that allegation was made, I believe with counsel early on -- not that allegation but a similar allegation, namely, when he was -- he said, "Listen. I'm the victim here. Look at my own house, which Michael Bryant flipped to me," which is No. 2 on the list of transactions of the Presentence Report. And all that was is the defendant himself serving for one transaction as the straw buyer. Had all the same elements of fraud as all of these, and it was one of the ways in which the defendant learned the scheme. It marked the beginning of his partnership with Michael Bryant in this case.

So I think the Court should simply give no credibility to that. With the defendant, I think we would have heard evidence of that. If it's true, it's quite a serious allegation. It's simply not true. What the defendant did was serve as straw buyer for the second house in time that is involved in the conspiracy here.

THE COURT: He said that a year later he was

1 | interviewed by the Internal Revenue Service.

2 MR. MEYERS: There's no evidence of that, Your 3 Honor. I don't believe that to be true.

THE COURT: But the service agent that's here is a special agent or a revenue agent?

MR. MEYERS: Special agent. He's not here anymore, Your Honor. He was a special agent.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. MEYERS: He is a special agent. He was here.

THE COURT: He was here and is a special agent.

All right. So at least, based on your knowledge of his knowledge of the services involved in this investigation, you were unaware of any representative of the Internal Revenue Service interviewing the defendant, I guess, 2003 time frame?

MR. MEYERS: That is correct. In fact, the IRS is not involved in this case. IRS special agent is here because he works a lot of mortgage fraud cases.

THE COURT: So he came here for training.

MR. MEYERS: Yes, sir. It's continuing education for them. The IRS was simply not involved in this case, Your Honor. So I think the court should give that statement of the defendant no credence, like many of the other false statements, which I'm prepared to prove just a couple of them now, Your Honor.

I mean, the suggestion that there's nothing wrong with what he did, and I thought he was about to say that he made mistakes, and he said his mistake, if the Court recalled, was that he trusted his co-conspirators. The evidence directed to the contrary.

The evidence was that this was the defendant directing and leading this organization. He went to them. They were all consistent.

What he says is simply not true. I'd like to play for the Court now the additional victim impact statements which we didn't play earlier. It's about 14 minutes, Your Honor. And I'll play that. I think it's directly relevant. And one of the reasons I want to do that, Your Honor, this is the impact to the buyers on their lives.

There's one buyer in here, Gabriel Brown, who is in 2005. 2005 borrower. I'll point out to the Court in her memorandum of interview in her documents it's the one the Court found the conspiracy continued in 2005. The defendant suggested earlier he found out that was fraudulent in 2003, and what his wife's MOI, which is in the Presentence Report, what the other MOI's after that time period cite, is he mostly shifted his operation to Atlanta. That's what he did when he supposedly found out it was fraudulent.

And the idea that you can find out a scheme is fraudulent after years of forging signatures, creating tax

returns, falsifying -- even lease agreements is the one thing he will admit, I guess because they have his fax header he the top -- filling out false statements, making false promises over and over again is simply absurd, and is a flat misrepresentation to this court, which is particularly egregious after two weeks of testimony to the contrary.

MR. TATE: Your Honor, we object to playing impact statements. These people testified at trial. It's cumulative. The hour's late.

THE COURT: I understand your concern for the time, but I believe I have a legal obligation under the Justice for All Act to consider all victim impact statements. And I apologize to all the Court staff and all everyone in the courtroom, but I believe I necessarily should hear these videotape impact statements. And even if law didn't mandate that I do hear them, I think in my discretion I want to hear them also.

MR. TATE: Just so my point is clear, we don't consider any of the straw buyers to be victimized if they are identified co-conspirators. Our position remains the same; they can't be both.

THE COURT: No. No, some of these are investors, like the last couple of these are investors like the 2006 transaction, right? Mr. Meyer?

1 MR. MEIER: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: But not --

3 MR. MEYERS: 2005.

THE COURT: Are all of them investors?

MR. MEYERS: Yes, Your Honor.

both co-conspirators and victims at the same time. And the victimization ultimately to them is in many cases extremely severe. So I definitely want to here this. And I believe the Justice for All Act requires that when the government's deeming the victims, I believe I have to hear it. Even if I didn't hear it, I want to hear it. Go ahead.

(Videotape played.)

MR. MEYERS: Judge, this is just some of the victim impact evidence that the Court heard during trial from Rodney Thompson. The Court will recall he was attempting to support his parents buying a house nearby.

Mr. Thompson was forced into bankruptcy, the houses went into foreclosure, and stories like this go on and on and on.

The losses are not just to these individuals, they are not just to the banks, they are not just to the financial markets, they are not just to the neighborhoods, they are also to these individuals.

Your Honor, the defendant, William Cloud, got up and said to this Court that he learned in 2003 what he was

doing as fraudulent. And you see him doing it over and over and over again, all the way through 2005, even one attempt we found in the January 2006.

His co-defendants had plead guilty. They were awaiting sentencing. The defendant, Cloud, simply moved to another jurisdiction and found new victims, new ways to defraud, and kept on with the scheme.

I'd like to show the Court what is in the

Presentence Report as Document 215-5, page 54 of 186. It's

one of the attachments to the Presentence Report. It is a

Memorandum of Interview of Ms. Brown. It is SA4B for

purposes of the government's sentencing exhibits.

I point out to the Court Mr. Brown's interview found under 2007, we were preparing for trial. She said, "Like the other straw buyer's print-off, Cloud did all the paperwork for her financing. He hold her if she didn't have a 1099, he would provide one." Cloud told her to and she completed income verification form in which she -- which Cloud indicated she made \$70,000 a year. That's not, in fact, true. In the Greene Financial, Cloud told her to just go along with it and agree with everything the loan officer said when the loan officer called to verify.

Ms. Brown said she asked Cloud why she didn't say she lived in the home. He said, "Just do it," and she would get at cheaper interest rate. Cloud told her they were a

good investment. He promised her that they would put the renters in the homes. She could sell the homes for a profit where he would buy them and she wouldn't have to spend any money on her own. This was again 6332 Thelo Drive; 2317 Jordi Way. He didn't even give her the keys. The first closing was at Dan Greene's office.

Your Honor this is some of the conduct in 2005. Cloud paid everything, and he gave her the kickback check for \$16,000. Met her in the parking lot. She said that Cloud was shading it, and Cloud said, "Don't worry, everybody is doing it." After telling this Court that he found out this was fraudulent in 2003, he's doing this in 2005. She never intended to live in the home nor did she ever talked about she wanted to live in them; she falsely said they were going to be her primary residence.

The Defendant Cloud also told this Court that a bunch of these houses he said weren't fraud. For example, my sister's house. Since that's the example he used, we will show that example to the Court.

The documents are in the Presentence Report.

Ms. Horton was interviewed by the Postal Inspection Service, attachment to the Presentence Report, it's Document 215-3, page 50 of 152 where that interview report starts in the Presentence Report. I'll show the Court, I believe it's at 17B.

She said she was William Cloud's sister. She had talked to him about getting houses. He convinced her to do it. She said throughout the transaction she thought he was just the middle man. She didn't even realize he was the seller. He flipped a house to her. She didn't even realize it.

Taking to you page 2 of this exhibit, he gave her a kickback for the house, and she cried when she reviewed HUD-1 Settlement Statement for the first half of the flip, realizing that her brother had sold her a house that he bought the same day for \$51,000 and sold to her for \$70,000.

This is the example he chooses to present to this Court of how a lot of these weren't fraudulent, example which, for lack of a better word, he screwed his own sister with this fraud.

It wasn't just the people from the churches it wasn't just the Filipino America community, he did it to his own family, which is exactly why there's nobody behind him today at this sentencing hearing. He preyed on everyone in pursuit of his own greed, Your Honor.

The loan application for his sister indicated that she had rented the home on 8601 First Front Court for eight years. It's not true. They owned the house and had been living there only for a few months.

Page 3. They didn't provide the cash deposit that

was listed there. They didn't own a car that was listed on the loan occupation. They never had any intention of occupying as a primary residency and it said they did.

The cashier's check with her in the remitter line, they didn't purchase the check nor did she provide funds for the transaction.

Your Honor, this is yet another example of the defendant, when he's asked to allocute, and to say what he says about his crimes, he blames it on the mortgage brokers, he is blames it on the banks, he blames it on the attorneys, he blames it on the brokers, he blames it on the prosecutor. No one is responsible for this crime -- Mr. Cloud says he's not responsible for this crime, yet everyone else is responsible for it. Yet he preys on all those communities that trusted him.

These straw buyers said over and over again that the worst thing about this wasn't just how much money I lost, getting sued, going into bankruptcy, losing house after house, it changed their entire outlook on the world. They don't trust people anymore.

To have someone like that, a friend, a family member prey on you, victimize you like that, and to lose your trust for everyone, that's something the defendant Cloud stole in addition to money. He stole their trust, Your Honor.

He said, "There's nothing at all wrong with what I did." It shows to the Court that the defendant, Cloud, will do this again.

There are other examples in the 2005 memorandums of interview. I point the Court to Allen Thompson. He's some of the few last transactions. His MOI is in the Presentence Report. I think the Court has likely reviewed it. Again the same story in 2005. I will present it to the Court very briefly.

At S87B, this is in the Presentence Report at Document 215-5, page 91 of 186. Allen Thompson purchased two houses. These houses are listed in the attachment of Presentence Report as No. 86 and No. 87 and No. 90. They are in 2005, Your Honor.

Allen Thompson, in 2005, after Mr. Cloud had told the Court he learned that the scheme was fraudulent, said Cloud was the middleman. He purchased those three properties. He was getting a \$20,000 kickback up front for each property purchased.

Page 2. Cloud told him his partners would pay the difference between the mortgage and the rent. He was in partnership with these individuals. They paid the down payment. They came in with a cashier's check. Prior to all them, Cloud told them to say he was going to live in the house. Cloud told them.

Dan Greene was on the application. He didn't have a Wachovia account. He received payment again for these closings.

I'm not going to belabor this, but the statement to the Court by the defendant is unbelievable; that he learned this was fraudulent 2003, and then it stopped. All he did was cover his tracks by removing to a different jurisdiction. That's what makes him the worst person in this entire case. That's what makes him the person who is the most incorrigible, the most reprehensible, the most guilty because he kept this on.

He was in it from the very beginning and he was in it way after everyone except for Dan Greene and him had stopped, all the way through 2005. The defendant Cloud kept on and kept on.

Your Honor, I am asking the Court to impose a sentence of 360 months imprisonment. It is the equivalent of going one level above the Guideline range here. I believe it's appropriate, because if the Court does not impose that sentence that's above the Guideline range, it takes into account not at all the victimization of all the borrowers, because there's nowhere accounted for it in the Presentence Report or in the Guidelines. The Guidelines don't address that. They don't address robbing someone of trust, except for the abuse of trust issue which this Court

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has declined to apply under the Guidelines. The Court may address it, however, in its sentencing with an upward variance.

It doesn't address \$80 million of loss in the neighborhoods, and really it doesn't address any loss to the neighborhoods because those losses to the neighborhoods change the Guidelines not at all. He was already at \$10 million above the next level.

The losses to the neighborhoods, victimization of straw buyers, the reprehensible conduct all the way through 2005, those dictate a sentence that is that high.

The Defendant Cloud played on churches. He played on Filipino Americans. He created the documents. He was the leader.

I ask the Court most of all to impose that sentence, 360 months, for that deterrence purposes, not just to address this defendant, who is the worst of the worst, but also to address the terms of this.

The mortgage fraud is at an all time high.

There's case after case cited in the Government's

Memorandum, which says that white-color criminals like

Cloud, and the ones that follow him, look to see the

cost/benefit analysis of infusion in the fraud. They look

to see the probability that they'll get caught. And the

Court can see we can only handle so many of these cases. We

just can't get to them. We don't have the resources. It takes forever to prosecute them. The Beazer Homes investigation is ongoing. It's simply not true that no one will be prosecuted for that case. All we've done is settle with the company itself. Investigation is ongoing.

It takes a lot of resources. It takes a foreclosure and a lot of complaints to even find out one of these mortgage fraud cases is going on.

The probability of detection and the prosecution is quite low for those engaging in mortgage fraud. And example of a bank robber is a good one, because those are folks who routinely go to jail for 30 years for one transaction in which they steal a few thousand dollars.

The defendant, Cloud, with greed as his only motive, robbed dozens and dozens of banks with lies and with a scheme that was much more intricate and much more thought out, and he had every the opportunity to make a living the right way. With a master's degree, with all of his abilities, the defendant, Cloud, had the opportunity to live his life the right way. Instead, for a six-year period, six years of ongoing activity, the defendant, Cloud, engaged in fraud.

Judge Posner writes that raising the price of crime will reduce its incidence, and I would ask this court to raise the price of mortgage fraud. That this sentence

for this defendant was more deserving than any other defendant.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Meyers.

Mr. Cloud, there's three-step process the Court must work through in determining the appropriate -- you don't need to stand up yet, but I'm just explaining the legal process that the Court is going to go through.

Through this three-step process this Court must go through in determining the appropriate and reasonable sentence in your case. This three-step process was set forth by the U. S. Supreme Court in a series of decisions starting with the decision of *United States v. Booker*. The first step in that process is determining the advisory Guideline range that applies in your specific case.

As you are aware, a few moments ago, after almost a full day of testimony and hearing, the Court concluded that the appropriate Guideline range in your case was 262 to 327 months. Now, that is the starting point of analysis. It is not necessarily the ending point.

The second step is to determine if a statutory minimum sentence applies in your case.

You have been convicted of multiple counts, but none of those counts have a statutory minimum sentence.

Several of the counts have a 30-year maximum sentence. The Court can sentence you literally to several hundred years of

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imprisonment, but the Court does not intend to do that today. But there's no minimum sentence that Congress has mandated that the Court must sentence you too.

The third, and by far the most important step the Court must follow in determining the appropriate and reasonable sentence in your case is to apply a series of sentencing factors that are set forth in Title 18, United States Code, Section 3553(a). And you've heard both those attorneys today discuss those factors at different times, and I'm sure Mr. Tate has discussed the sentencing factors with you.

The Court is going to go through the sentencing factors in your case and discuss how they apply in both determining aggravated factors in the analysis of your criminal conduct.

These sentencing factors were set forth by

Congress to guide courts in fashioning an appropriate and
reasonable sentence that's sufficient but not greater than
necessary to accomplish all the goals of sentencing. The
first sentencing factor the Court wants to consider is the
nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of you, the defendant.

This is, as the Court has already found as a matter of fact earlier today, a sophisticated criminal offense. It's one that required an extraordinary amount of

organization. It requires someone with a charismatic personality. It requires someone who can convince those who have licenses to practice law or to prepare real estate appraisals or to work in mortgage brokerage operations, requires many people with fiduciary duties to breach their fiduciary duties and their ethical obligation under their license to practice, much less criminal law.

I know it's your assertion that you were taking the guidance of those who were licensed and trained in these areas, but the record evidence shows that you were the one with the talent and the ability and the charismatic personality to bring all the players together. You built your transactions on a series of falsehood and lies.

Fraudulent statements, the false statements varied from transaction to transaction, but there was fraud in every single transaction that you put together. And whether this was a fraudulent lease agreement or whether it was a fraudulent statement on a loan application as to whether someone was a resident, owner/occupant versus being an investor, whether it was a fraudulent statement on a HUD-1 about who was providing the down payment, you were directly or indirectly involved in all those false statements.

It was a sophisticated and cunning operation, and you were really at the center of all the fraud on each and everyone of these transactions.

And you also prayed upon friends, and the Court has just seen the videotapes of some of your friends, many in the Filipino America community. You also targeted members of certain churches, and you hired recruiters to target those individuals, and once some of these properties started to go into foreclosure and you received complaints from the investors or what you call customers, you disregarded them in many cases and allowed the properties to go into foreclosure. And, therefore, your customer/investors lost their credit worthiness, financial institutions lost money from their loans, and the ultimate impact was broad-based.

The victimization was more than just the immediate victims, but as we spent most of the day discussing, it involved the neighborhood. It involved loss of property taxes. It involved cost to the community of additional services, such as law enforcement support, social services when abandon houses become the cesspools for criminal activity. And good neighborhoods lost some of their peace and tranquility when abandoned homes became the center of problems for those communities. The nature and circumstance of this offense are absolutely grave and broad-reaching.

And your history and characteristics also are troubling to the Court.

One, that you acknowledged earlier in your

allocution, Mr. Meyers pointed out, you said you had found out in 2003 what you were doing was fraudulent. Well, why didn't you stop? You said you changed preparing lease agreements and things like that that were fraudulent, but if you really knew in 2003 that what you were doing was wrong, you should have stopped cold and not just slightly changed what you were doing.

But it also goes back to something that the Court finds troubling. You have had problems with the law before in a lesser agree; you had problems with the law while you were in the Air Force, at that time once again it was fraudulent statements. It wasn't reckless behavior, getting drunken and in a brawl, which is not acceptable conduct but it is a conduct more related to someone in their teens or early 20s; it was false statements. It was fraudulent statements on travel vouchers. And fast-forward to 1999, and you're doing it again. And there was a gap there in time, but it's still crimes of veracity, crimes of truthfulness.

So your history and characteristics don't defend you. They show that you've lied on forms before and you were willing to do it starting in 1999, and you did it for many years. And although you have no criminal history points, it's very hard to view you as a first-time offender because every time you committed a fraudulent transaction,

you were committing an individual substantive crime; you just didn't get prosecuted for it. So you did this for many, many years, and finally it all caught up with you in this indictment, in this multiple indictment. The ultimate indictment of prosecution I think was the second superseding indictment. So the first sentencing factor weighs heavily against you.

The next sentencing factor is the need for the Court to impose a sentence that reflects the seriousness of the defense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense.

The Court's not going to restate all the things it just went through in discussing nature and circumstances of the offense. But just to say that all of those things also apply to the seriousness of this offense. The pervasive victimization of your crime just shows how serious this crime is. The immediate victims, the neighborhood victims, the victims in the broader community, the local government that has loss of tax revenues and an increase in governmental support of the victimized neighborhood, and ultimately, to an immeasurable degree, you contributed to the mortgage collapse that happened in 2008. Although that's not at all measurable, and it's -- the problem with our credit markets in 2008 is we lent money to people who couldn't afford it. And you facilitated the lending of

money to those who couldn't afford to borrow the money and sustain debt servicing on their actual residence and the residence they were investing in.

The need to promote respect for the law.

Real estate transactions, real estate closings have so many licensed individuals around them because I think public policy dictates those be honest transactions because there's so much put at risk in those transactions. Not only the money from the financial institutions, but it's also the people who are buying the property. And they are heavily regulated. And they have lawyers, they have real estate appraisers, they have mortgage brokers, all these individuals so they can be honest transactions. And you used your talent and ability to undermined the lawful structure of those closings. So there's an absolute need for this Court to impose a sentence that promotes respect for the law.

And the Court wants to point out that your motive was greed. You weren't trying to help others. The fact that in your allocution you talked about your sister's property, and then Mr. Meyers points out that your sister was in tears when she learned that you flipped a property on her. You didn't have respect for the law and you didn't have respect for the individuals you brought to these transactions.

And to provide just punishment for the offense.

It's always hard to exactly determine what's just punishment for any offense because it is a sentence -- the government says you deserve a 30-year sentence, and the Sentencing Guidelines aren't quite to 30 years.

Is there a real difference for you between a 30-year sentence and a sentencing in the Sentencing Guidelines because of your age? I'm not sure. Because either one is such a lengthy sentence based on your age, they might be de facto life sentences. So it's hard for the Court to measure specifically in your case a just punishment because as a gentleman in your early 60s, any sentence over a decade or so is a sentence that might be life imprisonment for you.

Nonetheless, the Court believes that you deserve a very serious and lengthy punishment, and that if the sentence the Court imposes is a de facto life sentence, even if it's not an actual life sentence, that's still a just punishment.

And I want to add to that the criticism you gave of Mr. Meyers a few minutes ago when you alleged that somewhere during the negotiation process when you chose not to enter a plea, you felt that he threatened you with a life sentence.

The reality is when you entered this courtroom

today, these Sentencing Guidelines calculations were a 360 -- well, the Presentence Report recommended 360 months to life. The government's proposal in one of its memorandum suggested an offense level of 45, which would have been mandatory life, and you aren't far from there in the calculations.

"you are facing life imprisonment," there was no misrepresentation whatsoever if he, in fact, said that. I don't know if he actually said that. But if he did, the fact that if he said that, that certainly is a very possible -- could have been, and might still be, a possibility for you, and if the Court sentences you to an actual time versus life imprisonment, it may be a de facto term of imprisonment anyway.

I found it disingenuous when you attacked Mr.

Meyers earlier, and I think whether he said that or not, it is not improper for a prosecutor to estimate that the Sentencing Guidelines could result in life imprisonment when it seems to be a plausible calculation based on the record before this Court.

The next sentencing factor the Court needs to consider is the need for the sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct.

That is what we refer to as general deterrence.

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The Court needs to impose a sentence that tells others who have not committed mortgage fraud of how horrendous mortgage fraud is as a crime. The Court needs to deter others from getting involved in such criminal conduct for a variety of reasons. Not only does it impact our financial institutions and impact our neighborhood, but it also, as Mr. Meyers pointed out, is a crime that's hard to detect.

The crime is detected frequently months, and in a couple instances in your case years after the crime occurred, only after the property goes into foreclosure and there's some collapse of the property, the debt services stops and a foreclosure start occurs, and then maybe the financial institution sells it or someone sells it in a form of foreclosure. The point is it's a crime that's hard to detect. So that's another reason, in addition to the extraordinary victimization, where the Court needs to deter others from getting involved in this type of criminal conduct.

The Court also needs to impose a sentence to protect the public from further crimes of you. We call that specific deterrence; specifically deterring you.

The Court was trying to be sympathetic to you earlier in your allocution, but the Court did not hear any remorse in your voice. The Court heard you pointing fingers as everybody else, pointing one at Mr. Meyers, pointing at

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Mr. Bryant and Mr. Bell -- or Bill, rather; attacking
Mr. Greene. You just didn't seem to either care or
understand that you were facilitating large amounts of
fraud. You were substantially benefiting, making more money
off of each transaction than anyone else, and then sending
these properties into foreclosure and disrepair, and having
a pervasive deterioration of the property, and then, of
course, deterioration of the neighborhood.

So the Court really does believe you need to be -you, personally, need to be deterred from further criminal
conduct and a lengthy sentence is necessary to do that.

The Court also needs to impose a sentence that it considers needed rehabilitation in the most effective manner.

The Court believes you are an educated gentlemen, very articulate gentleman. You're obviously a very smart gentleman. The Court believes you will receive educational and vocational opportunity within the Federal Bureau of Prisons. Also, the Court doesn't believe the sentence is going to have much impact on your rehabilitation, because you already are a gentleman of some years, and although you're not elderly at all, you are over 60, and when you are released from the Bureau of Prisons, you will probably be ---you will probably be too old to work a traditional job.

But nonetheless, the Court believes the Bureau of

Prisons will provide you rehabilitation opportunities, and hopefully you can survive your sentence and take advantage of those rehabilitation opportunities.

The Court wants to also discuss in detail the sentencing factor of avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparity amount similarity situated defendants.

You argue, and Mr. Tate argued, that you are unjustly punished, or are facing a lengthy punishment far more severe than you co-conspirators, and Mr. Tate's core argument is because you executed your constitutional right to a trial.

The Court does not dispute that you exercised your constitutional right to trial. The Court does not dispute that the fact you have not admitted your guilt, and you've delayed acknowledging your guilt, and even to this day you believe generally you are not guilty, then that has had an impact on your Sentencing Guideline calculation and had a impact on this Court's view of your sentence.

The question, though, is not how long your sentence is; whether it's an unwarranted sentencing disparity among similarity situated, and I underline "unwarranted sentencing disparity."

The Court believes the sentence you will receive is far more severe than virtually all your codefendants but that's a warranted sentencing disparity. Because you

haven't shown remorse, because you facilitated these transactions, because you preyed on friends and family members, because the damage from your criminal conduct was far more pervasive than just the foreclosure of one home, because you have not assisted the government in preventing this criminal conduct, all of these support a far more serious sentence than your co-conspirators.

There's also, as Mr. Meyers pointed out, the chronology of this investigation.

The earliest defendants admitted their guilt in 2003. Even after some of your co-conspirators were acknowledging they were involved in criminal conduct, you were still in criminal conduct.

The government had a limited database or a certain body of evidence in 2003. It used that evidence to prosecute the individuals that it was targeting at that time then. And after they cooperated, the body of evidence of the government grew, and over time the government learned more about the damage and more about the individual rolls of each of the players, and through that term of the investigation, the evidence suggested you were a far more serious co-conspirator. And you still continued, knowing there was an investigation around you, you still continued to participant.

The government's information and evidence just got

stronger, and the amount of criminal conduct you were involved in became more clearer. And because you, even to this day, haven't acknowledged any wrongfulness, the government has taken all the evidence it's collected over a five to six years of investigation and used it in presenting it's evidence to the probation officer, and then presenting it's evidence to this Court. And that's why you're facing a far more severe sentence than your co-conspirators. That's why it's a legitimate sentencing disparity, and why this Court intends to hand down a sentence today that you will hear in a few moments that is lengthy and severe, and is justified by virtually every sentencing factor under 3553(a).

The Court also notes that it's going to impose a sentence -- a restitution judgment, which is also a sentencing factor. That will be part of, of course, the judgment, and it is mandated under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act.

All right. The Court has considered all of the sentencing factors in Title 18, United States Code, Section 3553(a). The Court has gone through some detail on virtually all those sentencing factors, explaining how it impacts the Court's reasoning today.

The Court is about to state a sentence that it believes is sufficient but not greater than necessary to

accomplish the goals of all those sentencing factors. The Court would invite the attorneys to listen to the proposed sentence before it's actually imposed, so if there's a legal reason why it should not be imposed, you can so advise.

The Court proposes the following sentence:

Pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and United States v. Booker, it is the judgment of the Court, having considered the factors noted in 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a), that the defendant, William Roosevelt Cloud, is hereby committed to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a term 60 months open Count One; 324, three-two-four, months on each of Counts Two through Twelve, Fifteen through Eighteen and Twenty-Five; and 240 months on each of Counts Twenty-Seven through Three-Three, all counts to be served concurrently, for a total of 324 months.

It is further ordered that the defendant be required to support all dependents from prison earnings while incarcerated as outlined in the Presentence Report.

Upon release from imprisonment, the defendant shall be placed on supervised release for a term of three years. This term consists of terms of three years on each count, all such terms to run concurrently.

Within 72 hours of release from the custody of the Bureau of Prisons, the defendant shall report in person to the Probation Office to the district to which the defendant

is released. While on supervised release, the defendant shall not commit another federal, state or local crime, and shall comply with the standard conditions that have been adopted by the Court in Western District of North Carolina. And shall comply with the following additional conditions: Periodic drug testing mandated by the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 is hereby suspended. The Court finds this offense is not drug related, and the defendant has no current or past history of substance abuse.

It is further ordered the defendant shall pay the United States a special assessment of \$2,400.

The Court finds the defendant does not have the ability to pay a fine or interest. The Court having considered the factors noted in 18 U.S.C. 3572(a) will waive payment of a fine and interest in this case.

It is further ordered having considered the factors noted in 18 U.S.C., Section 3572(a), that the defendant shall reimburse United States for court-appointed attorney's fees.

It is further ordered having considered -- having determined the amount of restitution owed to each victim, that the defendant shall make restitution as directed to the following victims in the following amounts:

To Chase Home Finance, \$542,676.17.

First Tennessee Bank, \$29,509.92.

To Wilshire Credit Corporation, \$16,169.80.

First Horizon Home Loans, \$42,021.82.

To Alterna Mortgage, \$21,000. And the defendant is jointly and severally liable with Michael Dwayne Bryant, case 3:05CR330, for that 21,000.

First Guaranty, \$39,768.91. And once again, the defendant is jointly and severally with Michael Dwayne Bryant for that 39,000.

Alterna Mortgage Company, a second time, for \$51,450. And the Court notes that the defendant is jointly and severally liable with Donald Henderson, case 3:04CR236, for that sum of \$51,450.

Finally, to Southstar Funding, LLC, or whatever entity it now controls Southstar Funding, or the bankruptcy trustee that controls Southstar Funding, because it has been in bankruptcy, for the sum of \$137,444.83. The defendant is jointly and severally liable with Kenneth Strong, case 3:03CR216, for that 137,000 sum.

Now, any payment made that is not payment in full shall be divided proportionately among the victims named. The defendant is jointly and severally liable with the co-defendant for the total amount of restitution. Although that might be a moot point in this particular case -- no, I take that back, only Ms. Russell has passed away.

PROBATION OFFICER: That's correct.

THE COURT: Now, payment of the criminal monetary penalties shall be due and payment immediately. The Court has considered the financial and other information contained in the Presentence Report, and finds the following is feasible: If the defendant is unable to pay any monetary penalty immediately, during the period of imprisonment payments shall be made through the Bureau of Prisons Inmate Financial Responsibility Program.

Upon release from imprisonment, any remaining balance shall be paid in monthly installments of no less than \$150 to commence within 60 days after release from imprisonment until paid in full.

Throughout the period of supervision the Probation Officer shall monitor the defendant's economic circumstances and report to the Court, with recommendations as warranted, any material changes that affect the defendant's ability to pay any court-ordered penalties.

Now, I ask counsel if there's any legal reason why the sentence should not be imposed as stated?

MR. MEYERS: I think there's a technical correction the Court needs to make. The Court ordered 324 months as to Counts Two through Twelve. I think the Court did that because Counts Two through Four are mail fraud charges, and, in fact, they do effect a financial institution. However, the indictment I believe did not

allege they affected a financial institution.

THE COURT: I see what you're saying. So those are five years --

MR. MEYERS: 20 years, Your Honor. I believe the Court should correct its sentence so Counts Two through Four are a sentence of 240 months, and beginning with Count Five, that would be 324 months.

THE COURT: You are correct. Okay.

The Court amends its sentence to say that Counts
Two through Four result in 240 months on each those counts,
in addition to Counts Twenty-Seven through Thirty-Three.

MR. MEYERS: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. Thank you very much for clarifying that.

Mr. Tate, is there anything illegal about that sentence? I know you've reserved your right to appeal your objections, but is there anything illegal about the sentence?

MR. TATE: Other than what we've already objected to, no.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Now, before the Court goes forward, the Court also wants to make an alternative ruling.

Both parties have asked the Court to vary from the Sentencing Guidelines. The Court obviously has denied the

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variance upward made by the government and the variance downward made by the defendant. The Court believes

324 months is, under the sentencing factors, the correct sentence. That is the Court's belief that this is the appropriate and reasonable sentence. This is the sentence that considered all the sentencing factors thoroughly, and it's a sentence that is sufficient but not greater than necessary to accomplish the goals of sentencing.

Therefore, the Court hands down this alternative If the U. S. Court of Appeals of the Fourth sentence: Circuit were to determine that this Court either improperly as a matter of law applied the Sentencing Guidelines or was clearly erroneous in any of it's findings of fact, and, therefore, the Sentencing Guideline calculation were either to go up because the Court did not find the amount the government requested, or to go down because the defense has shown that the Court applied a calculation improperly, increased the offense level improperly, the Court alternatively varies upwardly or downwardly as from the Sentencing Guideline range determined by the Fourth Circuit, and reaches a sentence of 324 months as the total sentence, with the sentence as previously set as to each count, and all the other terms of the alternative sentence are the same as the primary sentence.

So the Court has sentenced both within the

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Guidelines and outside the Guidelines by variance if the Fourth Circuit were to determine the Court miscalculated the Guidelines.

Mr. Cloud, please stand again.

Sir, you may appeal your conviction if you believe that the verdict was somehow unlawful, if you believe there was some defect in your trial.

You also have a right to appeal your sentence, particularly if you think the sentence is contrary to law. Now, any notice of appeal must be filed within ten days from the date of written judgment in this case. This court usually hands down written judgment one to two weeks after this sentencing hearing. I do want to say, because we're coming up on the holiday season, the written judgment in your case might not be handed down within two to two weeks, it might be hand down in January. Nonetheless, whenever the written judgment is handed down, you have ten days.

Now if you were unable to pay the cost of an appeal, you may apply for leave to appeal at no cost to you. If you so request, the clerk of court will prepare and file a notice of appeal on your behalf. The Court recommends that you talk in detail with Mr. Tate about these appeal rights and procedures.

And do you understand these appeal rights and procedures as the Court has stated them to you today?

DEFENDANT CLOUD: Yes, sir, I understand them, and 1 2 we do appeal. THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 3 All right. Is there anything else from counsel? 4 5 Mr. Tate, there any reason to maintain your witnesses here in the Mecklenburg County? 6 7 MR. TATE: No, Your Honor. THE COURT: They can be -- the writs can be 8 9 released? MR. TATE: 10 Yes. THE COURT: The Court orders that those writs be 11 12 released, and the U. S. Marshal Service return the defendant to the custody -- not the defendants, the witnesses. 13 14 Mr. Tate, I should have asked: Would your client 15 like a recommendation designation? 16 MR. TATE: Yes. We'd asked for the Butner Medical 17 Facility if he qualifies with the sentence he got. But if he qualifies, for that facility. 18 19 THE COURT: Certainly. The Court will recommend 20 to the U. S. Bureau of Prisons that the defendant be 21 designated to the medical facility Butner if he qualifies, 22 and if he doesn't qualify, to Butner anyway or to another 23 medical facility. To Butner.

MR. TATE: Yes. Thank you.

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THE COURT: Anything else from the United States?

CECALA - CROSS 1 MR. MEYERS: No, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. Then the sentence as 2 3 stated, as well as the alternative sentence, is hereby imposed and this case is concluded. 4 I thank all counsel and all court personnel for 5 staying so late, but I do believe that the appropriate thing 6 7 to do today was to finish this case so that all the parties are here and the experts are here and their witnesses that 8 9 were brought here from the BOP. So thank you very much, and 10 we're now in recess. (Court adjourned 9:20 p.m.) 11 12 13 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 14 WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA 15 16 CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER 17 I, JOY KELLY, RPR, CRR, certify that the foregoing 18 is a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in 19 the above-entitled matter. 20 21 22 S/JOY KELLY 23 JOY KELLY, RPR, CRR Date U.S. Official Court Reporter 24 Charlotte, North Carolina

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